In both theoretical and applied contexts the concept of autonomy has assumed increasing importance in recent normative philosophical discussion. Given various problems to be clarified or resolved the author characterizes the concept by first setting out conditions of adequacy. The author then links the notion of autonomy to the identification and critical reflection of an agent upon his first-order motivations. It is only when a person identifies with the influences that motivate him, assimilates them to himself, that he is autonomous. (...) In addition this process of identification must itself meet certain procedural constraints. (shrink)

The Humean conception of the self prevalent in the contemporary literature in moral and political philosophy, philosophy of mind, and action theory has yielded a persuasive model of human action that has contributed considerably to our understanding of moral motivation, rational action, and many other issues. But it has also generated certain problems. I should like to take issue with this conception, first by describing it in some detail and charting its connection with two such interrelated problems in moral psychology. (...) Then I shall propose an alternative conception, cribbed in its essentials from Kant ’s metaphysics, that purports to do an even better job of explaining the psychological phenomena. Finally I shall argue that on the suggested alternative, these two problems do not arise. (shrink)