Switch to: Citations

References in:

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling

In A. Hajek & C. Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Applications.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Wolfgang Spohn presents the first full account of the dynamic laws of belief, by means of ranking theory. This book is his long-awaited presentation of ranking theory and its ramifications.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • Independent Opinions?Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann - unknown
    Democratic decision-making is often defended on grounds of the ‘wisdom of crowds’: decisions are more likely to be correct if they are based on many independent opinions, so a typical argument in social epistemology. But what does it mean to have independent opinions? Opinions can be probabilistically dependent even if individuals form their opinion in causal isolation from each other. We distinguish four probabilistic notions of opinion independence. Which of them holds depends on how individuals are causally affected by environmental (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • On the Formal Properties of Weighted Averaging as a Method of Aggregation.Carl Wagner - 1985 - Synthese 62 (1):97 - 108.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review.Christian List - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
    This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
    Suppose that the members of a group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, and imagine that the group itself has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   160 citations  
  • The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
    Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review.Christian List - manuscript
    This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Marc Pauly & Martin Hees - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569-585.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth J. Arrow - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   362 citations  
  • Aggregating Subjective Probabilities: Some Limitative Theorems.Carl Wagner - 1984 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 25 (3):233-240.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Many-Valued Judgment Aggregation: Characterizing the Possibility/Impossibility Boundary.Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins - unknown
    A model of judgment aggregation is presented in which judgments on propositions are not binary but come in degrees. The primitives are a set of propositions, an entailment relation, and a “triangular norm” which establishes a lower bound on the degree to which a proposition is true whenever it is entailed by a set of propositions. Under standard assumptions, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the collective judgments to be both deductively closed and free from veto power. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations