- (1 other version)On Action.Richard Malpas - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):134.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.details
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(2 other versions)The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom.Carl Ginet & Hugh J. McCann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):632.details
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On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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(1 other version)Conversation and Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Who Knew?: Responsiblity Without Awareness.George Sher - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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(1 other version)The Nature and Ethics of Blame.Neal A. Tognazzini D. Justin Coates - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.details
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Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility.Randolph K. Clarke - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Conversation & Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2012 - , US: Oup Usa.details
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Two Faces of Responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.details
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Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic norms without voluntary control.Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):599-632.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
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Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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The force and fairness of blame.Pamela Hieronymi - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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Involuntary sins.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):3-31.details
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(1 other version)An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.details
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The Concept of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible.Angela M. Smith - 2007 - The Journal of Ethics 11 (4):465-484.details
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(1 other version)‘“Ought” Implies “CAN”’1: PHILOSOPHY.G. P. Henderson - 1966 - Philosophy 41 (156):101-112.details
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Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
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The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.details
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Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account.Angela M. Smith - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):575-589.details
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Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility.David Shoemaker - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):602-632.details
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Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance.Holly M. Smith - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):115-146.details
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An essay on moral responsibility.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1988 - Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.details
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(1 other version)Intentional action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.details
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Restoring control: Comments on George Sher. [REVIEW]Neil Levy - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (2):213-221.details
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The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will and Freedom.Hugh McCann - 1998 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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(1 other version)On Action.Jennifer Hornsby - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498-500.details
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Direct control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.details
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The Intention/Volition Debate.Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.details
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Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):29 - 37.details
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Free Will and Agential Powers.Randolph Clarke & Thomas Reed - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Moral Responsibility 3:6-33.details
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(1 other version)The Nature and Ethics of Blame.D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.details
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The truth about tracing.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):531-556.details
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The Will. A Dual Aspect Theory.B. O'shaughnessy - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (3):497-498.details
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(1 other version)The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
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The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy.Neil Levy - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2):1-16.details
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(1 other version)The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
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Introduction.Erin McKenna - 2013 - The Pluralist 8 (3):113-113.details
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On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Mind 100 (3):390-394.details
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(1 other version)"Ought" Implies "Can".G. P. Henderson - 1966 - Philosophy 41 (156):101 - 112.details
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An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’.Paul Henne, Vladimir Chituc, Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):283-290.details
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