- Nonreductive physicalism and the limits of the exclusion principle.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):475-502.details
|
|
Agent-Causation Revisited: Origination and Contemporary Theories of Free Will.Thad Botham - 2008 - Berlin, Germany: Verlag D Müller.details
|
|
Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
|
|
Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will.Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.) - 2023 - Wiley.details
|
|
Responsibility Without Freedom? Folk Judgements About Deliberate Actions.Tillmann Vierkant, Robert Deutschländer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & John-Dylan Haynes - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10 (1133):1--6.details
|
|
On the natural law defense and the disvalue of ubiquitous miracles.Leigh C. Vicens - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80 (1):33-42.details
|
|
The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
|
|
(Metasemantically) Securing Free Will.Jason Turner - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):295-310.details
|
|
Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to do Otherwise.Patrick Todd - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):395-407.details
|
|
Degrees of Freedom.Pieter Thyssen & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2021 - Synthese 198 (11):10207-10235.details
|
|
The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.details
|
|
Galen Strawson, O niemożliwości całkowitej odpowiedzialności moralnej.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 65 (1):109-129.details
|
|
The truth in compatibilism and the truth of libertarianism.Helen Steward - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.details
|
|
Believing intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.details
|
|
Belief control and intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.details
|
|
Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
|
|
What must a proof of incompatibilism prove?Seth Shabo - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371.details
|
|
The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.details
|
|
The fall of “augustinian adam”: Original fragility and supralapsarian purpose.John Schneider - 2012 - Zygon 47 (4):949-969.details
|
|
Against Deliberation Restrictions.Garrett Pendergraft - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (3):341-357.details
|
|
What is chaos and how is it relevant for philosophy of mind?John M. Ostrowick - 2015 - South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):323-335.details
|
|
In the Beatific Vision, both Freedom and Necessity.Justin Noia - 2018 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2 (2).details
|
|
Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):356-378.details
|
|
Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.details
|
|
The Place of the Trace: Negligence and Responsibility.Samuel Murray - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):39-52.details
|
|
Responsibility and vigilance.Samuel Murray - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):507-527.details
|
|
Responsibility Regarding the Unthinkable.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1995 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):204-223.details
|
|
The Zygote Argument is invalid: Now what?Kristin Mickelson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2911-2929.details
|
|
Unconscious decisions and free will.Alfred Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):777-789.details
|
|
Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?Alfred Mele - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.details
|
|
Decisions, intentions, and free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.details
|
|
Can Libertarians Make Promises?Alfred Mele - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:217-241.details
|
|
Determinism, free will, and the Austrian School of Economics.Dawid Megger - 2021 - Journal of Economic Methodology 28 (3):304-321.details
|
|
The virtue of error: Solved games and ethical deliberation.David N. McNeill - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):639-656.details
|
|
Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):287-307.details
|
|
Free will and the necessity of the present.Roberto Loss - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):63-69.details
|
|
Free Will and Desire.Brian Looper - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1347-1360.details
|
|
What’s Wrong with the Consequence Argument: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.Christian List - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):253-274.details
|
|
A regress argument for restrictive incompatibilism.David Vander Laan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):201 - 215.details
|
|
Theism and the Criminalization of Sin.Jeremy Koons - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (1):163-187.details
|
|
Sellars on compatibilism and the consequence argument.Jeremy Randel Koons - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2361-2389.details
|
|
Molinism and Theological Compatibilism.Christoph Jäger - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):71-92.details
|
|
Swinburne on the Conditions for Free Will and Moral Responsibility.David P. Hunt - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):39--49.details
|
|
Moral responsibility and buffered alternatives.David P. Hunt - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):126–145.details
|
|
Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.details
|
|
Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525.details
|
|
拡張された帰結論証とヒューム主義的両立論.Soichiro Homma - 2022 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 50 (1):17-32.details
|
|
Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1417-1436.details
|
|
Concomitant Ignorance Excuses from Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):58-65.details
|
|
Luck, the Range of Obligations, and Frankfurt Examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (3):317-344.details
|
|