- Fainthearted Conditionals.Michael Morreau - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):187.details
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Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced Retributive Account.Alec Walen - 2015 - Louisiana Law Review 76 (2):355-446.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Normalcy and the Contents of Philosophical Judgements.Georgi Gardiner - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):700-740.details
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Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.details
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The epistemic account of ceteris paribus conditions.Wolfgang Spohn - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (3):385-408.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):197-224.details
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(1 other version)Punishing the Guilty, Not Punishing the Innocent.Richard Lippke - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):462-488.details
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(1 other version)Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.details
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Juridical proof and the best explanation.Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (3):223 - 268.details
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A theory of normal and ideal conditions.Philip Pettit - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 96 (1):21-44.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Knowledge, assertion and lotteries.Keith DeRose - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568–580.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Legal risk, legal evidence and the arithmetic of criminal justice.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Jurisprudence 9 (1):108-119.details
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When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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(1 other version)The rules of trial, political morality and the costs of error: or, Is proof beyond a reasonable doubt doing more harm than good?Larry Laudan - 2011 - In Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Generics and the ways of normality.Bernhard Nickel - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (6):629-648.details
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Proper names and identifying descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1970 - Synthese 21 (3-4):335 - 358.details
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In Defence of Reasonable Doubt.Georgi Gardiner - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):221-241.details
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Dispositions and normal conditions.Jan Hauska - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):219 - 232.details
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Exploring the proof paradoxes.Mike Redmayne - 2008 - Legal Theory 14 (4):281-309.details
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