- Dogmatism and Inquiry.Sam Carter & John Hawthorne - 2024 - Mind 133 (531):651-676.details
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Inquiry, reasoning and the normativity of logic.van Remmen Maximilian - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-28.details
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The Epistemic and the Deontic Preface Paradox.Lina M. Lissia & Jan Sprenger - manuscriptdetails
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Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
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Probabilifying reflective equilibrium.Finnur Dellsén - 2024 - Synthese 203 (2):1-24.details
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Prefaces, Knowledge, and Questions.Frank Hong - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Epistemic characterizations of validity and level-bridging principles.Joshua Schechter - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):153-178.details
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A Basis for AGM Revision in Bayesian Probability Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (6):1535-1559.details
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Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
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Reductive Evidentialism and the Normativity of Logic.Nader Shoaibi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1:1-10.details
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Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.details
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Knowledge and Prizes.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Artūrs Logins & Jacques Henri Vollet (eds.), Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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The Typical Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Profiling and Proof: Are Statistics Safe?Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (2):161-183.details
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Puzzles for Recursive Reliabilism.Shun Iizuka - 2022 - Review of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):55-73.details
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Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox.Sergi Oms - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (2):211-228.details
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A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention.Bob Beddor & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):346-378.details
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Epistemology Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):89-145.details
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Risky belief.Martin Smith - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):597-611.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):960-978.details
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Scientific Progress Without Justification.Finnur Dellsén - 2022 - In Insa Lawler, Kareem Khalifa & Elay Shech (eds.), Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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A Characterization of Probability-based Dichotomous Belief Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2021 - Studia Logica 110 (2):511-543.details
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Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Closing the Case on Self-Fulfilling Beliefs.Chad Marxen - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):1-14.details
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Frá skoðunum til trúnaðar og aftur til baka: Yfirlit um bayesíska þekkingarfræði [English title: "From Belief to Credence and Back Again: An Overview of Bayesian Epistemology"].Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Hugur 28:146-162.details
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Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.details
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Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists.Nicholas Makins - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):580-594.details
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Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
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Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4099-4118.details
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Collateral conflicts and epistemic norms.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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Another way logic might be normative.J. W. Evershed - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):5861-5881.details
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Will I get a job? Contextualism, belief, and faith.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5769-5790.details
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The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
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Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox.Kenneth Boyce & Allan Hazlett - 2014 - Ratio 29 (1):29-41.details
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Evidence-Coherence Conflicts Revisited.Alex Worsnip - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: an investigation on actual epistemic value.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):693-720.details
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The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.details
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A New Anti-Expertise Dilemma.Thomas Raleigh - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):1-19.details
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How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):965-990.details
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Interpreting plural predication: homogeneity and non-maximality.Manuel Križ & Benjamin Spector - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (5):1131-1178.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Credal sensitivism: threshold vs. credence-one.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2003-2028.details
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