Computing Methodologies -- Artificial Intelligence.

A young scientist and mathematician explores the mystery and complexity of human thought processes from an interdisciplinary point of view.

It is argued in this article that the concept of practice is one of the key concepts in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It partly replaces his earlier talk about the inexpressible. ?The practice has to speak for itself, as Wittgenstein succinctly puts it. The concept of practice not only points to the ways in which the unity of our concepts are underpinned, as Gordon Baker has it, it also comprises the skills involved in handling the conceptualized phenomena, our prereflective familiarity with (...) them, expressed in the sureness in our behaviour towards them, and the judgmental power exercised in applying or withholding a given concept on a particular occasion. These factors are all relevant to the establishment of knowledge, but they cannot themselves be fully and straightforwardly articulated by verbal means. Nevertheless, they represent what we go by when we apply concepts and other types of rules. To follow a rule is what Wittgenstein calls a practice. The sketched analysis of this concept makes us understand better how it is possible to apply a rule without the support of another rule. It also makes us realize in what sense one is justified in talking about tacit knowledge in connection with the application of concepts and rule?following in general. Quite a lot hangs on seeing the world aright at this point. (shrink)

The paper questions the expert system paradigm, both in terms of its range of application, and as a significant contribution to the understanding of artificial intelligence. The viewpoint is that of the systems designer who must judge the applicability of these methods in imminent and future systems. The expert system paradigm, (ESP for short), is criticised not because it is ubiquitously wrong, but because its range of application appears to be very limited, and much promise is made of its application (...) in areas where its success is likely to be little more than a matter of luck. The paper considers the success in both academic and commercial settings. It is suggested that the contribution of the ESP to the wider ambitions of AI is modest, and to the practical user is still a considerable and largely unquantifiable risk. (shrink)

Human intuition and perception are basic and essential phenomena of consciousness. As such, they will never be replicated by computers. This is the challenging notion of Hubert Dreyfus, Ph. D., archcritic of the artificial intelligence establishment. It's important to emphasize that he doesn't believe that AI is fundamentally impossible, only that the current research program is fatally flawed. Instead, he argues that to get a device (or devices) with human-like intelligence would require them to have a human-like being in the (...) world, which would require them to have bodies more or less like ours, and social acculturation (i.e. a society) more or less like ours. This helps to explain the practical problems in implementing artificial intelligence algorithms. (shrink)

Suitable for students and scholars, this title challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the heart of scientific discovery.

Gegenstand der "Phänomenologie des Geistes" ist die 'Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewußtseins', d.i. der Aufstieg der Gestalten vernünftiger Erkenntnis von der Stufe der naiven Wahrnehmung bis zur Höhe des absoluten Wissens. Von diesem ersten reifen Werk Hegels sagte Bloch, es sei "voll Jugend ohne gleichen, voll Überfülle und Glut, dichterisch durchaus, wissenschaftlich durchaus, in einzigartiger, morgendlicher Gärung ... Nirgends kann genauer gesehen werden, was großer Gedanke im Aufgang ist, und nirgends ist sein Lauf bereits vollständiger." – Die Einleitung gibt eine (...) genaue Rekonstruktion der Entstehungsgeschichte des Werks, außerdem eine klare Nachzeichnung des Argumentationsganges des Textes, die nicht nur die schwierige Lektüre erleichtert, sondern auch an den derzeitigen Interpretationsstand heranführt. (shrink)

Technological change is often seen as something that follows its own logic -- something we may welcome, or about which we may protest, but which we are unable to alter fundamentally. This reader challenges that assumption and its distinguished contributors demonstrate that technology is affected at a fundamental level by the social context in which it develops. General arguments are introduced about the relation of technology to society and different types of technology are examined: the technology of production: domestic and (...) reproductive technology; and military technology. The book draws on authors from Karl Marx to Cynthia Cockburn to show that production technology is shaped by social relations in the workplace. It moves on to the technologies of the household and biological reproduction, which are topics that male-dominated social science has tended to ignore or trivialise -- though these are actually of crucial significance where powerful shaping factors are at work, normally unnoticed. The final section asks what shapes the most frightening technology of all -- the technology of weaponry, especially nuclear weapons. The editors argue that social scientists have devoted disproportionate attention to the effects of technology on society, and tended to ignore the more fundamental question of what shapes technology in the first place. They have drawn both on established work in the history and sociology of technology and on newer feminist perspectives to show just how important and fruitful it is to try to answer that deeper question. The first edition of this reader, published in 1985, had a considerable influence on thinking about the relationship between technology andsociety. This second edition has been thoroughly revised and expanded to take into account new research and the emergence of new theoretical perspectives. (shrink)