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Testimony and Other Minds

Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183 (2015)

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  1. Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
    In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment.
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  • Speaking My Mind.Dorit Bar-On - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):1-34.
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  • Testimony: A Philosophical Study.Arindam Chakrabarti - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):965-972.
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  • Other Minds.Anita Avramides - 2001 - Routledge.
    How do I know whether there are any minds beside my own? This problem of other minds in philosophy raises questions which are at the heart of all philosophical investigations--how it is that we know, what is in the mind, and whether we can be certain about any of our beliefs. In this book, Anita Avramides begins with a historical overview of the problem from the Ancient Skeptics to Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, and Wittgenstein. The second part of the (...)
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  • 5. Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.Nicholas Silins - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 2 2:108.
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  • What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
    Something about this argument sounds funny. As we’ll see, though, it takes some care to identify exactly what Moore has done wrong. Iwill assume that Moore knows premise (2) to be true. One could inquire into how he knows it, and whether that knowledge can be defeated; but Iwon’t. I’ll focus instead on what epistemic relations Moore has to premise (1) and to his conclusion (3). It may matter which epistemic relations we choose to consider. Some philosophers will diagnose Moore’s (...)
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  • (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
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  • The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
    Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...)
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  • The Possibility of Knowledge.Quassim Cassam - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):125-141.
    I focus on two questions: what is knowledge, and how is knowledge possible? The latter is an example of a how-possible question. I argue that how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent and that they need to be dealt with at three different levels, the level of means, of obstacle-removal, and of enabling conditions. At the first of these levels the possibility of knowledge is accounted for by identifying means of knowing, and I argue that the identification of such means also contributes to (...)
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  • Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.Jennifer Lackey - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):471-490.
    We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial knowledge. The stronger thesis is that each speaker in a chain of (...)
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  • The Possibility of Knowledge.Quassim Cassam (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of how-possible questions in epistemology. In this highly original book Quassim Cassam explains how such questions arise and how they should be answered.
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  • Other Minds?Anita Avramides - 2002 - Think 1 (2):61-68.
    One of the most intriguing of philosophical puzzles concerns other minds. How do you know there are any? Yes, you're surrounded by living organisms that look and behave much as you do. They even say they have minds. But do they? Perhaps other humans are mindless zombies: like you on the outside, but lacking any inner conscious life, including emotions, thoughts, experiences and even pain. What grounds do you possess for supposing that other humans aren't zombies? Perhaps less than you (...)
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  • Testimony: A Philosophical Study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
    Our trust in the word of others is often dismissed as unworthy, because the illusory ideal of "autonomous knowledge" has prevailed in the debate about the nature of knowledge. Yet we are profoundly dependent on others for a vast amount of what any of us claim to know. Coady explores the nature of testimony in order to show how it might be justified as a source of knowledge, and uses the insights that he has developed to challenge certain widespread assumptions (...)
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  • Other Minds.[author unknown] - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):462-465.
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  • Epistemological Reflection on Knowledge of the External World.Barry Stroud - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):345 - 358.
    We can and do reflect in very general terms on human beings and their place in the world, and we do so for a number of reasons and in a variety of ways. We can notice similarities between human beings and other parts of nature, or differences between them and most other things, or even respects in which they are unique in the world as we know it. Human beings are born and grow and they decline and die. They are (...)
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  • Other Minds.J. Wisdom, J. L. Austen, J. L. Austin & A. J. Ayer - 1946 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 20:122-197.
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  • Speaking My Mind.Dorit Bar-On - 2000 - Philsophical Topics 28 (2):1-34.
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  • Interlocution, Perception, and Memory.Tyler Burge - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (1):21-47.
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  • On Dreaming and Being Lied To.Paul Faulkner - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):149-159.
    As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfied in the way the Moorean would suggest. This has (...)
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  • Understanding Human Knowledge in General.Barry Stroud - 1989 - In Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Westview Press.
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  • Knowledge and the Internal.John McDowell - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):877-893.
    1. I am going to work with an idea from Sellars, that knowledge—at least as enjoyed by rational animals—is a certain sort of standing in the space of reasons. My concern is a familiar philosophical dialectic, which I shall approach in terms of what happens to the Sellarsian idea when the image of standings in the space of reasons undergoes a certain deformation. That it is a deformation is something we can learn from how unsatisfactory the familiar dialectic is.
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  • On Knowing What is Necessary: Three Limitations of Peacocke’s Account. [REVIEW]Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):655–662.
    Chapter 4 of Being Known outlines an integrated metaphysics and epistemology for the metaphysical—absolute—notions of necessity and possibility. The leading idea is to view the modal status of a proposition as the deliverance of a set of fundamental Principles of Possibility, and our ability to recognise modal status as issuing from an implicit knowledge of these principles. Peacocke aims at a middle way between the extremes of Lewis-style realism about modality and the various—conventionalist, expressivist, Wittgensteinian—forms of non-cognitivism that were prominent (...)
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  • Knowledge and the Internal.John McDowell - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):877-93.
    1. I am going to work with an idea from Sellars, that knowledge—at least as enjoyed by rational animals—is a certain sort of standing in the space of reasons. My concern is a familiar philosophical dialectic, which I shall approach in terms of what happens to the Sellarsian idea when the image of standings in the space of reasons undergoes a certain deformation. That it is a deformation is something we can learn from how unsatisfactory the familiar dialectic is.
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  • Testimony: A Philosophical Study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - Philosophy 68 (265):413-415.
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  • Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Plantinga examines the nature of epistemic warrant; whatever it is that when added to true belief yields knowledge. This volume surveys current contributions to the debate and paves the way for his owm positive proposal in Warrant and Proper Function.
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  • Other Minds.J. L. Austin - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  • Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457.
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  • Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
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  • Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds.H. H. Price - 1938 - Philosophy 13 (52):425-56.
    In ordinary life everyone assumes that he has a great deal of knowledge about other minds or persons. This assumption has naturally aroused the curiosity of philosophers; though perhaps they have not been as curious about it as they ought to have been, for they have devoted many volumes to our consciousness of the material world, but very few to our consciousness of one another. It was thought at one time that each of us derives his knowledge of other minds (...)
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  • Knowledge by Hearsay.John McDowell - 1993 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing From Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 195--224.
    Language matters to epistemology for two separate reasons (although they are no doubt connected) -/- My interest in testimony derives from Gareth Evans, as does my conviction that it cannot be accommodated by the sort of account of knowledge which I attack in this paper. I believe I also owe to him my interest in the sorts of case I discuss in §4 below, where knowledge is retained under the risk that what would have been knowledge if the relevant fact (...)
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  • On Seeing That Someone is Angry.William E. S. McNeill - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.
    Abstract: Some propose that the question of how you know that James is angry can be adequately answered with the claim that you see that James is angry. Call this the Perceptual Hypothesis. Here, I examine that hypothesis. I argue that there are two different ways in which the Perceptual Hypothesis could be made true. You might see that James is angry by seeing his bodily features. Alternatively, you might see that James is angry by seeing his anger. If you (...)
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  • Our Knowledge of the External World.Bertrand Russell - 1915 - Mind 24 (94):250-254.
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  • The Possibility of Knowledge.Quassim Cassam - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):307-309.
    An epistemological how-possible question asks how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible. Familiar epistemological how-possible questions include ‘How is knowledge of the external world possible?’, ‘How is knowledge of other minds possible?’ and ‘How is a priori knowledge possible?’ These are the three questions that I tackle in my book. In each case, I explain how and why the question arises and propose a way of answering it. The main negative claim of the book is that transcendental (...)
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  • Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.Jennifer Lackey - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):471-490.
    We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial knowledge. The stronger thesis is that each speaker in a chain of (...)
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  • Singular Thought and the Extent of 'Inner Space'.John McDowell - 1986 - In John McDowell & Philip Pettit (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context. Clarendon Press.
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  • The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification.Robert Audi - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):405 - 422.
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