- (1 other version)What are the Contents of Experiences?Adam Pautz - 2011 - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Admissible Contents of Experience. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 114–138.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.details
|
|
(1 other version)Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
(1 other version)Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Perceptual Reports.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.details
|
|
(1 other version)Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Experience and content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.details
|
|
(1 other version)Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.details
|
|
Do visual experiences have contents?Susanna Siegel - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the world. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
|
|
Representationalism and the transparency of experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.details
|
|
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Is vision continuous with cognition?: The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception.Zenon Pylyshyn - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.details
|
|
Perception and its objects.Bill Brewer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):87-97.details
|
|
(1 other version)Perception and content.Bill Brewer - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.details
|
|
The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.details
|
|
Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Consciousness and Cognition.Michael Thau - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
|
|
(4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
|
|
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Perceiving: a philosophical study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 13 (3):365-366.details
|
|
(2 other versions)The Visual Experience of Causation.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - In The Contents of Visual Experience. , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument from Looks.Keith A. Wilson - 2018 - In Tamara Dobler & John Collins (eds.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 199-221.details
|
|
Perception Without Representation? On Travis’s Argument Against the Representational View of Perception.Berit Brogaard - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):273-286.details
|
|
Property-awareness and representation.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):331-342.details
|
|
(1 other version)Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Given.Tim Crane - 2013 - In Joseph K. Schear (ed.), Mind, reason, and being-in-the-world: the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. New York: Routledge. pp. 229-249.details
|
|
(1 other version)Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (3):355--88.details
|
|
(2 other versions)How to account for illusion.Bill Brewer - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 168-180.details
|
|
Talking about Looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):781-807.details
|
|
Perception: Essays After Frege.Charles Travis - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Phenomenology without Representation.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):1209-1237.details
|
|
(1 other version)What are the contents of experiences.Adam Pautz - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.details
|
|
(4 other versions)The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Phenomenology without Representation.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1209-1237.details
|
|
(1 other version)Experience and Content.Alex Byrne - 2011 - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Admissible Contents of Experience. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 60–82.details
|
|