- A unificationist defence of revealed preferences.Kate Vredenburgh - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):149-169.details
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(1 other version)Bayesian Cognitive Science, Monopoly, and Neglected Frameworks.Matteo Colombo & Stephan Hartmann - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):451–484.details
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Galton, reversion and the quincunx: The rise of statistical explanation.André Ariew, Yasha Rohwer & Collin Rice - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 66:63-72.details
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Four Pillars of Statisticalism.Denis M. Walsh, André Ariew & Mohan Matthen - 2017 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 9 (1):1-18.details
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Autonomy of Theories: An Explanatory Problem.Robert W. Batterman - 2018 - Noûs:858-873.details
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Explanation beyond causation? New directions in the philosophy of scientific explanation.Alexander Reutlinger - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):e12395.details
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(1 other version)Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification, and Explanation.Stephan Hartmann & Matteo Colombo - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2).details
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The Problems of Testing Preference Axioms with Revealed Preference Theory.Till Grüne - 2004 - Analyse & Kritik 26 (2):382-397.details
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The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective.David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.details
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Three Kinds of Idealization.Michael Weisberg - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (12):639-659.details
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A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2011 - Noûs 47 (1):104-134.details
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The dispositional/categorical distinction.Elizabeth Prior - 1982 - Analysis 42 (2):93-6.details
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(1 other version)Studies in the logic of explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.details
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Explanation and scientific understanding.Michael Friedman - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):5-19.details
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What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.details
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Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.details
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Program explanation: A general perspective.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):107-17.details
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The multiple realizability argument against reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.details
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Program explanation: a general perspective.Frank Jackson & Alonso Church - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):107.details
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Foundations of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory.D. Wade Hands - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1081-1108.details
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What Preferences Really Are.Erik Angner - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (4):660-681.details
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A reply to Lehtinen, Teschl and Pattanaik.Daniel M. Hausman - 2013 - Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (2):219-223.details
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Preferences: neither behavioural nor mental.Francesco Guala - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):383-401.details
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