- When Things Fail to Fit Together.Daniel Fogal - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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Bootstrapping and Persuasive Argumentation.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (2).details
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Testimony and Non-Evidential Reasons for Belief (A Non-Purist Place for Interpersonalism).Florencia Rimoldi & Federico Penelas - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force.Lu Teng - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):55-76.details
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Dogmatism, Seemings, and Non-Deductive Inferential Justification.Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. Chapter 8.details
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Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):257-273.details
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Reflective awareness, phenomenal conservatism, and phenomenal explanationism.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.details
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Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.details
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Dynamic Introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Dissertation, Stanford Universitydetails
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The epistemic import of phenomenal consciousness.Paweł Jakub Zięba - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-37.details
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Undercutting Defeat: When it Happens and Some Implications for Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 201-222.details
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Verstehen verstehen. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung.Federica Isabella Malfatti - 2023 - Berlin, Deutschland: Schwabe Verlag.details
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Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e42186.details
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A Metacognitive Account of Phenomenal Force.Lu Teng - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1081-1101.details
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Taking Skepticism Seriously.Harold Langsam - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):1803-1821.details
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A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
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How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness.François Kammerer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2845-2867.details
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The symmetry problem for testimonial conservatism.Matthew Jope - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6149-6167.details
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Epistemic Justification: Probability, Normalcy, and the Functional Theory.Marvin Backes - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):65-81.details
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Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1139-1159.details
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An Explanationist Account of Genealogical Defeat.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):176-195.details
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G. E. Moore and the Problem of the Criterion.Joshua Anderson - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (1):53-60.details
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Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1869-1893.details
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An Ecumenical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2019-2040.details
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Ethical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6943-6965.details
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Using and Abusing Moorean Arguments.M. Scarfone - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):52-71.details
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(1 other version)Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (96):517-539.details
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(1 other version)Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.details
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Epistemic Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Leaching.Luca Moretti & Crispin Wright - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):566-580.details
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Conservatism, Counterexamples and Debunking.Daniel Z. Korman - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):558-574.details
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What We All Know: Community in Moore's "A Defence of Common Sense".Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (4):629-651.details
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On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.details
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Free Will and External Reality: Two Scepticisms Compared.Helen Steward - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (1):1-20.details
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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(1 other version)Justification As A Loaded Notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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Circular and question-begging responses to religious disagreement and debunking arguments.Andrew Moon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):785-809.details
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(1 other version)Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin.Krista Lawlor - 2020 - In Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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The persuasiveness puzzle about bootstrapping.Guido Melchior - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):27-36.details
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On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):497-514.details
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Easy Knowledge, Circularity, and the Puzzle of Reliability Knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):453-473.details
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(1 other version)Introduction.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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Antiscepticism and Easy Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.details
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Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question.Hsueh M. Qu - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):301-323.details
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The Bayesian Objection.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1751-1769.details
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Are we post-justification? Stout's case for self-knowledge, political justification and public philosophy.Deven Burks - unknowndetails
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