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3.Wesley C. Salmon - 1984 - In Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton University Press. pp. 78-109.details
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Falsificationism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs' in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave.Imre Lakatos - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism.Brian P. Mclaughlin - 1992 - In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. New York: W. de Gruyter. pp. 49-93.details
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Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].details
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II—James Woodward: Mechanistic Explanation: Its Scope and Limits.James Woodward - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):39-65.details
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Stalking the elusive physicalist thesis: Daniel Stoljar: Physicalism. New York: Routledge, 2010, 252pp, $35.95 PB, $140.00 HB. [REVIEW]D. Gene Witmer - 2011 - Metascience 21 (1):71-75.details
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On characterizing the physical.Jessica Wilson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.details
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Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth.T. S. Weston & Larry Laudan - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (4):614.details
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Models and mechanisms in psychological explanation.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):313-338.details
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Current Physics and 'the Physical'.Agustín Vicente - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):393-416.details
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The Empirical Stance.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2002 - Yale University Press.details
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The Empirical Stance.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2002 - Yale University Press.details
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What's Old Is New Again: Kemeny-Oppenheim Reduction at Work in Current Molecular Neuroscience.Kari Theurer & John Bickle - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiae 17 (2):89-113.details
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Seventeenth-Century Mechanism: An Alternative Framework for Reductionism.Kari L. Theurer - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):907-918.details
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Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science.Nigel Stepp, Anthony Chemero & Michael T. Turvey - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):425-437.details
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Note on the Completeness of ‘Physics’.David Spurrett & David Papineau - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):25-29.details
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Descartes and modern neuroscience.C. U. M. Smith - 1999 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 42 (3):356-371.details
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Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.details
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Approaches to reduction.Kenneth F. Schaffner - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (2):137-147.details
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Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World.Wesley C. Salmon - 1984 - Princeton University Press.details
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Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 1951 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.details
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Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.details
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Minds and Machines.Joseph S. Ullian - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (1):177-177.details
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Physicalism; the Philosophical Foundations. [REVIEW]Keith Campbell - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):223-226.details
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Physicalism, the philosophical foundations.Jeffrey Stephen Poland - 1994 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Chomsky's Challenge to Physicalism.Jeffrey Poland - 2003 - In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 29–48.details
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Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):283-311.details
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Preface.Barry Loewer - 1987 - Synthese 70 (2):157-157.details
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Physicalism as an attitude.Alyssa Ney - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):1 - 15.details
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Defining physicalism.Alyssa Ney - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1033-1048.details
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The Structure of Science.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):275-275.details
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The body problem.Barbara Montero - 1999 - Noûs 33 (2):183-200.details
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A defense of the via negativa argument for physicalism.Barbara Montero & David Papineau - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):233-237.details
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A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):262-264.details
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A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modem Materialism. [REVIEW]Andrew Botterell - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.details
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Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.details
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Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino - 1990 - Princeton University Press.details
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An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.details
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Abstraction and the Organization of Mechanisms.Arnon Levy & William Bechtel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):241-261.details
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Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations.Robert Kirk - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):92.details
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Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory.Jaegwon Kim - 1972 - The Monist 56 (2):177-192.details
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Phenomenal properties, psychophysical laws and the identity theory.Jaegwon Kim - 1972 - The Monist 56 (April):178-92.details
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On reduction.John Kemeny & Paul Oppenheim - 1956 - Philosophical Studies 7 (1-2):6 - 19.details
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On Reduction.John G. Kemeny & Paul Oppenheim - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (2):316-317.details
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The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective.David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.details
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Moving parts: the natural alliance between dynamical and mechanistic modeling approaches.David Michael Kaplan - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (6):757-786.details
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Why ‘non-mental’ won’t work: on Hempel’s dilemma and the characterization of the ‘physical’.Neal Judisch - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):299 - 318.details
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