The paper outlines an attempt at phenomenological description of two intermingled dimensions of human vulnerability. First, vulnerability understood as an essential dimension in the constitution of embodiment and second, vulnerability in regard to trust, as a form of emotive interpersonal disposition. In either case, vulnerability does not only refer to mere physical fragility but to the situational horizon where from emerge progressive anticipations of “possible harm”. According to this account, vulnerability appears as a practical horizon of emotional awareness of risk (...) involving not only bodily fragility but a dimension of concrete existence of individual persons, namely, the intimate affectation of being harmed, injured or deprived or a practical aim. In this context the paper claims for a second and more radical sense of vulnerability that problematize the classical account of emotive protentionality, following Anthony Steinbock´s description of moral emotions. In this regard, vulnerability of trust involves an emotional risk and fragility that opens to consideration a dimension of human existence revealing human persons in their absolute and individual concreteness. (shrink)