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  1. Grounded Cognition: Past, Present, and Future.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):716-724.
    Thirty years ago, grounded cognition had roots in philosophy, perception, cognitive linguistics, psycholinguistics, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuropsychology. During the next 20 years, grounded cognition continued developing in these areas, and it also took new forms in robotics, cognitive ecology, cognitive neuroscience, and developmental psychology. In the past 10 years, research on grounded cognition has grown rapidly, especially in cognitive neuroscience, social neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology, and developmental psychology. Currently, grounded cognition appears to be achieving increased acceptance throughout cognitive (...)
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  • Vision dominates in perceptual language: English sensory vocabulary is optimized for usage.Bodo Winter, Marcus Perlman & Asifa Majid - 2018 - Cognition 179 (C):213-220.
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  • Defining a Conceptual Topography of Word Concreteness: Clustering Properties of Emotion, Sensation, and Magnitude among 750 English Words.Joshua Troche, Sebastian J. Crutch & Jamie Reilly - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Clustering, hierarchical organization, and the topography of abstract and concrete nouns.Joshua Troche, Sebastian Crutch & Jamie Reilly - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • The Native Mind: Biological Categorization and Reasoning in Development and Across Cultures.Douglas L. Medin & Scott Atran - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (4):960-983.
    . This paper describes a cross-cultural and developmental research project on naïve or folk biology, that is, the study of how people conceptualize nature. The combination of domain specificity and cross-cultural comparison brings a new perspective to theories of categorization and reasoning and undermines the tendency to focus on “standard populations.” From the standpoint of mainstream cognitive psychology, we find that results gathered from standard populations in industrialized societies often fail to generalize to humanity at large. For example, similarity-driven typicality (...)
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  • Radical concept nativism.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 2002 - Cognition 86 (1):25-55.
    Radical concept nativism is the thesis that virtually all lexical concepts are innate. Notoriously endorsed by Jerry Fodor (1975, 1981), radical concept nativism has had few supporters. However, it has proven difficult to say exactly what’s wrong with Fodor’s argument. We show that previous responses are inadequate on a number of grounds. Chief among these is that they typically do not achieve sufficient distance from Fodor’s dialectic, and, as a result, they do not illuminate the central question of how new (...)
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  • Content Differences for Abstract and Concrete Concepts.Katja Katja Wiemer-Hastings & Xu Xu - 2005 - Cognitive Science 29 (5):719-736.
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  • Visualizing Data Using T-SNE.Laurens Van Der Maaten & Geoffrey Hinton - 2008 - 9:2579–2605.
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  • The brain's concepts: The role of the sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge.Vittorio Gallese & George Lakoff - 2007 - Cognitive Neuropsychology 22 (3-4):455-479.
    Concepts are the elementary units of reason and linguistic meaning. They are conventional and relatively stable. As such, they must somehow be the result of neural activity in the brain. The questions are: Where? and How? A common philosophical position is that all concepts—even concepts about action and perception—are symbolic and abstract, and therefore must be implemented outside the brain’s sensory-motor system. We will argue against this position using (1) neuroscientific evidence; (2) results from neural computation; and (3) results about (...)
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