- Compatibilism and Free Belief.Anthony Robert Booth - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):1-12.details
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Seemings and the possibility of epistemic justification.Matthew Skene - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559.details
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Opressões epistêmicas.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2018 - In José Leonardo Annunziato Ruivo (ed.), Proceedings of the Brazilian Research Group in Epistemology. pp. 201-226.details
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Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 125-145.details
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Moderate scientism in philosophy.Buckwalter Wesley & John Turri - 2018 - In Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels & Rene van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2016 - Theoria 83 (1):4-28.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Epistemologia e Filosofia da Ciência.Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy.Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.) - 2017 - Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Taking aim at the truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.details
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Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress.Brian Weatherson - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):370-386.details
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Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
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Doxastic Decisions, Epistemic Justification, and The Logic of Agency.Heinrich Wansing - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):201-227.details
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“Ought” Implies “Can” but Does Not Imply “Must”: An Asymmetry between Becoming Infeasible and Becoming Overridden.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):487-514.details
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In Search of Doxastic Involuntarism.Matthew Vermaire - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):615-631.details
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Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology.John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2507-2537.details
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Belief isn’t voluntary, but commitment is.Nicholas Tebben - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1163-1179.details
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Why Impossible Options Are Better: Consequentializing Dilemmas.Brian Talbot - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (2):221-236.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Empiricism, metaphysics, and voluntarism.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):19-26.details
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Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
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Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.details
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Why There May Be Epistemic Duties.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (1):63-89.details
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Epistemic versus all things considered requirements.Scott Stapleford - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1861-1881.details
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Does Initial Appropriation Create New Obligations?Jesse Spafford - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2).details
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Reasons for Belief and Aretaic Obligations.Emmanuel Smith - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.details
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Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William J. Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
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Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
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Können wir uns dazu entscheiden, etwas zu glauben?Simon Walgenbach - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):583-592.details
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Intellectual Agency and Responsibility for Belief in Free Speech Theory.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (3):307-330.details
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How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2013 - Philosophia (1):1-13.details
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In Defense of Moral Evidentialism.Sharon Ryan - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427.details
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.details
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In defense of doxastic blame.Lindsay Rettler - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2205-2226.details
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Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):53-92.details
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Infinitism and epistemic normativity.Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):515-527.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529.details
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Responsible belief and epistemic justification.Rik Peels - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2895-2915.details
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Responsible Belief, Influence, and Control: Response to Stephen White.Rik Peels - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:53-62.details
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Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?Rik Peels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.details
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Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.details
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Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):679-702.details
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Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.details
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Belief-Policies Cannot Ground Doxastic Responsibility.Rik Peels - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):561-569.details
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Doxastic responsibility, guidance control, and ownership of belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):82-98.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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