The two most important and central concepts in ancient ethical theory are those of virtue and happiness. This is well-known by now, as is the way that many scholars and philosophers have in recent years investigated the structure of ancient ethical theories, at least partly in the hope that this would help us in our modern ethical thinking by introducing us to developed theories which escape the problems that have led to so much frustration with deontological and consequentialist approaches. And (...) there has indeed been considerable interest in developing modern forms of ethics which draw inspiration, to a greater or lesser extent, from the ancient theories. However, there is an asymmetry here. Modern theories which take their inspiration from Aristotle and other ancient theorists are standardly called virtue ethics, not happiness ethics. We have rediscovered the appeal of aretē, but eudaimonia is still, it appears, problematic for us. This has an important consequence for us, for in ancient theories virtue is not discussed in isolation; it is seen as part of a larger structure in which the overarching concept is happiness. If we focus on virtue alone and ignore its relation to happiness, we are missing a large part of the interest that study of the ancient theories can offer. (shrink)

Ancient ethical theories, based on the notions of virtue and happiness, have struck many as an attractive alternative to modern theories. But we cannot find out whether this is true until we understand ancient ethics--and to do this we need to examine the basic structure of ancient ethical theory, not just the details of one or two theories. In this book, Annas brings together the results of a wide-ranging study of ancient ethical philosophy and presents it in a way that (...) is easily accessible to anyone with an interest in ancient or modern ethics. She examines the fundamental notions of happiness and virtue, the role of nature in ethical justification and the relation between concern for self and concern for others. Her careful examination of the ancient debates and arguments shows that many widespread assumptions about ancient ethics are quite mistaken. Ancient ethical theories are not egoistic, and do not depend for their acceptance on metaphysical theories of a teleological kind. Most centrally, they are recognizably theories of morality, and the ancient disputes about the place of virtue in happiness can be seen as akin to modern disputes about the demands of morality. (shrink)

The point of departure of any ethical theory is the anthropological fact that normally developed humans must lead their own lives themselves. This means that their conduct is neither programmed nor determined by instincts. Human beings must on every occasion engage the circumstances of a practical situation by their own choice and decision. Even when they find themselves delivered over to the stimuli and powers of particular circumstances in a completely passive manner, this does not occur in the way that (...) it does for a robot, but rather, on the basis of a background of an essential possibility that they can conduct themselves otherwise than they are now behaving. Where there is the possibility of a choice, then the question inevitably arises regarding the principle of the choice. On what do we base our decision to choose one possibility rather than another? We can let fate decide, we can consult astrological charts, we can appeal to an authority, or we can try to find out what we truly want, what are our deepest desires and what choice agrees best with these desires. Finally, we can also inquire into what decision is the objectively correct and rational one, i.e. which decision is good independent of our subjective preferences. This latter case, of course, presupposes a standard of the objectively good and rational, in regard to which we can be responsible for and evaluate our decisions as well as our ensuing actions. (shrink)

I argue that the many similarities between what aristotle says about "eudaimonia" and what we say about happiness justify the traditional translation of "eudaimonia" as "happiness." it is not widely realized that "eudaimonia" involves a psychological state much like the one we call "happiness." nor is it generally recognized that both "eudaimonia" and "happiness" involve a standard for evaluating lives. For aristotle, The standard is objective and inflexible; for us, It is subjective and flexible. Thus, When we call someone happy (...) and aristotle says he is not "eudaimon", We are not using two different concepts, But rather two different ways of evaluating lives. (shrink)

In Cahn's brief article, he contests Philippa Foot's contention that “Great happiness, unlike euphoria or even great pleasure, must come from something related to what is deep in human nature, and fundamental in human life, such as affection for children and friends, the desire to work, and love of freedom and truth,” contesting her claim with the counterexample of a person, "Fred," not unlike people Cahn has known, who is perfectly contented with their role, not unlike the figure painted by (...) Glaucon in Book 2 of Plato's Republic, a "completely unjust person [who,] while doing the greatest injustice, [...] has nonetheless provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice.". (shrink)

It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...) first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. (shrink)

With a new foreword by Jonathan Lear 'Remarkably lively and enjoyable…It is a very rich book, containing excellent descriptions of a variety of moral theories, and innumerable and often witty observations on topics encountered on the way.' -_ Times Literary Supplement_ Bernard Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of his generation. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is not only widely acknowledged to be his most important book, but also hailed a contemporary classic of moral philosophy. Drawing on the (...) ideas of the Greek philosophers, Williams reorients ethics away from a preoccupation with universal moral theories towards ‘truth, truthfulness and the meaning of an individual life’. He explores and reflects upon the most difficult problems in contemporary philosophy and identifies new ideas about central issues such as relativism, objectivity and the possibility of ethical knowledge. This edition also includes a commentary on the text by A.W.Moore. At the time of his death in 2003, Bernard Williams was hailed by the Times as 'the outstanding moral philosopher of his age.' He taught at the Universities of Cambridge, Berkeley and Oxford and is the author of many influential books, including _Morality; Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry_ and _Truth and Truthfulness_. (shrink)

Author Julia Annas Aristotle made ​​the German Asia-mile out and fortunately Fuk The arguments related point, and the role of external good fortune Fook in the problems caused. And text analysis and dialectical Happy Stoic school and school for good moral behavior and external point of view. Author argues, Aristotle on the German sub-km behavior regardless of the state with the fortunate Fook, reflecting the hope臘human ethics ideological consensus, and he left to posterity to resolve the discovery. Aristotle on the (...) German sub-km conduct the test volume and fortunately Fook to take the views of ordinary people, and thus for long-term development. We take this to understand the Stoic school and get away with school, behavior and fortunately for Germany Fuk related views and noted against the intentions are. Julia Annas presents Aristotle's view of the relation of virtue and happiness, and the resulting problem of the role of the external goods in happiness. The Stoics and Peripatetic views on virtue and external goods have been analyzed and argued. The writer suggests what Aristotle says about virtue and happiness reflects common sense of Greek ethical thought and leaves the issue. Aristotle's account of virtue and happiness takes ordinary thought on the matter and develops it far. We can see what the Stoics and Peripatetics are going to say on this matter and the opposing tendencies in this article. (shrink)

Les phénomènes apparaissent-ils toujours selon la calme adéquation en eux de l'intuition avec la signification, voire, plus souvent, avec un déficit d'intuition? Ou bien certains - les phénomènes saturés - n'apparaissent-ils pas plutôt grâce au surcroît irrépressible de l'intuition sur tous les concepts et toutes les significations que l'on voudrait leur assigner? Cette question avait surgi du principe " Autant de réduction, autant de donation " (dans Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Husserl, Heidegger et la phénoménologie, 1989) et conduit à (...) dégager la donation, telle qu'elle déplie ce qui se donne et ce qui se montre (avec Etant donné. Essai d'une phénoménologie de la donation, 1997). Reste, une fois ces acquis répétés, à étudier en eux-mêmes chacun des quatre types de phénomènes saturés : l'événement (saturé selon la quantité), l'idole ou tableau (saturé selon la qualité), la chair (saturée selon la relation) et enfin l'icône ou visage d'autrui (saturée selon la modalité). Il devient alors pensable d'étudier leur combinaison dans ce qu'on doit thématiser comme saturé à la puissance, un paradoxe des paradoxes - le phénomène de révélation. En l'occurrence, il s'agit de comprendre (contre une féconde critique de J. Derrida) les trois moments de la théologie mystique (affirmation, négation, hyperbole) non seulement comme l'accomplissement d'un phénomène saturé exemplaire, mais encore comme la répétition de toute phénoménalité de l'excès. De surcroît donc. Parce qu'il s'agit de l'excès du donné qui se montre. Parce qu'il s'agit aussi de l'exposer une nouvelle fois. J.-L.M. (shrink)

In der 1785 veröffentlichten Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten formuliert Kant erstmals die Prinzipien einer universalistischen Ethik der Autonomie, deren Einfluß bis heute ungebrochen ist. Schon beim Übergang von der gemeinen zur philosophischen Vernunfterkenntnis findet man die Hauptgedanken: In der Ethik geht es nicht primär um das gute Leben und das Glück, und es geht auch zunächst nicht darum, welche Handlungserfolge erzielt werden; Gegenstand moralischer Hochschätzung sind vielmehr Intentionen und Maximen. Gut ist, was für alle vernünftigen Wesen gilt, weil es (...) von ihnen als autonomen und vernünftigen Wesen gewollt wird. Die Schrift ist kurz, einfach gegliedert und verständlich geschrieben. Sie eignet sich daher als Einführung in Kants Ethik, enthält aber zugleich als Grundlegung alle wesentlichen Gedanken seiner praktischen Philosophie. Auf der Grundlage der Originalausgabe von 1785/86 wurde der Text völlig neu erstellt. Eines der wichtigsten Bücher der Philosophiegeschichte liegt damit in einer zuverlässigen und preisgünstigen Neuausgabe vor. (shrink)

In der "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft" (1787) begründet Kant seinen wohl bekanntesten Lehrsatz, den Kategorischen Imperativ: "Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne". Das Bewußtsein dieses Grundgesetzes der praktischen Vernunft ist nach Kant ein "Faktum der reinen Vernunft", dem sich niemand verschließen kann, und in diesem Faktum sieht er den - nicht weiter herleitbaren und keiner weiteren Herleitung bedürftigen - Beweisgrund der Wirklichkeit unserer Freiheit, den die "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" auf (...) dem Felde der theoretischen Vernunft zwar fordern, aber nicht beibringen konnte. Neben den Schriften David Humes, der sich um eine empirische Begründung allgemeingültiger ethischer Grundsätze bemühte, gilt Kants Ansatz eines rein rational begründeten für jedermann verbindlichen Moralgesetzes bis auf den heutigen Tag als ein starkes und maßgebliches Argument für die Grundlegung einer rationalen Kriterien genügenden und daher allgemein verbindlichen Ethik. Diese Neuausgabe des Textes hält sich strikt an die Fassung der ersten Ausgabe von 1787, d.h. Lautstand, Diktion und die - typisch Kantische - Interpunktion des Originals werden auch dort bewahrt, wo sie heutigen Regeln nicht mehr entsprechen. Lediglich veraltete orthographische Schreibungen und offensichtliche Fehler in der Interpunktion wurden korrigiert, da sie die Lesbarkeit des Textes unnötig erschweren. Lesarten und Korrekturvorschläge späterer Ausgaben sowie die Eintragungen in Kants Handexemplar wurden berücksichtigt oder angemerkt, soweit sie nach dem Stand der neueren Kantforschung noch Beachtung verdienen, und im kritischen Apparat ausgewiesen. Die Einleitung gibt Auskunft über die Entstehung und die Verortung der Schrift in Kants Gesamtwerk und ihre Rezeption, Sachanmerkungen, Register und eine ausführliche Bibliographie geben weitere Hilfen zur Erschließung der Bedeutung des Werkes. (shrink)

The View from Here is a study of our must fundamental attitudes toward the past. The book explores the dynamics of affirmation and regret, tracing the connections of each to our ongoing attachments. The focus is on situations in which our attachments commit us to affirming events or decisions that we know to have been unfortunate or regrettable.

In this paper I explore the issue of how our personal life is given to us in experience as a whole to be actively shaped and determined. I examine in detail Husserl’s analysis of the kind of experience responsible for this achievement, which he terms Überschau and which thus far has never been addressed by scholars of phenomenology. First, I locate Überschau in the context of self-determination and highlight the difference between the unthematic pre-givenness of life in the phenomenon of (...) self-awareness and the actual, i.e. thematic givenness of life in acts of Überschau. Second, I contextualize Husserl’s discovery of Überschau in his analyses of ethical life and the possibility of a universal epoché. I argue that for Husserl the very possibility of ethical life and of phenomenology itself rest on the totalizing apprehension of one’s life rendered possible by Überschau. In the third section I spell out the essential characteristics of Überschau by contrasting this peculiar kind of consciousness with reproductive forms of consciousness such as recollection and expectation, which otherwise might be easily conflated with Überschau. In section four I reply to a possible objection to the very possibility of Überschau based on the consideration of the infinitely open stream of time-consciousness. I argue that the possibility of Überschau is tightly connected with the egological nature of consciousness as understood by Husserl. The ego does not coincide with its own conscious acts and thus enjoys a special vantage point on the totality of its own life. To conclude, I advance a speculative suggestion about the phenomenological origin of Überschau in the structure of self-awareness. This opens up a variety of possible lines of research that would connect Husserl with philosophers such as Augustine or Heidegger who are more immediately associated with the issue of personal life and its unity or lack thereof. (shrink)

Erstmals 1951 publiziert, bilden die Vorlesungen über die Grundlagen und den Aufbau der Ethik ein geschlossenes und harmonisches Ganzes. Der Band geht zurück auf ein im Wintersemester 1876 niedergeschriebenes Manuskript, das Brentano 1894 als Kolleg an der Universität Wien vortrug.

This classic and controversial book examines the roots of the idea of virtue, diagnoses the reasons for its absence in modern life, and proposes a path for its recovery.

By the time of his death in 2003, Bernard Williams was one of the greatest philosophers of his generation. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is not only widely acknowledged to be his most important book, but also hailed a contemporary classic of moral philosophy. Presenting a sustained critique of moral theory from Kant onwards, Williams reorients ethical theory towards ‘truth, truthfulness and the meaning of an individual life’. He explores and reflects upon the most difficult problems in contemporary philosophy (...) and identifies new ideas about central issues such as relativism, objectivity and the possibility of ethical knowledge. This edition also includes a new commentary on the text by A.W.Moore and a foreword by Jonathan Lear. (shrink)

This paper explores two perspectives in Husserl's recently published writings on ethics and axiology in order to sketch anew a phenomenological account of practical reason. The paper aims a) to show that a phenomenological account of moral intentionality i) transcends the disputes between intellectualist-emotivist and intellectualist-voluntarist disputes and ii) points toward a position in which practical reason has an emotive content or, conversely, the emotions have a cognitive content, and the paper aims b) to show that a phenomenological ethics identifies (...) universal human goods that are, nevertheless, specified differently in varying cultural contexts. (shrink)

At the beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger rejects Husserl’s classical phenomenology on three grounds: he claims that Husserlian phenomenology is impaired by indeterminate concepts, by naïve personalism, and by obscurities in its account of individuation. The paper studies the validity of this early critique by explicating Husserl’s discourse on human persons as bodily-spiritual beings and by clarifying his account of the principles by which such beings can be individuated. The paper offers three types of considerations. After a summary of (...) Heidegger’s early critique of Husserl, the second section of the paper distinguishes between two dimensions of Husserl’s discourse on human persons. It argues that Husserl does not put forward one analysis of the being of humans, but explicates two different accounts and then studies critically their mutual relations of dependency: on the one hand, the naturalistic account of human beings as layered beings and on the other hand the personalistic account of human beings as peculiar kinds of unified wholes in which the mental and the bodily are inextricably intertwined. The third section of the paper clarifies Husserl’s theory of individuation and its consequences for our discourse on human persons. Finally, the fourth section explicates the conceptual means by which Husserl develops his account of human beings as persons. The paper ends in drawing some conclusions for contemporary philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

Husserls Briefwechsel is von entscheidender Bedeutung für das Verständnis seiner philosophischen Entwicklung, seiner wissenschaftlichen Arbeit und Publikationsvorhaben. Er nimmt darin Stellung zu den politischen Entwicklungen in Deutschland und spricht sich aus über weltanschaulich-religiöse Fragen. Außerdem bestimmt er sein Verhältnis zu anderen Philosophen und Schulen. Die vorliegende, textkritisch konstituierte und reich kommentierte Gesamtausgabe ist nicht nur für Philosophen, Wissenschaftshistoriker und Zeitgeschichtlicher von hohem Interesse. Die Ausgabe umfaßt in sachlicher Gliederung Husserls Korrespondenz (ca. 1300 Einzelstücke) mit über 250 Personen und Instanzen, wobei (...) neben den Briefen Husserls - und, in großzügiger Auswahl, seiner Frau Malvine - auch alle erhaltenen Briefe an Husserl aufgenommen sind (ca. 700 Einzelstücke). Die Bände I--IV orientieren sich an der chronologischen Entwicklung der Husserlschen Philosophie, die Bände V--IX an der sachlichen Nähe der Korrespondenzpartner zu Husserls Philosophie. Band X enthält neben der Einführung in die Ausgabe verschiedene Register zur differenzierten Aufschlüsselung der Ausgabe. Edmund Husserl's correspondence is of eminent importance for a clear understanding of his philosophical development, his scientific work, and his publications. In his letters, he reacts on the political developments in Germany and ponders on the philosophy of life and on religious questions. He also clearly defines his relationships with other philosophers and schools of philosophy. This annotated and richly commented correspondence edition is of vital interest to philosophers, researchers and historians. The ten volumes consist of Husserl's correspondence (about 1300 letters) with more than 250 institutes and persons, and in addition to his letters, the letters of his wife Malvine and those received by both (about 700) are also included. Volumes I--IV present a chronological development of Husserl's philosophical system, Volumes V--IX are devoted to the correspondence partners in philosophy. The last volume consists of an extensive Introduction and a variety of indexes to all volumes in the set. (shrink)

Irvine looks at various Stoic techniques for attaining tranquility and shows how to put these techniques to work in our own life.

One of the best places to seek understanding of happiness is the study of ancient ethical theories and of those modern theories which share their eudaimonist concerns. For these recognize, and build on, some of our thoughts about happiness that have become overwhelmed by the kind of consideration that emerges in the claim that happiness is obviously subjective. Given the systematically disappointing results of the database approach, it is time to look seriously at our alternatives.

Though Husserl tends to receive less attention than other phenomenologists, there is growing interest in his ethics. Proponents of Husserl’s ethics argue that his moral philosophy is not merely of historical interest; Husserl, they claim, can contribute positively to contemporary debates in ethics, specifically debates about the role of feelings in moral agency. This paper raises questions about this last claim. I argue that, on the one hand, Husserl’s moral psychology proves superior to some of his modern predecessors, insofar as (...) Husserl accounts (1) for the intentionality of emotions and (2) for their cognitive content, and (3) for the connections between emotions and evaluation and between emotions and reasons. On the other hand, I argue that Husserl mistakenly claims that all valuing requires some feeling on the part of the person valuing. This error, I argue, is due to Husserl’s conflation of desires and emotions. I defend my critique of Husserl by reference to an Aristotelian account of rational and non-rational desires. (shrink)

The referent of the transcendental and indexical “I” is present non-ascriptively and contrasts with “the personal I” which necessity is presenced as having properties. Each is unique but in different ways. The former is abstract and incomplete until taken as a personal I. The personal I is ontologically incomplete until it self-determines itself morally. The “absolute Ought” is the exemplary moral self-determination and it finds a special disclosure in “the truth of will.” Simmel's situation ethics is useful for making more (...) precise Husserl's ethical position. (shrink)

This paper introduces Husserl's ethics by examining his critique of Kant's ethics. It presents Husserl's lectures on ethics in which he offers his own ethical theory in a historical context. The phenomenological ethics seeks to combine the advantages of both the traditional empiricism and rationalism. Husserl's ethics takes into account that emotions play an essential role in the constitution of values and morals. Contrariwise, Husserl fights against relativism in ethics and praises Kant for the discovery of an absolute moral imperative. (...) He considers Kant's ethics as a rationalistic position that is too formal and that does not take into account that every will must be motivated by some concrete material good that is evaluated in our feelings or emotions. (shrink)

How should we evaluate the success of each person's life? Countering the prevalent philosophical perspective on the subject, Steven M. Cahn and Christine Vitrano defend the view that our well-being is dependent not on particular activities, accomplishments, or awards but on finding personal satisfaction while treating others with due concern. The authors suggest that moral behavior is not necessary for happiness and does not ensure it. Yet they also argue that morality and happiness are needed for living well, and together (...) suffice to achieve that goal. Cahn and Vitrano link their position to elements within both the Hellenistic and Hebraic traditions, in particular the views of Epicurus and lessons found in the Book of Ecclesiastes. Written in an accessible style and illustrated with incisive vignettes drawn from history, literature, films, and everyday life, _Happiness and Goodness_ is a compelling work of philosophy for anyone who seeks to understand the nature of a good life. (shrink)

*Weitere Angaben Inhalt: Obwohl die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls zweifellos eine der einflußreichsten philosophischen Schulen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts ist, scheint es schwierig, die Frage nach der Relevanz ihrer Ergebnisse für die praktische Philosophie positiv zu beantworten. Daran ist ihr Begründer keineswegs unschuldig; so zeigt eine Konfrontation seiner inhaltlichen Ausführungen zur Ethik mit denen Kants, welche im ersten Teil der vorliegenden Studie geliefert wird, daß Husserls Überlegungen tatsächlich an einigen fundamentalen begrifflichen Schwächen kranken. Auf diese unbefriedigende Situation wird von phänomenologischer Seite gemeinhin (...) auf zwei Weisen reagiert: Man beschränkt sich entweder auf eine mehr oder minder kritiklose Darstellung der Ethik Husserls, oder man sucht sein Heil in der Berufung auf den generellen ethischen Anspruch der transzendentalen Phänomenologie als solcher. Ein derartiger Umweg ist jedoch, wie der Verfasser in den Teilen zwei und drei seiner Arbeit argumentiert, unnötig, denn es ist durchaus möglich, aus dem Schaffen Husserls bedeutsame Erkenntnisse für die praktische Philosophie zu ziehen, sofern man sich auf einen zentralen methodischen Aspekt seines Denkens besinnt: Dieses setzt, bekanntlich, die Analyse stets an beim individuellen Erlebnisbereich des Subjekts, welchem die heutige analytische Philosophie, und auch Kant, mit großem Mißtrauen begegnet; nachzuweisen, daß die entsprechende Skepsis übertrieben ist, und dass man insbesondere für das Verständnis dessen, was es heißt, moralisch verpflichtet zu sein und frei zu handeln, viel gewinnen kann durch einen Einbezug des phänomenalen Bewußtseins, ist das eigentliche Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchung. (shrink)

Argues that a coherent theory of ethics requires an account of selfhood.

Der Herausgeber dieses Jahrbuchs hat geglaubt, mit derVerof- 5 fentlichung der seit dem Erscheinen des ersten Bandes eingelaufenen und zum Teil schon im Herbst 1913 in den Druck gegebenen Arbei­ ten nieht Hinger zogern zu diirfen. So viele geistige Krafte dieser unheilvolle Krieg fesselt und leider auch zerstort, wirklich unterbin­ den kann und wird er das deutsche Geistesleben nieht. Nach wie vor 10 ist es beseelt von der ererbten Liebe zu den Ewigkeitswerten der Kultur, und immerfort wirkt es sich aus (...) in treuer Arbeit an ihren groBen Aufgaben. 1m besonderen unsere phanomenologische Philo­ sophie hat nicht geruht, auch ist ihr unverkennbar das warme Inter­ esse wissenschaftlicher Kreise erhalten geblieben. So diirften die bei- 15 den Bande, in die wir die bereitliegenden Arbeiten verteilt haben, nieht unwillkommen geheiBen werden. Die neuen Jahrbuchsarbeiten unterscheiden sieh ganz so wie die des ersten Bandes nieht nur durch ihre Themen, sondern auch durch die merklich nuancierten Auffas­ sungen, die sieh ihre Verfasser iiber Ziele, Methoden und mancherlei 20 Einzelfragen der phlinomenologisehen Forsehung gebildet haben. Es brauchte eigentlich nieht gesagt zu werden und muG es doeh ange­ siehts vorgekommener MiBverstlindnisse, daB der Herausgeber nur fiir seine eigenen Arbeiten die Verantwortung iibernimmt so wie jeder Mitarbeiter fiir die seinen. Sieherlieh ist die innere Gemein- 25 samkeit der "Phanomenologen" darum doch keine geringere, ja eher eine groBere als innerlhalb irgendwelcher sonstigen Forschungs- [VI] gemeinschaften, z. B. der der Experimental-Psychologen. (shrink)

Das Husserlbild der Gegenwart ist noch weitgehend gepragt von den erkenntnistheoretischen "Logischen Untersuchungen", durch die Husserl in weitem MaBe als Begriinder einer neuen objektiven Logik gilt. Mitunter wird er sogar als einseitig orien tierter Rationalist und Aufklarer des 20. J ahrhunderts, als der "Cartesius unserer Tage" 1 angesehen. Dieses Bild Husserls kann wohl jederzeit durch seine Veroffent lichungen gerechtfertigt werden. Dennoch ist es einseitig und recht vordergriindig, da dabei voll und ganz iibersehen wird, daB auch der Bereich des Emotionalen flir (...) HusserI ein entscheiden gut wie nichts des Interessengebiet darstellt, wovon bislang so veroffentlicht worden ist. Wohl werden in seinen Schriften gclegentlich Fragen der Wertlehre, der Asthetik und Ethik angeschnitten 2, aber eine eingehende Auseinandersetzung mit derartigen Fragen liegt in keinem der veroffentlichten Werke vor. In Wirklichkeit aber war ihm die Begriindung einer echten wissenschaftlichen Ethik immer ein ernstes philosophisches An liegen. Bereits vor den "Logischen Untersuchungen" beschaf tigte sich Husserl mit ethischen Grundproblemen 3. Welche 1 Vgl. Briick, Maria, Dr. phil, Ubey das Verhiiltnis Hllsserls zu Franz Brentano, vor nehmlich mit Rucksicht auf Brentanos Psychologie, 1933, S. 7. Husserl selbst hat die Phiinomenologie in den "Cartesianischen Meditationen" (Husscrliana, Bd. I, 1950, S. (shrink)

„In „Die Anweisungen zum seligen Leben“ unternimmt Fichte den Versuch, für ein breites Publikum in – für seine Verhältnisse verständlicher Sprache – die Verbindung philosophischer und religiöser Wahrheitsfindung aufzuzeigen.“ Redaktion Gröls-Verlag (Edition Werke der Weltliteratur).

Unter den Versuchen Fichtes, sein Denken allgemeinverständlich darzustellen, zählt diese 1800 erschienene Schrift zu den inhaltlich abgerundetsten und aufschlußreichsten; bei den Zeitgenossen stieß sie jedoch auf vehemente Kritik, Hegel sah in ihr gar einen besonders illustrativen Text für den Aufweis der Haltlosigkeit der von Fichte in der Wissenschaftslehre vertretenen Position einer auf das Ich als Tathandlung gegründeten Philosophie. Darum vermag allein schon die Lektüre von Fichtes Bestimmung des Menschen und ihrer kritischen Rezeption in Hegels Glauben und Wissen einen Einblick in (...) die Gründe zu vermitteln, warum bis ins 20. Jahrhundert die Philosophie Fichtes weitgehend als ein merkwürdiger Mosaikstein auf dem Wege "Von Kant bis Hegel" oder, im Hinblick auf den "Endpunkt" dieses Wegs wohl genauer, in der "Entwicklung des Spinozismus" betrachtet wurde. Deutlich wird einer neuen Lektüre aber auch, wieviel noch zu tun bleibt, um die wichtigen Erkenntnisse, die im Deutschen Idealismus auf so getrennten Bahnen gewonnen wurden, im Blick auf die gemeinsamen Grundprobleme einer "Ersten Philosophie" ohne Rückfall in die traditionellen Feindbilder wahrzunehmen und kritisch in die pluralistische Diskussion heutigen Philosophierens einzubringen. (shrink)

In this essay, I will attempt a systematic reconstruction of the general shape of Husserl's late philosophy, insofar as it centers on the concept of personhood. The systematic concatenation of this and other themes in Husserl's late work - the method of epoché and reduction, ethics, personhood, and teleology - has only recently begun to be explored in Husserl scholarship, and this article is a modest contribution to the further e1ucidation of their mutual relationship. One of the most striking results (...) of this reconstructive analysis is Husserl's final concept of "person", which goes beyond the traditional distinctions, such as "heart" and "mind" or "reason" and "emotion". For Husserl to conceive of the subject as moral person implies, then, the demand to not only conduct oneself morally, but also to have an ethical view of the world as a world that bears meaning and harbors values despite its apparent absurdities. (shrink)

The correlation between person and environment has long been a central focus of phenomenological analysis. While phenomenology is usually understood as a descriptive discipline showing how essential features of the human encounter with things and people in the world are articulated, phenomenology is also based on ethical concerns. Husserl himself, the founder of the movement, gave several lecture courses on ethics. This volume focuses on one trend in ethics—virtue ethics—and its connection to phenomenology. The essays explore how phenomenology contributes to (...) this field of ethics and clarifies some of its central issues, such as flourishing and good character traits. The volume initiates a conversation with virtue ethicists that is underrepresented in the current literature. Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics offers contributions from prominent phenomenologists who explore the following issues: how phenomenology is connected to the ancient Greek or Christian virtue tradition, how phenomenology and its foundational thinkers are oriented toward virtue ethics, and how phenomenology is itself a virtue discipline. The focus on phenomenology and virtue ethics in a single volume is the first of its kind. (shrink)