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You gotta do what you gotta do

Noûs 43 (1):157-177 (2009)

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  1. (4 other versions)Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50:115 - 151.
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  • (1 other version)Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
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  • (2 other versions)Language, truth and logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London,: V. Gollancz.
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  • (1 other version)Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.
    Provides a comprehensive introduction to the major philosophical theories attempting to explain the workings of language.
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  • (2 other versions)Language, Truth, and Logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London, England: Dover Publications.
    A dissertation in the tradition of logical positivism includes a discussion of the functions and methods of philosophy and a critique of ethics and theology.
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  • Is there a nexus between reasons and rationality?Michael Smith - 2007 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):279-298.
    When we say that a subject has attitudes that she is rationally required to have, does that entail that she has those attitudes for reasons? In other words, is there a deep nexus between being rational and responding to reasons? Many have argued that there is. For example, Derek Parfit tells us that 'to be rational is to respond to reasons '. But I am not so sure. I begin by considering this question in the domain of theoretical rationality. The (...)
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  • The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..
    Just as there are rational requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action. This book defends a conception of ethics, and a related conception of human nature, according to which altruism is included among the basic rational requirements on desire and action. Altruism itself depends on the recognition of the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many.
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  • Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Practical Reality is a lucid original study of the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. Jonathan Dancy maintains that current philosophical orthodoxy bowdlerizes this relation, making it impossible to understand how anyone can act for a good reason. By giving a fresh account of values and reasons, he finds a place for normativity in philosophy of mind and action, and strengthens the connection between these areas and ethics.
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  • (1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  • The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
    What is the Moral Problem? NORMATIVE ETHICS VS. META-ETHICS It is a common fact of everyday life that we appraise each others' behaviour and attitudes from ...
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  • (1 other version)Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    This book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational?
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  • Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
    Normative requirements are often overlooked, but they are central features of the normative world. Rationality is often thought to consist in acting for reasons, but following normative requirements is also a major part of rationality. In particular, correct reasoning – both theoretical and practical – is governed by normative requirements rather than by reasons. This article explains the nature of normative requirements, and gives examples of their importance. It also describes mistakes that philosophers have made as a result of confusing (...)
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  • Backgrounding desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592.
    Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision making, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in (...)
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  • The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.
    The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good. This agent (...)
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  • Assertion.Peter Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
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  • Direction of fit.I. Lloyd Humberstone - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):59-83.
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  • (2 other versions)Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed.Alfred J. Ayer - 1946 - New York: Dover.
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  • (2 other versions)Ways of meaning.Mark Platts - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):141-156.
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  • (1 other version)Language, Truth, and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - Philosophy 23 (85):173-176.
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  • The Moral Problem.Stephen Darwall - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):508-515.
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  • (1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
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  • Spreading the Word. [REVIEW]Kent Bach - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (1):120.
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  • (2 other versions)Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Essay 1.
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  • (1 other version)Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
    What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common-sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation. The defense no doubt requires some redeployment, but not more or less complete abandonment of the position, as (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
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  • (2 other versions)Ways of Meaning.Martin Bell & Mark De Bretton Platts - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119):164.
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  • (1 other version)Reasons and motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
    When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...)
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  • Access externalism.John Gibbons - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):19-39.
    This paper argues for externalism about justification on the basis of thought experiments. I present cases in which two individuals are intrinsically and introspectively indistinguishable and in which intuitively, one is justified in believing that p while the other is not. I also examine an argument for internalism based on the ideas that we have privileged access to whether or not our own beliefs are justified and that only internalism is compatible with this privilege. I isolate what I take to (...)
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  • Reasons and motivation: John Broome.John Broome - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
    Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.
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  • Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.
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  • (4 other versions)Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.
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  • How to Argue about Practical Reason.R. Jay Wallace - 1990 - Mind 99 (395):355-385.
    How to Argue about . Bibliographic Info. Citation. How to Argue about ; Author(s): R. Jay Wallace; Source: Mind , New Series, Vol.
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  • (2 other versions)Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):211-215.
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  • The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.
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  • (1 other version)Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.
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  • (2 other versions)Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Mind 94 (374):310-319.
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  • Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Alan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.
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  • (1 other version)Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John McDowell & I. G. McFetridge - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 (1):13-42.
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  • (1 other version)Précis of Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):423-428.
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  • (1 other version)Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1):99-130.
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  • (2 other versions)Ways of Meaning.Mark Platts - 1980 - Mind 89 (355):454-456.
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  • A priority as an evaluative notion.Hartry Field - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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  • Spreading the world.Simon Blackburn - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3):385-387.
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  • 1. the concept of apriority.Hartry Field - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 117.
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  • (1 other version)Michael Smith: The Moral Problem. [REVIEW]James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
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  • How to Argue About Practical Reason.J. R. Wallace - 1990 - Mind 99:355.
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