- Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
|
|
On behalf of controversial view agnosticism.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1358-1370.details
|
|
Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement.Sanford Goldberg - 2012 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge. pp. 277-294.details
|
|
Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
|
|
Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
|
|
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
|
|
The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):17-35.details
|
|
The Definition of Lying and Deception.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech.Sanford Goldberg - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2014 - Malden, MA: Polity.details
|
|
Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. [REVIEW]David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.details
|
|
Norms of assertion.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 233--250.details
|
|
The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice. The case of Homo floresiensis.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (2):169-177.details
|
|
The Role of the Priority Rule in Science.Michael Strevens - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):55-79.details
|
|
Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.details
|
|
A justificationist view of disagreement’s epistemic significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-154.details
|
|
Philosophical Renegades.Bryan Frances - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 121-166.details
|
|
Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.details
|
|
Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
|
|
Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
|
|
The division of cognitive labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.details
|
|
Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.details
|
|
Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
|
|
How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
|
|
Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2019 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
|
|
Publishing without belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.details
|
|
Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
|
|
A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.details
|
|
``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
|
|
``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
|
|
``Knowing and Asserting".Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
|
|
Argumentation: its adaptiveness and efficacy.Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):94-111.details
|
|
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
|
|