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Indexical Relativism versus genuine relativism.Max Kölbel - 2004 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297 – 313.details
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The evidence for relativism.Max Kölbel - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):375-395.details
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Moral Fictionalism.Andrew Fisher - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):145-148.details
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Rethinking intrinsic value.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.details
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Rethinking intrinsic value.Shelly Kagan - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):97--114.details
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Merely Verbal Disputes.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):11-30.details
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Lewis and Blackburn on quasi-realism and fictionalism.C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):315–319.details
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Realism, truth and truth aptness.Frank Jackson - 1994 - Philosophical Books 35 (3):162-169.details
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Minimalism and truth aptness.Michael Smith, Frank Jackson & Graham Oppy - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):287 - 302.details
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Truth wronged: Crispin Wright's truth and objectivity.Ian Rumfitt - 1995 - Ratio 8 (1):100-107.details
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Disagreement Without Error.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):143-154.details
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Varieties of disagreement and predicates of taste.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.details
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The value of truth.Paul Horwich - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):347–360.details
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Realism Minus Truth. [REVIEW]Paul Horwich - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):877-881.details
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Norms of truth and meaning.Paul Horwich - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47:19-34.details
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Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.details
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A Defense Of Minimalism.Paul Horwich - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):149-165.details
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What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?Robert Hopkins - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.details
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Moral testimony and moral epistemology.Alison Hills - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):94-127.details
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Supererogation.Douglas N. Walton - 1985 - Noûs 19 (2):284-288.details
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Supererogation.David Heyd - 2008 - Noûs.details
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VI*—The Disinterested Search for Truth.Jane Heal - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):97-108.details
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A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (2):57-81.details
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Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values.Stephen R. Grimm - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):725-744.details
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Truth and correct belief.Allan Gibbard - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.details
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Relativism, vagueness and what is said.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2008 - In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 129.details
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How to define intrinsic properties.Robert Francescotti - 1999 - Noûs 33 (4):590-609.details
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Truth. Paul Horwich. [REVIEW]Hartry Field - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (2):321-330.details
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Disquotational truth and factually defective discourse.Hartry Field - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):405-452.details
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Deflationist views of meaning and content.Hartry Field - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):249-285.details
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The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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Belief and normativity.Pascal Engel - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):179-203.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.details
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Truth as a Substantive Property.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.details
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Simplifying alethic pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.details
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How to solve the problem of mixed conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):143-149.details
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The suberogatory.Julia Driver - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):286 – 295.details
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Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise.Julia Driver - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):619-644.details
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Relativism (and expressivism) and the problem of disagreement.James Dreier - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):79-110.details
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Expressivist embeddings and minimalist truth.James Dreier - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.details
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A Prosentential theory of truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.details
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There is no Norm of truth: A minimalist reply to Wright.Julian Dodd - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):291–299.details
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There is no norm of truth: a minimalist reply to Wright.J. Dodd - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):291-299.details
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Audience in Context.Dan López de Sa - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):241-253.details
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Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.details
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On the nature of truth and falsehood.Bertrand Russell - 1910 - In Philosophical Essays. Longmans, Green.details
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