- The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability.Samuel Alexander Taylor - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177.details
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A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.details
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The cognitive attitude of rational trust.Karen Frost-Arnold - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9).details
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Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.details
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Naughty beliefs.Andrew Huddleston - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222.details
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Is There Non-Inferential Justification?James Pryor - unknowndetails
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Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):41–53.details
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Two Notions of Scientific Justification.Matthias Adam - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):93 - 108.details
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Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.details
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The will and evidence toward belief: A critical essay on Jonathan E. Adler's belief's own ethics.Nathan Segars - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):79 – 91.details
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Defining Wokeness.J. Spencer Atkins - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (3):321-338.details
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Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Noûs 57 (4):832-849.details
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A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.details
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In Search of Doxastic Involuntarism.Matthew Vermaire - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):615-631.details
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Liturgical Philosophy of Religion: An Untimely Manifesto on Sincerity, Acceptance, and Hope.Andrew Chignell - 2021 - In M. David Eckel, Allen Speight & Troy DuJardin (eds.), The Future of the Philosophy of Religion. Springer. pp. 73-94.details
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Persuasive Technologies and the Right to Mental Liberty: The ‘Smart’ Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders.Sjors Ligthart, Gerben Meynen & Thomas Douglas - forthcoming - In Marcello Ienca, O. Pollicino, L. Liguori, R. Andorno & E. Stefanini (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Information Technology, Life Sciences and Human Rights.details
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How inference isn’t blind: Self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency.David Jenkins - 2019 - Dissertation, King’s College Londondetails
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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Epistemic Judgement and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):738-758.details
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Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind.Lisa Bastian - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3615-3636.details
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Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence.Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):91-111.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2022 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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The Epistemic Norm of Inference and Non-Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Patrick Bondy - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-21.details
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Opressões epistêmicas.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2018 - In José Leonardo Annunziato Ruivo (ed.), Proceedings of the Brazilian Research Group in Epistemology. pp. 201-226.details
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Neural and Environmental Modulation of Motivation: What's the Moral Difference?Thomas Douglas - 2018 - In David Birks & Thomas Douglas (eds.), Treatment for Crime: Philosophical Essays on Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Choosing and refusing: doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology.John Turri, David Rose & Wesley Buckwalter - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2507-2537.details
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‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1641-1656.details
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Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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The Powers that bind : doxastic voluntarism and epistemic obligation.Neil Levy & Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 12-33.details
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Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
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Enquiry and the Value of Knowledge.Barnaby Walker - forthcoming - Philosophy.details
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.details
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Habits-Expressivism About Epistemic Justification.Christos Kyriacou - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):209 - 237.details
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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Implicit Biases and Byrne’s Epistemic Rule for Self-knowledge of Beliefs.Hanyu Liu - unknowndetails
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I Ought, Therefore I Can Obey.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.details
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Responsible belief and epistemic justification.Rik Peels - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2895-2915.details
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Futher reflections on semantic minimalism: Reply to Wedgwood.Alessandro Capone - 2013 - In Alessandro Capone, Franco Lo Piparo & Marco Carapezza (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy. Cham: Springer. pp. 437-474..details
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Kierkegaard's Eyes of Faith: The Paradoxical Voluntarism of Climacus's "Philosophical Fragments".Robert Wyllie - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (4):545-564.details
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