Criterion referenced assessment, if high stakes is not compatible with the development of rich knowledge and understanding in schools.

This article provides a conceptual map of the debate on ideal and non‐ideal theory. It argues that this debate encompasses a number of different questions, which have not been kept sufficiently separate in the literature. In particular, the article distinguishes between the following three interpretations of the ‘ideal vs. non‐ideal theory’ contrast: (i) full compliance vs. partial compliance theory; (ii) utopian vs. realistic theory; (iii) end‐state vs. transitional theory. The article advances critical reflections on each of these sub‐debates, and highlights (...) areas for future research in the field. (shrink)

The paper argues that no criterion-referenced assessment system can achieve both reliability and validity at one and the same time. It shows that the reasons for this are conceptual, and hence that empirical research into the‘problem’ is a waste of money and effort. Considerable discussion is devoted to ideas of knowledge and understanding, and to proper educational objectives pertaining to these. Much reference is made to the current National Curriculum context in the United Kingdom, and conclusions are drawn for appropriate (...) educational policy in this area. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse the Deweyan account of thinking and subject and discuss the educational consequences that follow from such an account. I argue that despite the grouping of thinking and reflective thought that has largely appeared in the interpretation of Deweyan work, Dewey discloses an inescapable uncertainty at the core of human thinking. This move is even more challenging given Dewey's firm faith in the power of intelligent action, and in education as the means by which human beings (...) grow and create meaningful existence. I argue that throughout his work, Dewey dismantled the understanding of the subject as a detached and self-assured centre of agency. In Deweyan understanding, on one hand, the subject is empowered to reflect on experience and to use this reflection to evolve new ways of acting, thus pushing experience forward. On the other hand, by acting, the subject can create new points of interaction within experience. This understanding of thinking and subject has far-reaching consequences for education, which must be conceived not so much as the attempt to master and control experience but as the means to create new, unpredictable experience by putting new points of interactions into our relationship with the environment, changing our being-embedded-in-the-world. Dewey repositions educational, intentional agency away from control and mastery and in the direction of growth and openness. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse the Deweyan account of thinking and subject and discuss the educational consequences that follow from such an account. I argue that despite the grouping of thinking and reflective thought that has largely appeared in the interpretation of Deweyan work, Dewey discloses an inescapable uncertainty at the core of human thinking. This move is even more challenging given Dewey's firm faith in the power of intelligent action, and in education as the means by which human beings (...) grow and create meaningful existence. I argue that throughout his work, Dewey dismantled the understanding of the subject as a detached and self-assured centre of agency. In Deweyan understanding, on one hand, the subject is empowered to reflect on experience and to use this reflection to evolve new ways of acting, thus pushing experience forward. On the other hand, by acting, the subject can create new points of interaction within experience. This understanding of thinking and subject has far-reaching consequences for education, which must be conceived not so much as the attempt to master and control experience but as the means to create new, unpredictable experience by putting new points of interactions into our relationship with the environment, changing our being-embedded-in-the-world. Dewey repositions educational, intentional agency away from control and mastery and in the direction of growth and openness. (shrink)

The distinguished author of books on psychology, ethics, and politics, John Dewey specialized in the philosophy of education. In this landmark work on public education, Dewey discusses methods of providing quality public education in a democratic society. First published close to 90 years ago, Democracy and Education sounded the call for a revolution in education, stressing growth, experience, and activity as factors that promote a democratic character in students and lead to the advancement of self and society. Unabridged reproduction of (...) the classic 1916 edition. (shrink)

Assessment is at the heart of teaching as it provides a necessary condition for judging success or failure. It is also necessary to ensure that providers of education are accountable to users and providers of resources. Inferential hazard is an inescapable part of any assessment procedure but cannot be an argument against assessment as such. Rich knowledge may be the aim of education but it does not follow that it is the aim of every stage of education. Teaching to tests (...) is the most natural way of ensuring that teaching matches assessment. Failure to assess places public education in jeopardy. (shrink)

Assessment is at the heart of teaching as it provides a necessary condition for judging success or failure. It is also necessary to ensure that providers of education are accountable to users and providers of resources. Inferential hazard is an inescapable part of any assessment procedure but cannot be an argument against assessment as such. Rich knowledge may be the aim of education but it does not follow that it is the aim of every stage of education. Teaching to tests (...) is the most natural way of ensuring that teaching matches assessment. Failure to assess places public education in jeopardy. (shrink)

This paper argues that egalitarianism, in itself and as a basis for educational policy, is unacceptable. Three recent defences of it are examined and rejected. Three anti-egalitarian positions, however, all of which stress sufficiency rather than equality, pass muster. Educational implications are followed through, with reference to mixed ability grouping, selection, equal opportunities in education and conflicting views about the minimum content of a common school curriculum.

This paper argues that egalitarianism, in itself and as a basis for educational policy, is unacceptable. Three recent defences of it are examined and rejected. Three anti-egalitarian positions, however, all of which stress sufficiency rather than equality, pass muster. Educational implications are followed through, with reference to mixed ability grouping, selection, equal opportunities in education and conflicting views about the minimum content of a common school curriculum.

This paper defends certain of Andrew Davis’s arguments on assessment from critique by John Gingell and Christopher Winch. It emphasises the role of personal acquaintance in assessing ‘rich’ understanding, criticises Antony Flew’s claim that assessment is a necessary part of teaching, and rejects the argument that public assessment is necessary for purposes of accountability. It also suggests that parents’ monitoring of their young children’s progress could act as a yardstick, suitably modified, for what might be done in formal education. The (...) conclusion raises problems about the assessment of moral development and about the justifiability of leaving assessment under political rather than professional control. (shrink)

This paper defends certain of Andrew Davis's arguments on assessment from critique by John Gingell and Christopher Winch. It emphasises the role of personal acquaintance in assessing `rich' understanding, criticises Antony Flew's claim that assessment is a necessary part of teaching, and rejects the argument that public assessment is necessary for purposes of accountability. It also suggests that parents' monitoring of their young children's progress could act as a yardstick, suitably modified, for what might be done in formal education. The (...) conclusion raises problems about the assessment of moral development and about the justifiability of leaving assessment under political rather than professional control. (shrink)

This article proposes an approach to educational distribution that attempts to minimise enduring tensions among conflicting values. At the foundation of this approach is a threshold of educational adequacy based on what is needed for citizens to participate in a democratic society. This threshold is justified because it minimises conflict with parental rights and because it better manages ‘the bottomless pit’ problem of educational distribution. This threshold is then modified to stipulate that, after the threshold has been reached, public resources (...) should be distributed equally across students from all backgrounds. While this modification is essential to sending messages of equal citizenship, it also leaves a ‘moral residue’ because it allows wealthy parents to invest greater private resources in their children, thus preserving their children's competitive advantage. Minimising this harm requires policy mechanisms outside of schools that more aggressively break the link between educational outcomes, success in market competition, and social goods. Something ‘external’ to educational institutions is necessary, then, for the achievement of educational justice. (shrink)

This paper rereads John Dewey's works in the light of complexity theory and self‐organising systems. Dewey's pragmatic inquiry is posited as inspirational for developing a logic of education and learning that would incorporate novelty and creativity, these artistic elements being part and parcel of the science of complexity. Dewey's philosophical concepts are explored against the background of such founders of dynamical systems theory as Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Ervin Laszlo, and Erich Jantsch. If, in this process, Dewey's thought appears to undergo (...) some transformation, this would only confirm Jim ) belief that Dewey would welcome, in accord with his own philosophical project, the reconstruction of his own ideas so as to better respond to contingencies and challenges of new times, places and contexts. The paper introduces some elements of non‐linear dynamics, relating them to the problematic of learning and the transformation of habits. Finally, the paper addresses a delicate balance between novelty and confirmation in a self‐organised system, positing it as an issue of pedagogical significance. (shrink)

Complexity theory challenges educational philosophy to reconsider accepted paradigms of teaching, learning and educational research. However, though attractive, not least because of its critique of positivism, its affinity to Dewey and Habermas, and its arguments for openness, diversity, relationships, agency and creativity, the theory is not without its difficulties. These are seen to lie in terms of complexity theory's nature, status, methodology, utility and contribution to the philosophy of education, being a descriptive theory that is easily misunderstood as a prescriptive (...) theory, silent on key issues of values and ethics that educational philosophy should embrace, of questionable internal consistency, and of limited ‘added value’ in educational philosophy. The paper sets out key tenets of complexity theory and argues that, though it is useful for educational philosophy, it requires new conceptual tools and mind‐sets to comprehend fully its significance. (shrink)

Complexity theory challenges educational philosophy to reconsider accepted paradigms of teaching, learning and educational research. However, though attractive, not least because of its critique of positivism, its affinity to Dewey and Habermas, and its arguments for openness, diversity, relationships, agency and creativity, the theory is not without its difficulties. These are seen to lie in terms of complexity theory's nature, status, methodology, utility and contribution to the philosophy of education, being a descriptive theory that is easily misunderstood as a prescriptive (...) theory, silent on key issues of values and ethics that educational philosophy should embrace, of questionable internal consistency, and of limited ‘added value’ in educational philosophy. The paper sets out key tenets of complexity theory and argues that, though it is useful for educational philosophy, it requires new conceptual tools and mind‐sets to comprehend fully its significance. (shrink)

The discretionary powers of welfare state professionals are in tension with the requirements of the democratic Rechtsstaat. Extensive use of discretion can threaten the principles of the rule of law and relinquish democratic control over the implementation of laws and policies. These two tensions are in principle ineradicable. But does this also mean that they are impossible to come to grips with? Are there measures that may ease these tensions? We introduce an understanding of discretion that adds an epistemic dimension (...) (discretion as a mode of reasoning) to the common structural understanding of discretion (an area of judgment and decision). Accordingly we distinguish between structural and epistemic measures of accountability. The aim of the former is to constrain discretionary spaces or the behaviour within them while the aim of the latter is to improve the quality of discretionary reasoning. The focus in this article is on epistemic measures that are internally related to the main characteristic of accountability, namely justified use of discretionary power. (shrink)

Centralized, democratic rules are often asserted as a superior basis for rationing than individualized physician discretion. This article counters this prevailing wisdom by exploring the deficiencies of rule-based rationing. Rules are too imprecise to accurately reflect all the nuances of physical and mental impairment and the complexity of medical science, particularly considering the widely varying personal values that different patients attach to medical risk and benefit. Rule-based rationing also suffers from the biasing effects of interest group pressure on political processes (...) and the tendency to absolve physicians from any moral responsibility for the rationing decisions they implement. Internalizing cost constraints is a more socially and professionally acceptable means of rationing and, in any event, it is inevitable since even a preponderance of rule-based rationing will leave considerable areas of discretion for physician judgment in the implementation and interpretation of the rules. As a consequence, despite the flaws of bedside rationing, it is foolhardy to dispense with it entirely in favor of an exclusively rule-based system. Keywords: Bedside rationing, cost-constraints, rule-based rationing CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)