- The Radicalism of Truth‐insensitive Epistemology: Truth's Profound Effect on the Evaluation of Belief.John Turri - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):348-367.details
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Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality.Tage Shakti Rai & Alan Page Fiske - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (1):57-75.details
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Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):20-25.details
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Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030.details
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Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking.John Turri & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):615-634.details
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Why is belief involuntary?O. Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87-107.details
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Life in Interesting Times: Cooperation and Collective Action in the Holocene.Kim Sterelny - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press.details
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A Framework for the Psychology of Norms.Chandra Sripada & Stephen Stich - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), Innate Mind: Volume 2: Culture and Cognition. , US: Oup Usa.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Acceptance and deciding to believe.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.details
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Ability, Responsibility, and Global Justice.Wesley Buckwalter - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):577-590.details
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How “ought” exceeds but implies “can”: Description and encouragement in moral judgment.John Turri - 2017 - Cognition 168 (C):267-275.details
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Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology.John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2507-2537.details
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'Ought' implies 'can' and the derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.David Copp - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):67-75.details
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Being nice is not a building block of morality.J. Flack & F. de Waal - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (1-2):67-77.details
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The Role of Learning in Punishment, Prosociality, and Human Uniqueness.Fiery Cushman - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press.details
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Does 'ought' conversationally implicate 'can'?Bart Streumer - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219–228.details
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