- Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Thomas Reid's Common Sense Philosophy of Mind.Todd Buras - 2019 - In Rebecca Copenhaver (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Early Modern and Modern Ages: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 4. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 298-317.details
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The Ontology of Intentional Agency in Light of Neurobiological Determinism: Philosophy Meets Folk Psychology.Dhar Sharmistha - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (1):129-149.details
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Reid's Regress.Terence Cuneo & Randall Harp - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):678-698.details
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Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.details
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Deliberating in the presence of manipulation.Yishai Cohen - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):85-105.details
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Free Will, Agent Causation, and “Disappearing Agents”.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - Noûs:76-96.details
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Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency.Randolph Clarke - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):747-764.details
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Reasons Explanation and Agent Control.John Ross Churchill - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):241-253.details
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Free Will, Self-Governance and Neuroscience: An Overview.Alisa Carse, Hilary Bok & Debra J. H. Mathews - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):237-244.details
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The myth of source.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.details
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Free will and the mind–body problem.Bernard Berofsky - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.details
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Divine Responsibility Without Divine Freedom.Michael Bergmann & J. A. Cover - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):381-408.details
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Emergencia y reducción.José Tomás Alvarado - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (1).details
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Wohin führt die kausale Handlungstheorie?Georg Gasser - 2008 - In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen?: Ein Akttheoretischer Zugang. Onto Verlag. pp. 181-208.details
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Thomas Reid on active power and free agency.Xiangdong Xu - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):369-389.details
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The Metaphysics of Emergence.Hong Yu Wong - 2005 - Noûs 39 (4):658 - 678.details
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Autonomy and Free Will.David Weissman - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (5):609-645.details
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Do the Results of Divine Actions Have Preceding Causes?Daniel von Wachter - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):347-367.details
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Free Will and Mental Powers.Niels van Miltenburg & Dawa Ometto - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1155-1165.details
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Natural necessity: An introductory guide for ontologists.Fumiaki Toyoshima - 2020 - Applied ontology 15 (1):61-89.details
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Causation: A functional perspective.Fumiaki Toyoshima, Riichiro Mizoguchi & Mitsuru Ikeda - 2019 - Applied ontology 14 (1):43-78.details
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Causes and Categories.Nathanael Stein - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):465-489.details
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On a Neglected Aspect of Agentive Experience.Andrew Sims - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1313-1330.details
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The Two‐Stage Luck Objection.Seth Shabo - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):3-23.details
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Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:277-300.details
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Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
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Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck.Carolina Sartorio - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):93-105.details
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Events, agents, and settling whether and how one intervenes.Jason D. Runyan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1629-1646.details
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Agent-causal libertarianism, statistical neural laws and wild coincidences.Jason D. Runyan - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4563-4580.details
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The right perspective on responsibility for ill health.Karl Persson - 2013 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (3):429-441.details
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Freedom With a Human Face.Timothy O'Connor - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.details
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Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis.Robert Northcott - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):617-631.details
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Doings and subject causation.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):255 - 272.details
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The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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O’Connor’s argument for indeterminism.Samuel Murray - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):268-275.details
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The implications of rejecting free will: An empirical analysis.Stephen Morris - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):299-321.details
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The Problem of Luck and the Contradictory Nature of Moral Responsibility in the Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Aleksandr S. Mishura - 2019 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62 (10):102-120.details
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Truth and freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.details
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Direct control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.details
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Personal Agency.E. J. Lowe - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:211-227.details
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The Syntax of Principles: Genericity as a Logical Distinction between Rules and Principles.Pedro Moniz Lopes - 2017 - Ratio Juris 30 (4):471-490.details
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What is ‘mental action’?Yair Levy - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):971-993.details
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Responsibility as an Obstacle to Good Policy: The Case of Lifestyle Related Disease.Neil Levy - 2018 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 15 (3):459-468.details
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Hodgson, David., Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will.Neil Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):183-192.details
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Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians.Neil Levy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.details
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Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.details
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Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-582.details
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Flanagan and Cartesian Free Will: A Defense of Agent Causation.John Lemos - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 22.details
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