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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
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Change blindness.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.details
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Intentionalism and intransitivity.Max Deutsch - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):1-22.details
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Phenomenal continua and the sorites.Delia Graff Fara - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):905-935.details
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Representation and explanation.David Papineau - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (December):550-72.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.details
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The case for phenomenal externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-35.details
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Inverted earth, swampman, and representationalism.Michael Tye - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:459-78.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Inverted earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.details
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Is experiencing just representing? [REVIEW]Ned Block - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663-670.details
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Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.details
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The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.details
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The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Is Experiencing Just Representing?Ned Block - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Is Experiencing Just Representing?Ned Block - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663-670.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.David Sosa & Fred Dretske - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):429.details
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The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):17-35.details
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Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism.Michael Tye - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):459-477.details
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Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.William G. Lycan, Penelope Maddy, Gideon Rosen & Nathan Salmon - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:69–91.details
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