- Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)On an argument for incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):37-41.details
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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.John Martin Fischer - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):526-531.details
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(1 other version)Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416.details
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(1 other version)Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525.details
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On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.details
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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Are We Rarely Free? A Response to Restrictivism.Pettit Gordon - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):219-237.details
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A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.details
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A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism.Thomas J. McKay & David Johnson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):113-122.details
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Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.David Lewis - 1979 - Noûs 13 (4):455-476.details
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The modal argument for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (March):227-44.details
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The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.details
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(1 other version)An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Free will remains a mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.details
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(1 other version)Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.details
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(1 other version)Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.details
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The mind argument and libertarianism.Alicia Finch & Ted A. Warfield - 1998 - Mind 107 (427):515-28.details
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Humean compatibilism.Helen Beebee & Alfred Mele - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):201-223.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.details
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(1 other version)Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield.Erik Carlson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):730-737.details
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A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.Robert Stalnaker - 1981 - In William Leonard Harper, Robert Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 87-104.details
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(1 other version)On an argument for incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1987 - Analysis 47 (January):37-41.details
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Free Will: A Philosophical Study.Laura Waddell Ekstrom - 1999 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview.details
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(1 other version)Elusive freedom? A reply to Helen Beebee.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416.details
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(1 other version)An Essay on Free Will by Peter van Inwagen. [REVIEW]Michael Slote - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (6):327-330.details
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Basic conditional logic.Brian F. Chellas - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):133 - 153.details
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Freedom, necessity, and laws of nature as relations between universals.Kadri Vihvelin - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (December) 371 (December):371-381.details
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(1 other version)In Defence of the Mind Argument.Erik Carlson - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):393-400.details
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Van Inwagen on free will.Peter Van Inwagen - 2004 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.details
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Nature's Challenge to Free Will.Bernard Berofsky - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press USA.details
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On the transfer of necessity.Timothy O’Connor - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):204-18.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals. [REVIEW]William Parry - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):278-281.details
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Incompatibilism and the transfer of power necessity.Erik Carlson - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):277-290.details
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(1 other version)In defense of the mind argument.E. Carlson - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):393-400.details
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On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Mind 100 (3):390-394.details
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On Action.Jennifer Hornsby - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498-500.details
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