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  1. Does a Mugger Dominate? Episodic Power and the Structural Dimension of Domination.Dorothea Gädeke - 2019 - Journal of Political Philosophy 28 (2):199-221.
    Imagine you are walking through a park. Suddenly, a mugger points a gun at you, threatening to shoot you if you do not hand over your valuables. Is this an instance of domination? Many authors working within the neo-republican framework - including Philip Pettit himself - are inclined to say 'yes'. After all, the mugger case seems to be a paradigmatic example of what it means to be at someone's mercy. However, I argue that this conclusion is based on a (...)
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  • The Domination Complaint.Philip Pettit - 2005 - Nomos 46:87-117.
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  • The Impossibility of Republican Freedom.Thomas W. Simpson - 2017 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 45 (1):27-53.
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  • A Theory of Justice: Original Edition.John Rawls - 2005 - Belknap Press.
    Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.
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  • Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique.Matthew Boyle - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):527-555.
    Additive theories of rationality, as I use the term, are theories that hold that an account of our capacity to reflect on perceptually-given reasons for belief and desire-based reasons for action can begin with an account of what it is to perceive and desire, in terms that do not presuppose any connection to the capacity to reflect on reasons, and then can add an account of the capacity for rational reflection, conceived as an independent capacity to ‘monitor’ and ‘regulate’ our (...)
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  • The Insufficiency of Non-Domination.Patchen Markell - 2008 - Political Theory 36 (1):9-36.
    This essay argues that the neo-Roman republican principle of "non-domination," as developed in the recent work of Philip Pettit, cannot serve as a single overarching political ideal, because it responds to only one of two important dimensions of concern about human agency. Through critical engagements with several aspects of Pettit's work, ranging from his philosophical account of freedom as "discursive control" to his appropriation of the distinction between dominium and imperium, the essay argues that the idea of domination, which responds (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
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  • Freedom as the absence of arbitrary power.Quentin Skinner - 2008 - In Cecile Laborde & John Maynor (eds.), Republicanism and Political Theory. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 83--101.
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  • Kantian constructivism in moral theory.John Rawls - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (9):515-572.
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  • What is the point of equality.Elizabeth Anderson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
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  • Domination.Christopher McCammon - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Theories of domination are primarily attempts to understand the value of justice, freedom, and equality by examining cases where they are absent. Such theories seek to clarify and systematize our judgments about what it is to be weak against uncontrolled strength, i.e., about what it is to be vulnerable, degraded, and defenseless against unrestrained power. -/- Much contemporary disagreement about domination involves competing answers to three questions: (1) Who, or what, can dominate? (2) Is it possible to dominate merely by (...)
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  • Gruesome Freedom: The Moral Limits of Non-Constraint.John Lawless - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Many philosophers conceive of freedom as non-interference. Such conceptions unify two core commitments. First, they associate freedom with non-constraint. And second, they take seriously a distinction between the interpersonal and the non-personal. As a result, they focus our attention exclusively on constraints attributable to other people’s choices – that is, on interference. I argue that these commitments manifest two distinct concerns: first, for a wide range of options; and second, for other people’s respect. However, construing freedom as non-interference unifies these (...)
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  • (1 other version)Keeping Republican Freedom Simple.Philip Pettit - 2002 - Political Theory 30 (3):339-356.
    There has recently been a good deal of interest in the republican tradition, particularly in the political conception of freedom maintained within that tradition. I look here at the characterisation of republican liberty in a recent work of Quentin Skinner1and argue on historical and conceptual grounds for a small amendment—a simplification—that would make it equivalent to the view that freedom in political contexts should be identified with nondomination.
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  • The Grundrisse.Karl Marx & David Mclellan - 1972 - Science and Society 36 (1):91-92.
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  • Domination: A Rethinking.Christopher McCammon - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1028-1052.
    Sometimes dictators are benevolent. Sometimes masters are kind and gentle to their slaves. John Adams was a pretty good "husband" to Abigail Adams. But it seems like there’s something very wrong with being a dictator or a master or a spouse with the power that John Adams had over Abigail Adams in late 18th Century America. A theory of domination tries to pinpoint what’s distinctive about dictatorship and mastery and traditional husbanding, and what is distinctively wrong with such—even the benevolent, (...)
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  • Kant on the right to freedom: A defense.Louis‐Philippe Hodgson - 2010 - Ethics 120 (4):791-819.
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  • (1 other version)What is it to wrong someone? A puzzle about justice.Michael Thompson - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 333-384.
    This will be the best way of explaining ‘Paris is the lover of Helen’, that is, ‘Paris loves, and by that very fact [et eo ipso] Helen is loved’. Here, therefore, two propositions have been brought together and abbreviated as one. Or, ‘Paris is a lover, and by that very fact Helen is a loved one’.
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  • Preserving Republican Freedom: A Reply to Simpson.Frank Lovett & Philip Pettit - 2018 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (4):363-383.
    Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, Page 363-383, Fall 2018.
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  • A Kantian Republican Conception of Justice as Nondomination.Rainer Forst - 2013 - In Andreas Niederberger & Philipp Schink (eds.), Republican democracy: liberty, law and politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    This chapter explores the relationship between republican democracy and justice by comparing Philip Pettit's notion of neo-republicanism with that of Immanuel Kant. It begins by describing a republican, political conception of justice as nondomination and explaining why the discourse of republicanism and that of theories of justice often remain at odds with one another. It then considers the basis of a republican conception of justice as nondomination and locates it within the principle of justification, along with Pettit's idea of autonomy (...)
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  • Freedom and Trust: A Rejoinder to Lovett and Pettit.Thomas W. Simpson - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (4):412-424.
    Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 47, Issue 4, Page 412-424, Fall 2019.
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  • Liberty before Liberalism.Quentin Skinner - 2001 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 63 (1):172-175.
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  • Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican1.Philip Pettit - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):15-38.
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  • Free persons and freee choices.Philip Pettit - 2007 - History of Political Thought 28 (4):709-718.
    Social freedom may be taken to be primarily a property of persons, derivatively a property of choices, or the other way round. Nowadays it is standard to take it the other way round. But there is much to be said for the person-based rather than the choice- based way of thinking. And this way of thinking is characteristic of the neo-Roman, republican tradition.
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  • Beyond non-domination.Sharon R. Krause - 2013 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 39 (2):187-208.
    The concept of non-domination is an important contribution to the study of freedom but it does not comprehend the whole of freedom. Insofar as domination requires a conscious capacity for control on the part of the dominant party, it fails to capture important threats to individual freedom that permeate many contemporary liberal democracies today. Much of the racism, sexism and other cultural biases that currently constrain the life-chances of members of subordinate groups in the USA are largely unconscious and unintentional, (...)
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  • Slavery and Freedom in Theory and Practice.David J. Watkins - 2016 - Political Theory 44 (6):846-870.
    Slavery has long stood as a mirror image to the conception of a free person in republican theory. This essay contends that slavery deserves this central status in a theory of freedom, but a more thorough examination of slavery in theory and in practice will reveal additional insights about freedom previously unacknowledged by republicans. Slavery combines imperium (state domination) and dominium (private domination) in a way that both destroys freedom today and diminishes opportunities to achieve freedom tomorrow. Dominium and imperium (...)
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  • (1 other version)Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner.Philip Pettit - 2002 - Philosophy Today 30 (3):339-356.
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  • Republican freedom, rights, and the coalition problem.Keith Dowding - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):301-322.
    Republican freedom is freedom from domination juxtaposed to negative freedom as freedom from interference. Proponents argue that republican freedom is superior since it highlights that individuals lose freedoms even when they are not subject to interference, and claim republican freedom is more ‘resilient’. Republican freedom is trivalent, that is, it includes the idea that someone might be non-free to perform some actions rather than unfree, and in that sense everyone regards republican freedom as different from negative freedom. Trivalence makes republican (...)
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