Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game.Raphaële Préget, Phu Nguyen-Van & Marc Willinger - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (4):581-599.
    We rely on the methodology of Fischbacher et al. :397–404, 2001) in order to identify subjects’ behavioral types. We then link the likelihood to act as a leader in a repeated public goods game to the elicited behavioral types. The leader in a group is defined as the subject who voluntarily decides in the first place about his contribution. The leader’s contribution is then reported publicly to the remaining group members who take their contribution decisions simultaneously. Our main findings are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations.Ganna Pogrebna, David H. Krantz, Christian Schade & Claudia Keser - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (4):473-502.
    We use a sequential voluntary contribution game to compare the relative impact of a first-mover’s non-binding announcement versus binding commitment on cooperation. We find that a non-binding announcement and a binding commitment increase individual contributions to a similar extent. Since announced contributions systematically exceed commitments, in sessions with a non-binding announcement, second-movers tend to contribute more to the group activity than in sessions with a binding commitment. Yet, second-movers appear to be more motivated towards achieving a social optimum when the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Communication, leadership and coordination failure.Lu Dong, Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (4):557-584.
    We investigate the limits of communication and leadership in avoiding coordination failure in minimum effort games. Our environment is challenging, with low benefits of coordination relative to the effort cost. We consider two leader types: cheap-talk leader-communicators who suggest an effort level, and first-mover leaders who lead by example. Both types of leadership have some ability to increase effort in groups with no history, but are insufficient in groups with a history of low effort. Using the strategy method for followers’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes.Jean-Jacques Rousseau & F. C. Green - 1942 - Philosophy 17 (66):185-186.
    Originally published in 1941, this book contains the French text of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 1755 treatise Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes, in which he examines the artificial origins of human social structures designed to keep one group elevated above another. The preface by F. C. Green provides the historical context for Rousseau's essay and explains its influence on the authors of the French Revolution. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations