- Moore's Proof, liberals, and conservatives : is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?Annalisa Coliva - 2012 - In Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - forthcoming - Synthese.details
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Everything is Knowable – How to Get to Know Whether a Proposition is True.Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek & Petar Iliev - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):93-114.details
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Should Intentionality be Naturalized?Thomas Bontly - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:43-60.details
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On an argument for irrationalism.Alan Weir - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (2):95-114.details
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Knowledge from Blindspots.Rhys Borchert, Juan Comesaña & Tim Kearl - 2023 - In Rodrigo Borges & Ian Schnee (eds.), Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 76-91.details
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A Commitment-Theoretic Account of Moore's Paradox.Jack Woods - forthcoming - In An Atlas of Meaning: Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface).details
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Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546.details
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Indexicals and communicative affordances.Adrian Briciu - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-21.details
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The Point of Moore's Proof.Charles Raff - 2021 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 11 (1):1-27.details
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Constitutivism, belief, and emotion.Larry A. Herzberg - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.details
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Evaluatively incomplete states of affairs.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (2):211 - 224.details
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Cooperation and doing the best one can.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 65 (3):283 - 304.details
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A Defense of Descriptive Moral Content.Jeff Wisdom - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):285-300.details
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P, but you don’t know that P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.details
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Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech.John N. Williams - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):225-254.details
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Wittgensteinian accounts of Moorean absurdity.John N. Williams - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):283-306.details
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The completeness of the pragmatic solution to Moore’s paradox in belief: a reply to Chan.John N. Williams - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2457-2476.details
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The absurdities of Moore's paradoxes.John N. Williams - 1982 - Theoria 48 (1):38-46.details
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Moore’s Paradox, Truth and Accuracy: A Reply to Lawlor and Perry.John N. Williams & Mitchell S. Green - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255.details
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Moore’s Paradox for God.John N. Williams - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):265-270.details
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Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief.John Nicholas Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.details
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Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis.John N. Williams - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.details
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Moore's paradoxes, Evans's principle and self-knowledge.John N. Williams - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):348-353.details
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Moore’s paradox in belief and desire.John N. Williams - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.details
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Moorean absurdities and the nature of assertion.John N. Williams - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149.details
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Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional 'Structure' of Assertion.John N. Williams - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):160 - 166.details
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Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox.John N. Williams - 2013 - Theoria 81 (1):27-47.details
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Three moments in the theory of definition or analysis: Its possibility, its aim or aims, and its limit or terminus.David Wiggins - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):73-109.details
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True lies and Moorean redundancy.Alex Wiegmann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13053-13066.details
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On G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’.James Owen Weatherall - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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New Foundations for Imperative Logic Iii: A General Definition of Argument Validity.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2012 - Manuscript in Preparation.details
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New foundations for imperative logic III: A general definition of argument validity.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1703-1753.details
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No norms and no nature — the moral relevance of evolutionary biology.Bart Voorzanger - 1987 - Biology and Philosophy 2 (3):253-270.details
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Certainty and Assertion.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Dialectica 999 (1).details
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Moore’s Open Question Phenomenon Explained—Naturalistically.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):241-256.details
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Moore’s Open Question Maneuvering: A Qualified Defense.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):91-117.details
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What We All Know: Community in Moore's "A Defence of Common Sense".Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (4):629-651.details
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Editors’ Review and Introduction: Lying in Logic, Language, and Cognition.Hans van Ditmarsch, Petra Hendriks & Rineke Verbrugge - 2020 - Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (2):466-484.details
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Brute necessity.James Van Cleve - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (9):e12516.details
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A Landscape of Logics beyond the Deduction Theorem.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (1):25-38.details
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Rationalizing beliefs: evidential vs. pragmatic reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):447-462.details
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Radical interpretation and Moore's paradox.Hamid Vahid - 2008 - Theoria 74 (2):146-163.details
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Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.details
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Moore's paradox and Evans's principle: a reply to Williams.H. Vahid - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):337-341.details
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Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.details
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Moore's paradox and Evans's principle: A reply to Williams.Hamid Vahid - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):337–341.details
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How to solve the hardest logic puzzle ever in two questions.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):39-44.details
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