This paper offers some comments on some metaphysical and epistemological claims of theological realism from the perspective of continental philosophy of religion, thereby taking the work of Soskice and Hick as paradigmatic for this kind of philosophical theology. The first comment regards the fact that theological realism considers religious and theological propositions as ways to depict or represent reality, and hence aims to bring them as much as possible in line with scientific ones. Some contemporary French philosophers criticize such a (...) representing, depicting knowledge of God, because it encapsulates the divine reality in mundane, specifically scientific categories. eventually, theological realism runs the risk of annihilating God’s radical transcendence and reducing religion to an alternative scientific theory. The second comment tries to explore whether one can affirm God’s reality from a practical perspective, as a postulate of reason, and whether such an approach could serve as a common ground for religious and secular ways of life in times of radical pluralism. This comment begins by investigating the regulative character of Kant’s idea of God as the highest idea of reason, which not only orientates our theoretical enquiries, but also our moral actions. Although this idea is only a heuristic fiction for theoretical reason, God’s existence has to be affirmed on practical grounds, as a symbolic reality that gives orientation to people’s lives. (shrink)

Review of Lampe, K., & Benjamin, A. (Eds.). (2021). German Stoicisms: From Hegel to Sloterdijk. London: ‎Bloomsbury Academic.

This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy (...) and neighbouring fields, including those of mathematics, psychology, literature and film, and neuroscience. (shrink)

Brauchen Roboter moralische Kompetenz? Die Antwort lautet ja. Einerseits benötigen Roboter moralische Kompetenz, um unsere Welt aus Regeln, Vorschriften und Werten zu begreifen, andererseits um von ihrem Umfeld akzeptiert zu werden. Wie aber lässt sich moralische Kompetenz in Roboter implementieren? Welche philosophischen Herausforderungen sind zu erwarten? Und wie können wir uns und unsere Kinder auf Roboter vorbereiten, die irgendwann über moralische Kompetenz verfügen werden? André und Iga Maria Schmiljun skizzieren aus einer humanistisch-philosophischen Perspektive erste Antworten auf diese Fragen und entwickeln (...) einen didaktischen Einstieg in das Thema für die Grundschule. (shrink)

Ethik und Seelsorge sind Bereiche, in denen menschliches Sein und Handeln reflektierend begleitet wird, um Orientierung, Unterstützung oder Trost zu geben. Bei Berufen, in denen Menschen auf eine gewaltverstrickte Lebenswelt treffen, ihrerseits staatlich legitimiert Gewalt ausüben und selbst von Gewalt betroffen sind, tauchen dabei besondere Widersprüche und Sinnfragen auf. Diese Herausforderungen in den Blick zu nehmen und an der Schnittstelle von Philosophie und praktischer Theologie zu erörtern, so wie es der Münsteraner Theologe Werner Schiewek richtungsweisend vorgezeichnet hat, ist das Ziel (...) des vorliegenden Bandes. (shrink)

W. V. Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment is commonly presented as the slogan: “to be is to be the value of a variable”. More specifically, to be is to be in the domain of values of a bound variable attached to a existential quantifier in the body of a theory. If a sentence of our best available theory quantifies over bachelors, so we conclude that, according to it, there are bachelors. Simplicity and the use of logical apparatus for determining this (...) criterion are responsible for many philosophers to adhere to this standpoint within analytical metaphysics. I will argue that despite this strong influence of the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment in many debates, we find at least three interlinked problems in its original formulation: (1) The criterion depends of a clear definition of theory for the determination of the quantifications counting as entailers of ontological commitments. However, Quine does not present such clear concept of what would be a theory and of how to formalize it. Quine develops this notion under just the metaphor of the knowledge fabric, in which we have a group of sentences, which does not suffice for the required account of ontological commitment. (2) There are distinct possibilities of quantifying over given sentences, which leaves room for different ontological commitments associated with the same statement. In that sense, someone could argue that the Quinean solution would be to endorse just the first order predicate logic. Nonetheless, the Quinean should explain why we ought to be restricted to this logic. (3) The previous problems lead to a possible explosion of the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment, making it trivial, because it permits the quantification over any supposed entities and, hence, that anything can exist. Thus, I will discuss Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment in the light of the abovementioned problems, showing that, unless the Quinean presents a more specific definition of theory beyond just a group of sentences, he leads to an explosion of commitments with different entities. I will conclude that, if you understand ‘theory’ as Alonzo Church’s concept of ‘formalized language’, this knot can be undone. However, Church’s concept is much more akin to Carnap’s linguistic framework than to a notion of knowledge fabric “without borders” as the one proposed by Quine. (shrink)

Autonomie und mit ihr die Selbstbestimmung gelten als hohes Gut. Demnach hat jeder Mensch das Recht, selbst darüber zu entscheiden, wie er leben möchte, und seine persönlichen Entscheide in der eigenen Lebensführung zu realisieren - und das ohne die Einmischung von anderen, auch staatlichen Stellen. Doch Selbstbestimmung ist nicht grenzenlos. Sie hat auch Rücksicht auf andere zu nehmen, deren Rechte zu achten und ist immer mit Verantwortung verbunden. Die Beiträger*innen des Bandes stellen sich diesem Spannungsfeld und fragen: Was heißt es (...) unter diesen Vorzeichen, sich selbst zu bestimmen und ein gelungenes Leben zu führen? Und was bedeutet Autonomie für Entscheide am Lebensende und die personalisierte Medizin? (shrink)

Unentwegt werden neue technische Produkte gestaltet. Doch was macht die technische Gestaltung aus? Wie lässt sich ihr Gegenstand - (noch) nicht existierende Artefakte - adäquat auf den Begriff bringen? Michael Kuhn begreift technische Ideen vor ihrer Realisierung als Fiktionen. Er bietet eine fiktionstheoretische Rekonstruktion der Gestaltungstätigkeit und entwickelt hieraus eine Ethik der Gestaltung. Der stark interdisziplinäre Zugang zwischen Technikphilosophie und Ingenieurwissenschaften liefert neue Erkenntnisse für beide Fachrichtungen und stellt wertvolle Grundlagen bereit.

The idea that there is a distinctively practical use of reason, and correspondingly a distinctively practical form of knowledge, unites many otherwise diverse voices in the history of practical philosophy: from Aristotle to Kant, from Rousseau to Marx, from Hegel to G.E.M. Anscombe, and many others. This volume gathers works by scholars who take inspiration from these and many other historical figures in order to deepen our systematic understanding of questions raised by their work that still are, or ought to (...) be, at the center of contemporary philosophical debate: the form and nature of practical reasoning, agential self-consciousness or practical knowledge, how knowledge of the good relates to our motivational capacity, and the shape of philosophical thinking about sound forms of living together. Accordingly, the volume is divided into three parts: action theory, meta-ethics, and political philosophy. This fusion of perspectives delivers novel possibilities not only for answering the systematic questions outlined above, but also for understanding both what unifies and distinguishes those historical voices that have sought to articulate the concept of practical reason. “This fascinating volume brings out the richness and profundity of an oft-neglected approach to understanding human agency, one that foregrounds action as itself an exercise of reason. Essays on ethics, mind, action, and political philosophy explore the history, substance, and implications of this idea, cutting across while also revealing the unity underlying various parts of philosophy that are typically treated separately.” – Eric Marcus, Auburn University. (shrink)

The claim of the freedom of the will (understood as an individual who is transcendent to Nature) in the name of XXth century scientific knowledge, against the perspective of XVIIIth-XIXth century scientific materialism, is analysed and refuted in the present paper. The hypothesis of reductionism finds no obstacle within contemporary natural sciences. Determinism in classical physics is irrefutable, unless classical physics is itself refuted. From quantum mechanics, some authors argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism (...) in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, here I defend the opposite thesis because indeterminism does not imply free will, and because the considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against neuroscience or evolutionary theories about human beings. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms. (shrink)

I argue that Kant took from Moses Mendelssohn the idea of a distinction between geometry of morals and a practical ethic. He was drastically misunderstood by his followers precisely on this point. He had learned from the sceptics and the Jansenists the lesson that men are prompted to act by deceptive ends, and he was aware that human actions are also empirical phenomena, where laws like the laws of Nature may be detected. His practical ethics made room for judgment as (...) a holistic procedure for assessing the salience of relevant moral qualities in one given situation; this procedure yields the same results as the geometry of morals does for abstract cases, but does so immediately and without balancing conflicting duties with each other, since what makes for the salient quality of a situation is perceived from the very beginning. (shrink)

The present text deals with the question of the meaning of life in theexistentialist theory oft heNorwegian philosopher Peter Wessel Zapffe(1899–1990). In his book On the Tragic (1941), Zapffe sketched a theory of the human condition where the meaning of life plays a decisive role together with the human need for justice. This paper aims to reconstruct the central elements of Zapffe’s analysis and to discuss them critically by focusing on his claim that human beings need a fundamental meaning of (...) life as a whole that transcends meaning in life. I pay particular attention to Zapffe’s claim that life is meaningless, since the meaning of life is fundamentallylacking.I conclude that Zapffe’s analysis is problematic for reasons both internal and external to his theory. (shrink)

The role that need plays in dealing with problems of distributive justice is examined in a series of vignette studies. Among other things, it becomes clear that impartial observers make gradual assessments of justice that depend on the extent to which the observed individuals are endowed with a good. If it is known how high their need for that good is, the assessments are made relative to this reference point. In addition, impartial decision-makers make hypothetical distribution decisions that take into (...) account need, productivity, and accountability. The need of individuals is partially compensated even if they have contributed less to the available amount than they themselves require. However, the willingness to do so decreases if they are accountable for needing more than others or for having contributed less than others. Lastly, both impartial observers and impartial decision-makers distinguish between different types of needs, the fulfillment of which is given different levels of importance. (shrink)

Se busca precisar dos sentidos de mecanismo en Kant, a saber, el “mecanismo de la naturaleza” como sinónimo de la causalidad natural y el concepto de mecanismo que se desprende de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, para iluminar lo que este autor entiende por “explicación mecánica” en el juicio teleológico. Eso permite entender por qué los seres orgánicos son inexplicables mecánicamente y, de esta manera, justificar la necesidad de los juicios teleológicos sobre la naturaleza.

This volume collects selected papers delivered at the 15th Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, which was held at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in July 2018. It includes papers dealing with the past, present, and future of utilitarianism – the theory that human happiness is the fundamental moral value – as well as on its applications to animal ethics, population ethics, and the future of humanity, among other topics.

Do we need a new ethics? And if so: why? Just because Kant's Categorical Imperative (Cat. Imp.) seems to be no longer valid? Are there, nevertheless, values that survive the so-called "decay of values"? And if there are limits of ethics, e.g. in system conditions, one can ask if new legit requests are to be made. Or can ethics even be absorbed (or "abolished") in anthropology and philosophy of history?

Zusammenfassung Schleiermachers Theorie der Erbsünde wird gewöhnlich als Abkehr von Augustinus verstanden. Diese Behauptung ist unhaltbar. Eine genauere Untersuchung wird zeigen, dass Schleiermachers Kritik an Augustinus darauf abzielt, Augustins Lehre von der Erbsünde logisch kohärent und widerspruchsfrei zu machen und die Gefahr eines manichäischen Dualismus so weit wie möglich zu umgehen. Darüber hinaus wird gezeigt, dass Schleiermachers Lehre von der Erbsünde in hohem Maße kohärent und in sich konsistent ist, da die folgenden Ideen Schleiermachers philosophische und theologische Schriften durchdringen: die (...) Untrennbarkeit der transzendentalen Freiheit von den sinnlichen Trieben, die Untrennbarkeit von Materie und Form und die Untrennbarkeit von Gott und Welt. Auf diese Weise können wir den Geist von Schleiermachers Lehre der Erbsünde besser verstehen. (shrink)

Based on the dispute between Protagoras and Socrates on the origin of ethics, one can ask the question of whether the principle of ethics is reason orfeeling/emotion, or whether ethics is grounded on reason or feeling/emotion. The development of Kant’s thoughts on ethics shows the tension between reason and feeling/emotion. In Kant’s final critical ethics, he held to a principle of “rational a priori.” On the one hand, this is presented as the rational a priori principle being the binding principle (...) of judgment. On the other hand, it is presented as the doctrine of “rational fact” as the ultimate argument of his ethics. Husserl believed that Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori totally disregarded the a priori essential laws of feeling. Like Husserl, Scheler criticized Kant’s doctrine of a rational a priori, and therefore developed his own theory of an “emotional a priori”. Both of them focused their critiques on the grounding level of ethics. Scheler, however, did not follow Husserl all the way, but criticized him and reflected on his thoughts. At last, he revealed the primary status of a phenomenological material ethics of value. (shrink)

Criticizing the misunderstanding and wrong explanation of Marx's philosophical system made by recent Chinese textbooks on Marxist philosophy, the author argues that Marx's philosophy has practical, economical-philosophical, and ontological dimensions and stresses on reconstructing Marx's philosophical system through synthesizing the above three dimensions. This paper intends to set up a new outline of Marx's philosophical system, in terms of the following four concepts-thing, value, time, and freedom.

This paper is concerned with the competing and complimentary relationships between intersubjectivity and discursive logic. It contends that the ultimate failure of Husserlian phenomenology is a testament to the dilemma of subjectivist philosophy. Indeed, political philosophy requires a paradigm-shift from subjectivity to intersubjectivity. With this in mind, this paper examines the classical encounter between morality and ethical life in connection with discursive ethics. While it argues that Habermas still retains a strong residue of subjectivist philosophy, it attempts to clarify the (...) discursive analysis of Foucault and probes into its applicability to practical philosophy. (shrink)

Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) extols Heidegger’s interpretation of human Dasein as “being-capable” and admits that he was inspired by Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in many ways; however, although he, like Heidegger, emphasizes that human finitude is the basic premise of Kantian philosophy, he refuses to apply this premise to Kant’s philosophy as a whole. He argues, for Kant, “human beings are finite but can be infinite.” Moreover, he, on the one hand, criticizes Heidegger for withdrawing the dimension of absolute spontaneity, infinitude, (...) supersensibility and supratemporality from morality and, on the other hand, criticizes Kant for rejecting the possibility of a positive use of intellectual intuition. By the general insight of Chinese philosophy, which positively recognize the intellectual intuition, Mou believes that one can change the downside of Kantian philosophy and organically combine Western and Asian philosophy. (shrink)

This is a “metacritical” engagement from a Confucian perspective with the legacy of Kantian ethics. The first and longest part of this essay deals with the European West and Kant, especially the categorical imperative. The second part hearkens back to East Asian antiquity, especially Ancient China, as it briefly explores Kongzi’s Golden Rule and Mengzi’s compassion.

This is a critical discussion of Part III of Peter Railton's recent book Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence (Cambridge University Press, 2003).

. Gustav Radbruch is one of the most important German-speaking philosophers of law of the twentieth century. This paper raises the question of how to classify Radbruch's theories in the international context of legal philosophy and philosophy in general. Radbruch's work was mainly influenced by the southwest German school of Neo-Kantianism, represented by Windelband, Rickert, and Lask. Their theories of culture and value show an affirmative-holistic understanding of philosophy as a source of wisdom and meaningfulness. Kant, on the other hand, (...) belongs more to a fundamentally different, critical camp of philosophy. Although Radbruch has incorporated Kantian Elements into his theory, he is rather a member of the affirmative-holistic camp. In the end the question will be raised as to what ought to be preserved of his philosophy. (shrink)

In his essay against Eberhard, Kant denies that there are innate concepts. Several scholars take Kant’s statement at face value. They claim that Kant did not endorse concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts, and that Kant’s views on innateness are significantly different from Leibniz’s. This paper takes issue with those claims. It argues that Kant’s views on the origin of the intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz’s. Given two widespread notions of innateness, the dispositional notion and (...) the input/output notion, intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than for Leibniz. (shrink)

Two large online surveys were conducted among employees in Germany to explore the importance employees and organizations place on aspects of interpersonal respect in relation to other work values. The first study (n = 589) extracted a general ranking of work values, showing that employees rate issues of respect involving supervisors particularly high. The second study (n = 318) replicated the previous value ranking. Additionally, it is shown that the value priorities indicated by employees do not always match their perceptions (...) of actual organizational practices. Particularly, interpersonal respect issues that involve employees’ supervisors diverge strongly negative. Consequences and potentials for change in organizations are discussed. (shrink)

Research on work values shows that respectful leadership is highly desired by employees. On the applied side, however, the extant research does not offer many insights as to which concrete leadership behaviors are perceived by employees as indications of respectful leadership. Thus, to offer such insights, we collected and content analyzed employees’ narrations of encounters with respectful leadership ( N 1 = 426). The coding process resulted in 19 categories of respectful leadership spanning 149 leadership behaviors. Furthermore, to also harness (...) this comprehensive repertoire for quantitative organizational research, we undertook two more studies ( N 2a = 228; N 2b = 412) to empirically derive a feasible item-based measurement of respectful leadership and assess its psychometric qualities. In these studies, we additionally investigated the relationships between respectful leadership as assessed with this new measurement and employees’ vertical and contextual followership as assessed via subordinates’ identification with their leaders, their appraisal respect for their leaders, their feeling of self-determination, and their job satisfaction. (shrink)

Husserl develops his reflection on ethics mainly in his lecture courses. These lectures can be divided into two parts, according to a principle that is both chronological and pertaining to content, and following thus the respective editions in the Gesammelte Werke.1 The common aspect of the two different phases of Husserl’s research can be detected in the critical confrontation with Kant’s practical philosophy, starting with the question concerning the formality.

Der Beitrag will dazu ermutigen, für die Entwicklung einer Ethik der Polizei starker als bislang auch Einsichten aus der Geschichte der Philosophie miteinzubeziehen. In einem ersten Schritt soll plausibel werden, dass die Polizei durch ihre Arbeit an den Grenzen und Grenzsituationen unseres Lebens eine ursprüngliche Nähe und Offenheit zur Philosophie hat (Kap.1). Deren unverzichtbare Verwiesenheit auf die Geschichte („Weisheit der Alten“) (Kap.2) wird – einem Hinweis Werner Schieweks folgend – auf dem Hintergrund der politischen Philosophie für die Ethik der Polizei (...) und ihrer Ausbildung schrittweise entfaltet (Kap.3): Persönliche Letztverantwortung des Menschen, ein sozialer und solidarischer Begriff von Freiheit, die schlechterdings zentrale Bedeutung vor allem der „musisch-literarischen“, gewaltreduzierenden Ausbildung der künftigen „Wächter“, ihre Vorbereitung auf die Maßlosigkeit des Menschen oder die Kultivierung ihrer Affekte etwa in einer Atmosphäre des „Schönen“ sind mögliche Aspekte, an die eine Ethik der Polizei vielleicht bei Platon anknüpfen kann. Das gilt vor allem für ein Verständnis der polizeilichen Kardinaltugend: der Tapferkeit. Als feste Überzeugung über das, was für den Staat gefährlich ist, zeichnet sich die Tapferkeit durch eine besondere Furcht aus: Durch die Furcht der Wächter vor sich selbst und ihrer eigenen Ambivalenz. Die Einübung in diese Furcht kann im Rahmen der Ausbildung u.a. in einer Auseinandersetzung mit der radikalen Moralkritik bestehen, wie sie Platon anhand unterschiedlicher sophistischer Positionen diskutiert. Abschließend gibt der Beitrag noch einen Ausblick auf weitere Perspektiven für die Polizeiethik, die sich aus der Geschichte der Philosophie ergeben: Zum einen im Anschluss an Kant die mögliche Relevanz von Hoffnung für moralisches Handeln auch in der Polizei; zum anderen die Möglichkeit einer philosophischen „Therapie“ von starken Emotionen wie etwa Angst oder Zorn. (shrink)

Today, in a Western secular context, the affective phenomenon of religious zeal is often associated, or even identified, with religious intolerance, violence, and fanaticism. Even if the zealots’ devotion remains restricted to their private lives, “we” as Western secularists still suspect them of a lack of reason, rationality, and autonomy. However, closer consideration reveals that religious zeal is an ethically and politically ambiguous phenomenon. In this article, I explore the question of how this ambiguity can be explained. I do so (...) by drawing on Paul Ricœur’s theory of affective fragility and tracing back the ambiguity of religious zeal to a dialectic inherent to human affectivity and existence itself. According to Ricœur, human affectivity is constituted by the two poles of vital and spiritual desires which are mediated by the thymos. As I show, this theory helps us to understand that religious zeal as a spiritual desire is neither plainly good nor plainly bad, but ambiguous. Moreover, it enables us to acknowledge the entanglement of abstraction and concretion that is inherent to the phenomenon of religious zeal. Finally, this theory helps us to understand why religious zeal, as one possible expression of the human quest for the infinite, is both a promise and a threat. In conclusion, human existence is tragic not in that we necessarily fail, but in that no matter which path we take with regard to our spiritual desires—that of affirmation, rejection, or moderation—we are and remain fallible. (shrink)

Many interpretations of Kant’s first Critique fail to appreciate the revolutionary nature of his account of knowledge and its implications for skepticism, givenness and mind-independence, because they read Kant as holding a compositional account of knowledge. I contend that the reason for this is that this account is both naturally appealing in its own right, and fits an influential reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. On this reading, the Deduction aims to respond to a skeptical worry which issues from the empiricist (...) version of epistemic compositionalism and which questions the intelligibility of the claim to knowledge of our judgements. Against this, I argue that what Kant’s Deduction actually aims to address is a radicalization of this epistemic worry, which instead questions the intelligibility of the objective purport of our judgements. I contend that the compositional account is unable to respond to this more radical worry, thereby putting it into question both as a reading of Kant, and as an account of knowledge generally. To corroborate this, I provide a reading of the Deduction that overcomes epistemic compositionalism by thinking through its shortcomings in order to arrive at a more adequate successor account: the hylomorphic account of knowledge, which, I contend, is able to dissolve both the more radical and the epistemic worry. I suggest that this implies generally that the epistemic worry issuing from the compositional account is not self-contained, but must give way to Kant’s more radical worry, which I argue can only be addressed within the underappreciated framework of epistemic hylomorphism. (shrink)

Information security can be of high moral value. It can equally be used for immoral purposes and have undesirable consequences. In this paper we suggest that critical theory can facilitate a better understanding of possible ethical issues and can provide support when finding ways of addressing them. The paper argues that critical theory has intrinsic links to ethics and that it is possible to identify concepts frequently used in critical theory to pinpoint ethical concerns. Using the example of UK electronic (...) medical records the paper demonstrates that a critical lens can highlight issues that traditional ethical theories tend to overlook. These are often linked to collective issues such as social and organisational structures, which philosophical ethics with its typical focus on the individual does not tend to emphasise. The paper suggests that this insight can help in developing ways of researching and innovating responsibly in the area of information security. (shrink)

Critical thinking is currently much celebrated in the contemporary West and beyond, not least in higher education. Tertiary education students are generally expected to adopt a critical attitude in order to become responsible and constructive participants in the development of modern democratic society. Currently, the perceived desirability of critical thinking has even made it into a seemingly successful marketable commodity. A brief online search yields a vast number of books that are mostly presented as self-help manuals to enable readers to (...) enhance their critical abilities. But how should critical thinking be taught? Is it at all possible? Instead of attempting to provide a direct answer to this pressing question, this paper seeks inspiration in a culturally rather remote philosophy of education that hitherto has not been regarded as a stimulant for critical thinking, namely the ancient philosophy of Confucianism. The paper argues that not only are most if not all types of thinking regarded in the West as ‘critical’ also present in Confucianism, but also that the Confucian philosophy presides over a particular type which increasingly tends to be neglected in the contemporary West; a type that I call ‘transformative self-critical attitude’. Through a comparison with the well-known Teaching Perspectives Inventory in higher education, the transformative self-critical attitude is used to elucidate some further aspects of the Confucian philosophy of education that may offer valuable insights to contemporary educators. (shrink)

Practical philosophy in the classical German tradition from Kant to Hegel seems to be moralistic and even ascetic. The core of its moral and legal philosophy is a concept of freedom as independence from any longing for pleasure and happiness. Tracing the development of Hegel’s philosophy of subjective, objective and absolute spirit, however, exhibits a deep systematic connection between the forms of freedom and happiness in all their traditional and modern meanings. Many of them can be compared with modern conceptions, (...) but others have to be saved from oblivion and defended against reductive conceptions of freedom and happiness in modern philosophy. (shrink)

I feel deeply honored and privileged to have the opportunity of giving the first Baffi Lecture at the Bank of Italy. Paolo Baffi was not only a distinguished banker and financial expert, he was also a remarkable economist and a visionary social thinker. He had outstanding technical expertise in many different fields, but combined his intellectual eminence with a profound sense of values. As Governor Ciampi put it at the general meeting of the Bank of Italy last May, Paolo Baffi (...) represented “an extraordinary combination of penetrating logic, erudition and moral strength … [he was] not only a gifted student of economics, he had a deep-seated commitment to act for the common good.”1 In remembering Baffi today, we must keep in mind both his intellectual contributions and his general evaluative concerns. (shrink)

Obwohl seit einiger Zeit ein verstärktes Forschungsinteresse an Emmanuel Levinas’ Denken des Politischen, verbunden mit einer genaueren Inblicknahme der zentralen Begriffe des Dritten und der Gerechtigkeit aufgekommen ist, blieb bislang unklar, inwiefern aus Levinas’ intrinsisch ‚ethischem‘ Denken in konkreterer Weise normative Konsequenzen zu ziehen sind. Diesem Desiderat versucht der vorliegende Beitrag nachzukommen. Das Levinas’sche Gerechtigkeitsdenken wird dabei so eingeführt, dass es zugleich als alternativer Entwurf und als produktive kritische Provokation für gegenwärtige Gerechtigkeitstheorien lesbar wird. Ausgehend von einer Rekonstruktion des alteritären (...) Verständnisses ethischer Subjektivität, wie es Levinas insbesondere in Jenseits des Seins erarbeitet, wird ausgelotet, wie tragfähig Levinas’ ethische Konzeption plural alteritär durchfurchter Subjektivität für normative Gerechtigkeitsfragen ist. Aus einer Reflexion auf den Begriff des ‚Dritten‘ werden einige konkrete Konsequenzen für das Denken gerechter Institutionen gezogen. (shrink)

Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim “you ought to help others” is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the rational maxim “you ought to brush your teeth twice a day”. But it seems that there is a crucial difference these two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I argue that this difference is to be understood as a difference between two kinds of normativity: demanding and recommending normativity. But the crucial task is, of course, (...) to explain the difference. In the second part of this paper, I suggest that metaethical expressivists can provide a good explanation: by extending the analysis of ordinary (non-normative) demands and recommendations to normative judgments, they can formulate a convincing account that captures the key differences between morality and rationality. (shrink)

The authors undertake a thought experiment the purpose of which is to explore possibilities for understanding moral principles in analogy with cosmic order. The experiment is based on three proposals, which are described in detail: an ontological, a neurological, and a moral proposal. The ontological proposal accepts from the phenomena of quantum physics that there is a nonempirical domain of physical reality that consists not of material things but of what is philosophically conceptualized as a realm of nonmaterial forms. This (...) realm of forms is the realm of potentiality in physical reality that quantum physics posits as an indivisible Wholeness—the One. It is the ultimate reality because everything empirical is the actualization of its forms. The neurological proposal is the hypothesis that the brain is sensitive to the potentiality waves in the cosmic field, as ordinary measuring instruments in physics are sensitive to potentiality waves at the quantum level, so that the cosmic field can communicate with the human brain. The third proposal assumes that the communication with the cosmic field can translate into moral ideas and actions. Even though the three proposals underlying the thought experiment are highly speculative, they lead to definite implications that make sense in their own right and can be applied in a useful way. From the order of reality some simple rules of conduct follow that are identical with traditional moral rules but have the character of rules of well-ness, leading to new aspects of Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia and Kant's concept of the highest good. In analogy with the structure of physical reality, where all empirical phenomena are actualizations of nonempirical forms, it is suggested that the structure of morality, too, is that of a tacit, nonempirical form that actualizes in explicit principles and moral acts through our consciousness. The tacit form is thought to exist in the realm of cosmic potentiality, together with all the other forms that the empirical world actualizes. It can appear spontaneously in our consciousness when needed, offering its guidance to our judgment and free will. Because it does not appear in the form of commandments accompanied by threats, the actions of the tacit moral form define a higher level of morality, similar to that offered by some aspects of the Christian teaching, where one acts not out of fear but on the desire to do things right. (shrink)

In ‘Human Fallibility and the Need for Forgiveness’, Claudia Blöser has proposed a Kantian account of our reasons to forgive that situates our moral fallibility as their ultimate ground. Blöser argues that Kant’s duty to be forgiving is grounded on the need to be relieved from the burden of our moral failure, a need that we all have in virtue of our moral fallible nature, regardless of whether or not we have repented. Blöser claims that Kant’s proposal yields a plausible (...) account of the normative status of forgiveness. Kant classifies the duty to be forgiving as a wide duty of virtue, and according to Blöser, this means that Kantian forgiveness is elective in the sense that forgiveness is good in general but without being obligatory in each particular case. In the course of presenting her own reconstruction of Kant’s account, Blöser also objects to some aspects of an interpretation of Kant’s theory of forgiveness which I had previously defended in my paper ‘Forgiveness and Moral Development’. Although there are a lot of points of agreement between our interpretations, the aim of this article is to highlight four key points of disagreement. These issues are worth discussing because they have implications not only for a plausible interpretation of a recognisable Kantian account of forgiveness but also for wider debates in the contemporary literature on forgiveness. First, I show that Kant is not committed to a form of weak situationism as suggested by Blöser and that Kant’s grounding of the duty to be forgiving does not appeal to moral luck. Second, I argue that although Kant’s duty to be forgiving is elective in one sense of the term, it is not elective in another important sense of the term, and that it is in fact better not to interpret Kantian imperfect duties as being elective. Third, I show that awareness of moral fallibility per se does not provide a morally appropriate ground for forgiveness and offer an alternative reconstruction of Kant’s account- in which fallibility plays a role, but it is not the main reason to forgive. Finally, I argue that Blöser’s account of the need to be forgiven is not recognisable Kantian because, from a Kantian perspective, repentance is a necessary condition for the desirability and, in fact, the very possibility of ameliorating our own guilt. (shrink)

Forgiveness is clearly an important aspect of our moral lives, yet surprisingly Kant, one of the most important authors in the history of Western ethics, seems to have very little to say about it. Some authors explain this omission by noting that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought: forgiveness seems to have an ineluctably ‘elective’ aspect which makes it to a certain extent arbitrary; thus it stands in tension with Kant’s claim that agents are autonomous beings, capable of determining (...) their own moral status through rational reflection and choice. Other authors recognise that forgiveness plays a role in Kant’s philosophy but fail to appreciate the nature of this duty and misrepresent the Kantian argument in support of it. This paper argues that there is space in Kant’s philosophy for a genuine theory of forgiveness and hopes to lay the grounds for a correct interpretation of this theory. I argue that from a Kantian perspective, forgiveness is not ‘elective’ but, at least in some cases, morally required. I claim that, for Kant, we have an imperfect duty of virtue to forgive repentant wrongdoers that have embarked on a project of self-reflection and self-reform. I develop a novel argument in support of this duty by drawing on Kant’s theory of rational agency, the thesis of radical evil, Kant’s theory of moral development, and the formula of humanity. However, it must be noted that this is a conditional duty and Kant’s position also entails that absence of repentance on the part of the wrongdoer should be taken as evidence of a lack of commitment to a project of self-reflection and self-reform. In such cases, Kant claims, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. I argue that this duty should be understood as one of the duties of self-esteem, which involves the duty to respect and recognise our own dignity as rational beings. (shrink)

The question of the relationship between faith and reason marks one of the fundamental issues for classical German philosophy. The paper is guided by a systematic interest in identifying some common features in the approaches taken by Kant and Hegel that are also of interest for the contemporary discussion: 1. The specific modernity of Kant’s and Hegel’s considerations, evident in their rejection of the resources traditionally appealed to by religion and rationalist metaphysics; 2. the anti-naturalist conviction that, in contrast to (...) animals, a metaphysical dimension is inscribed into the human mind; and 3. the thesis that metaphysical questions are existential questions arising from an impulse toward freedom, and hence that a purely theoretical approach is inadequate to address them. (shrink)

The essay recapitulates the decisive steps in Heidegger’s development of the problem of human freedom. The interpretation is set in the context of a general matrix for how freedom is treated in the tradition, as both a theoretical ontological problem, and as practical appeal. According to some readers, Heidegger’s thinking is a philosophy of freedom throughout; according to others his “turning” implies abandoning the idea of human freedom as a metaphysical remnant. The essay seeks an intermediate path, by following his (...) explicit attempts to develop an ontology based on the concept of freedom in the earlier writings, showing how this is the central theme in his confrontation and also his final break with German idealism, with Kant and with Schelling in particular, and with the prospects for a system of freedom. However, this break does not terminate his preoccupation with the problem of freedom, which is then transformed into the idea of thinking as a practice of freedom, as a way of reaching into “the free”. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag entfaltet eine grundsätzliche Kritik an konsequenzialistischen Ethiken. Unsere Kritik zielt auf den Nachweis, dass konsequenzialistische Ansätze einer methodischen Anforderung bei der Begründung eines Moralprinzips nicht gerecht werden, weil sie einen Begriff des Guten voraussetzen, ohne auf seinen epistemischen Status zu reflektieren. Es gelingt ihnen daher nicht, einen Begriff des Guten zu entwickeln, der gleichermaßen sowohl die Erkenntnis einer logischen Notwendigkeit als auch einer praktischen Relevanz zum Ausdruck bringen kann. Aus methodischen Gründen muss daher unklar bleiben, warum das, was (...) als „gut“ gesetzt und erkannt wird, auch realisiert werden muss.Wir gehen in vier Schritten vor: In einem ersten Schritt greifen wir mit dem Ziel der Verschärfung des Problems mit dem so genannten deontologischen Paradox eine der größten Herausforderungen für deontologische Ethiken auf. Wir wollen aber zeigen, dass dieses Paradox überhaupt nur formuliert werden kann, wenn bereits von einem Prinzip des Guten ausgegangen wird, ohne es in ein Verhältnis zur praktischen Vernunft des Handelnden zu setzen. Dazu rekonstruieren wir in einem zweiten Schritt Mills Beweis für das Nützlichkeitsprinzip des Utilitarismus, weil sich daran das methodische Problem einer Erkenntnis des Guten besonders gut herausarbeiten lässt. Im dritten Schritt entwickeln wir unter Rückgriff auf methodologische Überlegungen Kants aus der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft ein Argument, das zeigen soll, dass in keiner moralphilosophischen Argumentation ein Begriff des Guten einfach vorausgesetzt werden kann, ohne logisch primär die durch das Prädikat „gut“ erkannte praktische Notwendigkeit in ein Verhältnis zum Handelnden zu setzen. Das, was überhaupt als gut erkannt werden kann, ist daher durch reflexive Urteile über den Modus des praktischen Erkennens zu bestimmen. Mit diesem Ergebnis wird in einem vierten Schritt das deontologische Paradox aufgelöst. (shrink)