- Are There Counterexamples to the Consistency Principle?Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):852-869.details
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Contextualismo, paradoxo cético e paradoxo do prefácio: Contextualism, preface paradox and skeptical paradox.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues - 2011 - Controvérsia 7 (2).details
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The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2021 - In Franz Dietrich & Christian List (eds.), Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Essays on the Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-54.details
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The Epistemic and the Deontic Preface Paradox.Lina M. Lissia & Jan Sprenger - manuscriptdetails
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The norms of acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.details
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Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.details
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Degrees of belief.Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2009 - London: Springer.details
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Epistemic dimensions of personhood.Simon Evnine - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
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Probabilifying reflective equilibrium.Finnur Dellsén - 2024 - Synthese 203 (2):1-24.details
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Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.details
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Rational understanding: toward a probabilistic epistemology of acceptability.Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2475-2494.details
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Logical norms as defeasible obligations: disentangling sound and feasible inferences.Matteo De Benedetto & Alessandra Marra - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: an investigation on actual epistemic value.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):693-720.details
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A normatively adequate credal reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.details
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The Bad News of the Gospel.Christopher Miles Coope - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (2):249-291.details
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Preface Writers are Consistent.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):362-381.details
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Probability, Approximate Truth, and Truthlikeness: More Ways out of the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):209-225.details
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The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.details
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On epistemic and ontological interpretations of intuitionistic and paraconsistent paradigms.W. Carnielli & Abilio Rodrigues - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.details
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Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Dogmatism and Inquiry.Sam Carter & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind.details
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A paradox of rejection.Thomas N. P. A. Brouwer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4451-4464.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox.Kenneth Boyce & Allan Hazlett - 2014 - Ratio 29 (1):29-41.details
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Subjective Realism: A Possible-Worlds Interpretation of the Anti-Relativist Arguments in Plato’s Theaetetus.Jon Bornholdt - 2023 - Apeiron 56 (1):75-104.details
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Logics for Belief as Maximally Plausible Possibility.Giacomo Bonanno - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (5):1019-1061.details
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How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):965-990.details
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Closure and Epistemic Modals.Justin Bledin & Tamar Lando - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):3-22.details
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Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4099-4118.details
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Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.details
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Bare Quantifiers?Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):175-188.details
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The rational dimension of understanding.Miloud Belkoniene - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-16.details
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Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.details
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Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention.Bob Beddor & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):346-378.details
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Lotteries And Contexts.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2):415-428.details
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DeRose on Lotteries.Peter Baumann - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):44-67.details
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Supererogation and sequence.Adam Bales & Claire Benn - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7763-7780.details
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Epistemic Justification: Probability, Normalcy, and the Functional Theory.Marvin Backes - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):65-81.details
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A Bitter Pill for Closure.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Synthese 196:3773-3787.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Levels of Belief in Nonmonotonic Reasoning.David C. Makinson - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 341--354.details
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Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 49--74.details
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Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface.Mark Kaplan - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-35.details
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Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.details
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