- Contractualism and the Death Penalty.Hon-Lam Li - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (2):152-182.details
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Contractualism and the Death Penalty.Li Hon Lam - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (2):152-182.details
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Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.details
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When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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Paternalism.Jessica Begon - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):355-373.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Can Self-determined Actions be Predictable?Amit Pundik - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):121-140.details
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Naked statistical evidence and verdictive justice.Sherrilyn Roush - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy:1-27.details
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The sensitivity of legal proof.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):1-23.details
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Just Probabilities.Chad Lee-Stronach - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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On Relativizing the Sensitivity Condition to Belief-Formation Methods.Bin Zhao - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):165-175.details
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Algorithmic Decision-making, Statistical Evidence and the Rule of Law.Vincent Chiao - forthcoming - Episteme.details
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The Value of Knowledge and Other Epistemic Standings: A Case for Epistemic Pluralism.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1829-1847.details
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A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge.Jonathan Vandenburgh - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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Statistical evidence and the criminal verdict asymmetry.Avital Fried - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6).details
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Knowledge, Individualised Evidence and Luck.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3791-3815.details
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The Foundations of Criminal Law Epistemology.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment.James Fritz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):573-587.details
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Probability of Guilt.Mario Günther - manuscriptdetails
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Fairness in Machine Learning: Against False Positive Rate Equality as a Measure of Fairness.Robert Long - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (1):49-78.details
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The Normative Connection Between Paternalism and Belief.Stephanie Sheintul - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (1):97-114.details
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Sensitivity Unmotivated.Haicheng Zhao - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):507-517.details
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Norms of criminal conviction.Jennifer Lackey - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):188-209.details
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Statistical evidence and incentives in the law.John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs & Vishnu Sridharan - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):128-145.details
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Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence.Jacob Smith & Georgi Gardiner - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):334-354.details
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Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law.Renée Jorgensen - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):1-17.details
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Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding.David Enoch, Talia Fisher & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):85-103.details
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Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism about the Epistemic Project.Giada Fratantonio - 2021 - International Journal of Evidence and Proof:online first.details
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An Epistemic Objection to Racial Profiling.Alexandra Lloyd - forthcoming - Tandf: Social Epistemology:1-9.details
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Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333.details
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Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.details
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De Re Beliefs and Evidence in Legal Cases.Samuel J. Thomas - 2021 - Dissertation, Arizona State Universitydetails
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Profiling, Neutrality, and Social Equality.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):808-824.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge‐norms in a common‐law crucible.Cosim Sayid - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):261-276.details
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Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3777-3795.details
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An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning.Tim Henning - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6665-6686.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):943-960.details
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Bias and interpersonal skepticism.Robert Pasnau - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):154-175.details
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Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
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Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
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Explaining the Justificatory Asymmetry between Statistical and Individualized Evidence.Renee Bolinger - 2021 - In Jon Robson & Zachary Hoskins (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge. pp. 60-76.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Recent work on the proof paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12667.details
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