The debate over the value of pleasure among Eudoxus, Speusippus, and Aristotle is dramatically documented by the Nicomachean Ethics, particularly in the dialectical pros-and-cons concerning the so-called argument from contraries. Two similar versions of this argument are preserved at EN VII. 13, 1153b1–4, and X. 2, 1172b18–20. Many scholars believe that the argument at EN VII is either a report or an appropriation of the Eudoxean argument in EN X. This essay aims to revise this received view. It will explain (...) why these two arguments differ in premises, contents and purposes, and why these distinctions matter for a proper assessment of Aristotle’s understanding of pleasure and pain in general and his dialectical art in particular. (shrink)

This paper reexamines Theophrastus’ Metaphysics 11a18–26, an obscure testimony about Speusippus, the second head of the Platonic Academy. As opposed to the traditional interpretation, which takes this passage as Theophrastus’ polemic against Speusippus’ doctrine of value, I argue that he here dialectically takes advantage of, rather than launches an attack on, the Platonist. Based on this new reading, I further propose a revision and a reassessment of the ‘gloomy metaphysics’ of Speusippus which will shed new light on his ethics.

The philosophical practices undertaken in Plato's Academy remain, in the words of Cherniss, a 'riddle'. Yet surviving accounts of the views of the first two scholarchs of Plato's Academy after his death, Speusippus and Xenocrates, reveal a sophisticated engagement with their teacher's ideas concerning the pursuit of knowledge and the ends of philosophy. Speusippus and Xenocrates transform Plato's views on epistemology and happiness, and thereby help to lay the groundwork for the transformation of philosophy in the Hellenistic era.

The Heirs of Plato is the first book exclusively devoted to an in-depth study of the various directions in philosophy taken by Plato's followers in the first seventy years or so following his death in 347 BC--the period generally known as 'The Old Academy'. Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, the three successive heads of the Academy in this period, though personally devoted to the memory of Plato, were independent philosophers in their own right, and felt free to develop his heritage in (...) individual directions. Dillon's clear and accessible book fills a significant gap in our understanding of Plato's immediate philosophical influence, and will be of great value to scholars and historians of ancient philosophy. (shrink)

The last phase of Greek philosophy has until recently been less intelligently studied than any other, and in our understanding of its development there are still lamentable lacunae. Three errors in particular have in the past prevented a proper appreciation of Plotinus' place in the history of philosophy. The first was the failure to distinguish Neoplatonism from Platonism: this vitiates the work of many early exponents from Ficinus down to Kirchner. The second was the belief that the Neoplatonists, being ‘mystics,’ (...) were necessarily incomprehensible to the plain man or even to the plain philosopher. To have encouraged the persistence of this superstition in the nineteenth century is the least pardonable of Creuzer's many sins. The third was the chronological confusion involved in the ascription to Saint Paul's contemporary of the works of the pretended Dionysius Areopagita, which contain a fully-developed Neoplatonic theology. Though the fraud had been exposed by Scaliger, these writings continued down to the beginning of the nineteenth century to be used as evidence that the ‘Nsoplatonic trinity’ was an inferior imitation of the Christian one. When this false trail was at length abandoned the fashion for orientalizing explanations persisted in another guise: to the earliest historians of Neoplatonism, Simon and Vacherot, the school of Plotinus was ‘the school of Alexandria,’ and its inspiration was mainly Egyptian. Vacherot says of Neoplatonism that it is ‘essentially and radically oriental, having nothing of Greek thought but its language and procedure.’ Few would be found to-day to subscribe to so sweeping a pronouncement; but the existence of an important oriental element in Plotinus' thought is still affirmed by many French and German writers. (shrink)

Aristotle and Eudemus report a Speusippean argument to the effect that defining anything requires knowing everything. Scholars have failed to make sense of this argument. This paper argues that the main preoccupations to which the Puzzle is meant to respond are: (i) to ensure the co-extensiveness of the definition with the definiendum; (ii) to rule out a particular definitional mistake—underdivision. The implications of the Puzzle for Speusippus’ conception of knowledge are further explored.

In Metaphysics Λ7 1072b30–1073a3, Aristotle introduces a Speusippean theory according to which ‘what is most beautiful and best is not en archēi’. Through a detailed analysis of the passage, I argue that Aristotle’s refutation of Speusippus’ thesis is favoured by the introduction of the seed example, which conflates both ontological and temporal priority. The elements gathered from the analysis of Aristotle’s polemical strategy will support a broader conclusion: Speusippus’ reason not to characterise his principle(s) as (the) good is related to (...) the problematic relationship Forms and sensibles had within Plato’s account, or, in other words, participation. (shrink)

As Aristotle himself says, A.Po. 2.13 is an attempt to provide some rules to hunt out the items predicated in what something is, namely to discover definitions. Since most of this chapter is devoted to the discussion of some rules of division , it may be inferred that somehow division plays a central role in the discovery of definitions. However, in the following pages I shall not discuss what this role is. Nor shall I discuss what place division has in (...) the wider discussion of definition and explanation as it emerges from A.Po. 2. 1 shall rather focus on the argument that Aristotle reports and discusses in A.Po. 2.13.97a6–22, and which our extant sources ascribe to Speusippus. As will become clear later on, this argument undermines the possibility of giving any definition, and Aristotle deals with it here because he can block it by exploiting some properties of the method of division. (shrink)

Cet article vise à comprendre si une quelconque notion d’“intermédiaire” joue un rôle dans le système de Speusippe. Je commence en étudiant cette question vis-à-vis des objets mathématiques. Étant donné que je souscris au modèle épisodique du monde de Speusippe, je propose que la seule signification possible de μεταξύ dans son système est celle d’une simple position. En effet, dans un monde épisodique, la distinction ontologique radicale qui délimite chaque couche de réalité demande une signification de μεταξύ qui n’indique rien (...) de plus que l’emplacement d’un élément dans un classement d’êtres. Cette conclusion nous fournit cependant un candidat inhabituel pour le rôle d’“intermédiaire” : l’âme. En effet, la notion d’“intermédiaire”, si elle est prise comme un concept heuristique, nous permet de voir l’âme de Speusippe sous un jour différent. Plus précisément, étant donné que l’âme est une substance spécifique, je soutiens que son caractère intermédiaire ne repose ni dans sa composition ontologique mixte ni dans son statut d’objet ontologique intermédiaire. Au contraire, l’âme peut être considérée comme un intermédiaire dans la mesure où elle est ce qui confère aux êtres humains leurs fonctions cognitives par une interaction avec le corps. (shrink)

‘There are important differences between Aristotle's account of homonymy and synonymy on the one hand, and Speusippus' on the other; in particular, Aristotle treated homonymy and synonymy as properties of things, whereas Speusippus treated them as properties of words. Despite this difference, in certain significant passages Aristotle fell under the influence of Speusippus and used die words “homonymous” and “synonymous” in their Speusippan senses.’.