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(1 other version)Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.details
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Introspection.Alex Byrne - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.details
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(1 other version)Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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(1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.details
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(1 other version)Freud.Jonathan Lear - 2005 - New York: Routledge.details
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Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.details
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(1 other version)Perspectives on Self-Deception.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) - 1988 - University of California Press.details
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Deciding to Believe.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76.details
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A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..details
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(1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom in belief and desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.details
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(2 other versions)The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.details
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(1 other version)3. Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind.Mark Johnston - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 63-91.details
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(1 other version)The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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On the aim of belief.J. David Velleman - manuscriptdetails
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On the hypothetical and non-hypothetical in reasoning about belief and action.Peter Railton - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 53--79.details
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On overrating oneself... And knowing it.Adam Elga - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):115-124.details
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(1 other version)``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom in Belief and Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom in Belief and Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.details
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12. Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception.Georges Rey - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 264-296.details
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