- ¿Puedo reconocer a un par distante? Una consecuencia del desacuerdo profundo entre pares epistémicos.Ignacio Madroñal - 2023 - Filosofia Unisinos 24 (2):1-14.details
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When warrant transmits.James Pryor - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field & Bruno Jacinto - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-53.details
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El escepticismo williamsoniano sobre la utilidad epistémica de la distinción a priori/a posteriori.Emilio Méndez Pinto - 2023 - Dissertation, National Autonomous University of Mexicodetails
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Indeterminacy, coincidence, and “Sourcing Newness” in mathematical research.James V. Martin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-23.details
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The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.details
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Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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واقعگرایی در نظام معرفتاخلاقی علامه طباطبایی.ابوذر نوروزی & محسن شیراوند - 2018 - حکمت معاصر 9 (1):85-110.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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Articulating the A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction.Albert Casullo - 2014 - In Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification. Oup Usa. pp. 289-327.details
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Annotated Bibliography on A Priori Knowledge.Albert Casullo - 2014 - In Essays on a Priori Knowledge and Justification. Oup Usa. pp. 329-339.details
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Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Desacuerdos Básicos entre Pares Epistémicos.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (168):81-99.details
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Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.details
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Epistemic Norms: Truth Conducive Enough.Lisa Warenski - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2721-2741.details
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Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.details
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Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge.Elizabeth Tropman - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (33):459-467.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (2):57-68.details
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How to Be an Ethical Expressivist.Alex Silk - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):47-81.details
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The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of “The Will to Believe”.Nishi Shah & Jeffrey Kasser - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):1-17.details
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Scepticism, defeasible evidence and entitlement.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):439-455.details
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Tempered expressivism.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics (1).details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
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Transparent Contents and Trivial Inferences.Mirco Sambrotta - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):9-28.details
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On Linguistic Evidence for Expressivism.Andrés Soria Ruiz & Isidora Stojanovic - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:155-180.details
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Kitcher, Mathematics, and Apriority.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):687-702.details
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A Priori Justification in Nietzsche.Justin Remhof - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (3):261-276.details
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Resolute conciliationism.John Pittard - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):442-463.details
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Review : 'New Essays on the A Priori' ed. by P. Boghossian & C Peacocke. [REVIEW]Graham Oppy - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):384-6.details
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Evidential holism.Joe Morrison - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (6):e12417.details
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Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 193.details
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Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity: The Case of Historiography.Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (5):331-363.details
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Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.details
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The metaethics of belief: An expressivist reading of "the will to believe".Jeff Kasser & Nishi Shah - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):1 – 17.details
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Justification magnets.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):93-111.details
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A priori knowledge: Debates and developments.C. S. Jenkins - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):436–450.details
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Three challenges (and three replies) to the ethics of belief.Brian Huss - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):249-271.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):250-282.details
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Unrevisability.Christopher S. Hill - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3015-3031.details
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A defense of objectivism about evidential support.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):716-743.details
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Naturalistic Moral Realism and Moral Disagreement: David Copp’s Account.Mark Hanin - 2012 - Res Publica 18 (4):283-301.details
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Unity and Application.Geoffrey Hall - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.details
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Theorizing justification.Peter J. Graham - 2010 - In Joseph Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harvey Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 45-72.details
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You gotta do what you gotta do.John Gibbons - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):157-177.details
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¿Intuición o confianza racional?María D. García Arnaldos - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (2):49.details
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