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Lotteries, Knowledge, and Irrelevant Alternatives.Rachel Mckinnon - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (3):523-549.details
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The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalist.Deborah Mayo & Jean Miller - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):305 - 314.details
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Methodology in Practice: Statistical Misspecification Testing.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1007-1025.details
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Duhem's problem, the bayesian way, and error statistics, or "what's belief got to do with it?".Deborah G. Mayo - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):222-244.details
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The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Why Most Published Research Findings Are False.John P. A. Ioannidis - 2005 - PLoS Med 2 (8):e124.details
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Safety and epistemic luck.Avram Hiller & Ram Neta - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313.details
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Relevant alternatives.Mark Heller - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):23 - 40.details
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The Universal Core of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):769-786.details
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Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.details
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The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (3):288-318.details
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Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
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Profiling and Proof: Are Statistics Safe?Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (2):161-183.details
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Normalcy and the Contents of Philosophical Judgements.Georgi Gardiner - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):700-740.details
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Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.details
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Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):197-224.details
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True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.details
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Varieties of Risk.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):432-455.details
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Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.details
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Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science.Kevin Christopher Elliott & Ted Richards (eds.) - 2017 - New York: Oup Usa.details
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The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence, and science.Sherrilyn Roush - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The book of evidence.Peter Achinstein - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 86-102.details
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Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.details
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Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1982 - Critica 14 (41):87-93.details
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Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.details
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Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Knowledge and Legal Proof.Sarah Moss - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Recent Work on Radical Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):215-257.details
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Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism about the Epistemic Project.Giada Fratantonio - 2021 - International Journal of Evidence and Proof:online first.details
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Other Minds.J. L. Austin - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.details
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Evidence as Passing Severe Tests: Highly Probable versus Highly Probed Hypotheses.Deborah G. Mayo - 2005 - In P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 95--128.details
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Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.Guido Melchior - 2020 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.details
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Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (3):314-318.details
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