Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Experiential blindness revisited: In defense of a case of embodied cognition.N. Gangopadhyay - 2010 - Cognitive Systems Research 11:396-407.
    The sensorimotor theory (Noe¨, 2004, in press) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience despite no sensory impairment. The phenomenon dubbed “experiential blindness” is cited as evidence for a constitutive relation between sensorimotor skills and perceptual experience. Recently it has been objected (Adams & Aizawa, 2008; Aizawa, 2007) that the cases described by Noe¨ as experiential blindness are cases of pure sensory deficit. This paper argues that while the objections bring out limitations of Noe¨’s sensorimotor theory they do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?Tim Van Gelder - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (7):345 - 381.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   305 citations  
  • Can social interaction constitute social cognition?Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo & Shaun Gallagher - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):441-447.
    An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in social cognition. We show that interactive processes are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   233 citations  
  • Towards a General Theory of Antirepresentationalism.Francisco Calvo Garzón - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):259-292.
    This work represents an attempt to stake out the landscape for dynamicism based on a radical dismissal of the information-processing paradigm that dominates the philosophy of cognitive science. In Section 2, after setting up the basic toolkit of a theory of minimal representationalism, I introduce the central tenets of dynamic systems theory (DST) by discussing recent research in the dynamics of embodiment (Thelen et al. [2001]) in the perseverative-reaching literature. A recent proposal on the dynamics of representation--the dynamic field approach (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Extended Vision.Robert A. Wilson - 2010 - In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, action, and consciousness: sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems. New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    Vision constitutes an interesting domain, or range of domains, for debate over the extended mind thesis, the idea that minds physically extend beyond the boundaries of the body. In part this is because vision and visual experience more particularly are sometimes presented as a kind of line in the sand for what we might call externalist creep about the mind: once all reasonable concessions have been made to externalists about the mind, visual experience marks a line beyond which lies a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension.Andy Clark (ed.) - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark argues that the human mind is not bound inside the head but extends into body and environment.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   729 citations  
  • Enactivism and the unity of perception and action.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Julian Kiverstein - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):63-73.
    This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Inference or interaction: Social cognition without precursors.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):163 – 174.
    In this paper I defend interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). IT opposes the basic suppositions that both TT and ST depend upon. I argue that the various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines. They are not replaced or displaced by such capacities in adulthood, but rather continue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   111 citations  
  • Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind.Evan Thompson - 2007 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    The question has long confounded philosophers and scientists, and it is this so-called explanatory gap between biological life and consciousness that Evan ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   866 citations  
  • After the Philosophy of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science.Tony Chemero & Michael Silberstein - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (1):1-27.
    We provide a taxonomy of the two most important debates in the philosophy of the cognitive and neural sciences. The first debate is over methodological individualism: is the object of the cognitive and neural sciences the brain, the whole animal, or the animal--environment system? The second is over explanatory style: should explanation in cognitive and neural science be reductionist-mechanistic, inter-level mechanistic, or dynamical? After setting out the debates, we discuss the ways in which they are interconnected. Finally, we make some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  • (1 other version)The shared circuits model. How control, mirroring, and simulation can enable imitation and mind reading.Susan Hurley - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines; it is here surveyed under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring and simulation. It is cast at a middle, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science.Tim van Gelder - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28.
    According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   216 citations  
  • Doing without representing?Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3):401-31.
    Connectionism and classicism, it generally appears, have at least this much in common: both place some notion of internal representation at the heart of a scientific study of mind. In recent years, however, a much more radical view has gained increasing popularity. This view calls into question the commitment to internal representation itself. More strikingly still, this new wave of anti-representationalism is rooted not in armchair theorizing but in practical attempts to model and understand intelligent, adaptive behavior. In this paper (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   184 citations  
  • Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
    "Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   930 citations  
  • A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   752 citations  
  • (1 other version)Understanding the embodiment of perception.Kenneth Aizawa - 2006 - APA Proceedings and Addresses 79 (3):5-25.
    Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Nos (2004) theory of enactive perception provides one proposal. Where it is commonly thought that.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception[REVIEW]Ned Block - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):259-272.
    This is a charming and engaging book that combines careful attention to the phenomenology of experience with an appreciation of the psychology and neuroscience of perception. In some of its aimsfor example, to show problems with a rigid version of a view of visual perception as an inverse optics process of constructing a static 3-D representation from static 2-D information on the retina--it succeeds admirably. As No points out, vision is a process that depends on interactions between the perceiver and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • Vision as dance? Three challenges for sensorimotor contingency theory.Andy Clark - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    In _Action in Perception _Alva No develops and presents a sensorimotor account of vision and of visual consciousness. According to such an account seeing (and indeed perceiving more generally) is analysed as a kind of skilful bodily activity. Such a view is consistent with the emerging emphasis, in both philosophy and cognitive science, on the critical role of embodiment in the construction of intelligent agency. I shall argue, however, that the full sensorimotor model faces three important challenges. The first is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Discrete thoughts: Why cognition must use discrete representations.Eric Dietrich & Arthur B. Markman - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (1):95-119.
    Advocates of dynamic systems have suggested that higher mental processes are based on continuous representations. In order to evaluate this claim, we first define the concept of representation, and rigorously distinguish between discrete representations and continuous representations. We also explore two important bases of representational content. Then, we present seven arguments that discrete representations are necessary for any system that must discriminate between two or more states. It follows that higher mental processes require discrete representations. We also argue that discrete (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Varieties of externalism.Susan Hurley - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 101-153.
    Externalism comes in varieties. While the landscape isn.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  • Cognition in the Wild.Edwin Hutchins - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Hutchins examines a set of phenomena that have fallen between the established disciplines of psychology and anthropology, bringing to light a new set of relationships between culture and cognition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   707 citations  
  • Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence.Andy Clark - 2003 - Oxford University Press. Edited by Alberto Peruzzi.
    In Natural-Born Cyborgs, Clark argues that what makes humans so different from other species is our capacity to fully incorporate tools and supporting cultural ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   324 citations  
  • The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1677 citations  
  • Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   357 citations  
  • I See What You Are Saying: Action as Cognition in fMRI Brain Mapping Practice.Morana Alač & Edwin Hutchins - 2004 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 4 (3-4):629-661.
    In cognitive neuroscience, functional magnetic resonance imaging is used to produce images of brain functions. These images play a central role in the practice of neuroscience. In this paper we are interested in how these brain images become understandable and meaningful for scientists. In order to explore this problem we observe how scientists use such semiotic resources as gesture, language, and material structure present in the socially and culturally constituted environment. A micro-analysis of video records of scientists interacting with each (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Amy Coplan - 2008 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (1):94-97.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   268 citations  
  • Cognition in the Wild.Edwin Hutchins - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):486-492.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   554 citations  
  • (1 other version)Understanding The Embodiment of Perception.Kenneth Aizawa - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (1):5-25.
    Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Noë’s theory of en- active perception provides one proposal. Noë suggests a radical constitutive hypothesis according to which (COH) Perceptual experiences are constituted, in part, by the exercise of sensorimotor (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945/1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
    Challenging and rewarding in equal measure, _Phenomenology of Perception_ is Merleau-Ponty's most famous work. Impressive in both scope and imagination, it uses the example of perception to return the body to the forefront of philosophy for the first time since Plato. Drawing on case studies such as brain-damaged patients from the First World War, Merleau-Ponty brilliantly shows how the body plays a crucial role not only in perception but in speech, sexuality and our relation to others.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   889 citations  
  • Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
    First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s monumental _Phénoménologie de la perception _signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers. _Phenomenology of Perception _stands in the great phenomenological tradition of Husserl, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1074 citations  
  • (1 other version)Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   182 citations  
  • Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind.Simon Baron-Cohen - 1997 - MIT Press.
    In Mindblindness, Simon Baron-Cohen presents a model of the evolution and development of "mindreading." He argues that we mindread all the time, effortlessly, automatically, and mostly unconsciously. It is the natural way in which we interpret, predict, and participate in social behavior and communication. We ascribe mental states to people: states such as thoughts, desires, knowledge, and intentions. Building on many years of research, Baron-Cohen concludes that children with autism, suffer from "mindblindness" as a result of a selective impairment in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   469 citations  
  • Mindblindness. An essay on autism and theory of mind, Cambridge, Mass, MITPTCSS, tradiit. Dautismo e la lettura della mente, Roma.S. Baron-Cohen - forthcoming - Astrolabio.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   408 citations  
  • Radical Embodied Cognitive Science.Anthony Chemero - 2009 - Bradford.
    While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach, puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and John (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   625 citations  
  • Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands.B. Latour - 1986 - Knowledge and Society 6:1--40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  • Common codes for situated interaction.Paul Cisek & John F. Kalaska - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-884.
    A common code for integrating perceptions and actions was relevant for simple behavioral guidance well before the evolution of cognitive abilities. We review proposals that representation of to-be-produced events played important roles in early behavior, and evidence that the neural mechanisms supporting such rudimentary sensory predictions have been elaborated through evolution to support the cognitive codes addressed by TEC.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Internalism, externalism, and transcendental idealism.Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Synthese 160 (3):355-374.
    The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Perception and action: Alternative views.Susan Hurley - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):3-40.
    A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected. Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  • The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception.Rick Grush - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):377-396.
    The emulation theory of representation is developed and explored as a framework that can revealingly synthesize a wide variety of representational functions of the brain. The framework is based on constructs from control theory (forward models) and signal processing (Kalman filters). The idea is that in addition to simply engaging with the body and environment, the brain constructs neural circuits that act as models of the body and environment. During overt sensorimotor engagement, these models are driven by efference copies in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   274 citations  
  • Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    In this important book, Susan Hurley sheds new light on consciousness by examining its relationships to action from various angles. She assesses the role of agency in the unity of a conscious perspective, and argues that perception and action are more deeply interdependent than we usually assume. A standard view conceives perception as input from world to mind and action as output from mind to world, with the serious business of thought in between. Hurley criticizes this picture, and considers how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   417 citations  
  • Perception, action, and experience: unraveling the golden braid.A. Clark - 2010 - In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, action, and consciousness: sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems. New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • (1 other version)Gesture and Thought.David McNeill - 2005 - University of Chicago Press.
    In Gesture and Thought he brings together years of this research, arguing that gesturing, an act which has been popularly understood as an accessory to speech, ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • Genic representation: Reconciling content and causal complexity.M. Wheeler & A. Clark - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):103-135.
    Some recent cognitive-scientific research suggests that a considerable amount of intelligent action is generated not by the systematic activity of internal representations, but by complex interactions involving neural, bodily, and environmental factors. Following an analysis of this threat to representational explanation, we pursue an analogy between the role of genes in the production of biological form and the role of neural states in the production of behaviour, in order to develop a notion of genic representation. In both cases an appeal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • The Visual Brain in Action.A. David Milner & Melvyn A. Goodale - 1995 - Oxford University Press.
    Although the mechanics of how the eye works are well understood, debate still exists as to how the complex machinery of the brain interprets neural impulses...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   398 citations  
  • Towards a cognitive robotics.Andy Clark & Rick Grush - 1999 - Adaptive Behavior 7 (1):5-16.
    There is a definite challenge in the air regarding the pivotal notion of internal representation. This challenge is explicit in, e.g., van Gelder, 1995; Beer, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler, 1994; and elsewhere. We think it is a challenge that can be met and that (importantly) can be met by arguing from within a general framework that accepts many of the basic premises of the work (in new robotics and in dynamical systems theory) that motivates such scepticism in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Action in Perception by Alva Noë. [REVIEW]Ned Block - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):259-272.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • (1 other version)Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2006 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   321 citations  
  • The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Kenneth Aizawa.
    A critique of the hypothesis of extended cognition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   451 citations  
  • Cognition in the Wild.Edward Hutchins - 1995 - Critica 27 (81):101-105.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   777 citations  
  • Vision without representation.A. Noë - 2010 - In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, action, and consciousness: sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems. New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations