Genetic research attracts significant attention from the popular press, and often these representations are less than ideal, skewing toward hyperbole and promises of near-future benefits. Indeed, revolutionary language has permeated public discourse since the start of the Human Genome Project in the early 1990s. If the near constant parade of enthusiastic headlines is to be believed, we have been in the midst of a "genetic revolution" for over three decades, yet, the promised revolutionary changes never fully materialize, at least not (...) to the extent envisioned by the proselytizers. The revolution is always just around the corner. Moreover, the nature and impact of the promised revolution is... (shrink)

There has been growing concern about the phenomenon of science hype, the tendency to exaggerate the value or near-future application of research results. Although this is a problem that touches every area of biomedicine, the topic of genetics seems to be particularly prone to enthusiastic predictions. The world has been told for over two decades-by the media, researchers, politicians, and the biotech industry-that a genome-driven health care revolution is just around the corner. And while the revolution never seems to arrive, (...) the hopeful rhetoric continues. It has been suggested that this unrelenting “genohype” is having a range of adverse social consequences, including misleading the public and hurting the long-term legitimacy of the field. While we need more good data on the nature and magnitude of these possible harms, few would argue with the proposition that sustained science hype is a bad thing. We all benefit from robust science and accurate public representations of biomedical research. But, to date, there has been very little consideration of the degree to which the scholarship on the related ethical, legal, and social issues has been hyped. Are the conclusions from ELSI scholarship also exaggerated? (shrink)

This book presents the first comprehensive set of principles for an ethics of science communication. We all want to communicate science ethically, but how do we do so? What does being ethical when communicating science even mean? The authors argue that ethical reasoning is essential training for science communicators. The book provides an overview of the relationship between values, science, and communication. Ethical problems are examined to consider how to create an ethics of science communication. These issues range from the (...) timing of communication, narratives, accuracy and persuasion, to funding and the client-public tension. The book offers a tailor-made ethics of science communication based on principlism. Case studies are used to demonstrate how this tailor-made ethics can be applied in practice. (shrink)

Epistemic trust is crucial for science. This article aims to identify the kinds of assumptions that are involved in epistemic trust as it is required for the successful operation of science as a collective epistemic enterprise. The relevant kind of reliance should involve working from the assumption that the epistemic endeavors of others are appropriately geared towards the truth, but the exact content of this assumption is more difficult to analyze than it might appear. The root of the problem is (...) that methodological decisions in science typically involve a complex trade-off between the reliability of positive results, the reliability of negative results, and the investigation's power. Which balance between these is the ‘correct’ one can only be determined in light of an evaluation of the consequences of all the different possible outcomes of the inquiry. What it means for the investigation to be ‘appropriately geared towards the truth’ thus depends on certain value judgments. I conclude that in the optimal case, trusting someone in her capacity as an information provider also involves a reliance on her having the right attitude towards the possible consequences of her epistemic work. 1 Introduction2 Epistemic Reliance within the Sciences3 Methodological Conventionalism4 Trust in Science5 Conclusions. (shrink)

In the context of stem cell research, the promise of economic growth has become a common policy argument for adoption of permissive policies and increased government funding. However, declarations of economic and commercial benefit, which can be found in policy reports, the scientific literature, public funding policies, and the popular press, have arguably created a great deal of expectation. Can stem cell research deliver on the economic promise? And what are the implications of this economic ethos for the researchers who (...) must work under its shadow? (shrink)

Philosophers of science now broadly agree that doing good science involves making non-epistemic value judgments. I call attention to two very different normative standards which can be used to evaluate such judgments: standards grounded in ethics and standards grounded in political philosophy. Though this distinction has not previously been highlighted, I show that the values in science literature contain arguments of each type. I conclude by explaining why this distinction is important. Seeking to determine whether some value-laden determination meets substantive (...) ethical standards is a very different endeavor from seeking to determine if it is politically legitimate. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the concept of public trust in science and offers some guidance for ethicists, scientists, and policymakers who use this idea defend ethical rules or policies pertaining to the conduct of research. While the notion that public trusts science makes sense in the abstract, it may not be sufficiently focused to support the various rules and policies that authors have tried to derive from it, because the public is not a uniform body with a common set of interests. (...) Well-focused arguments that use public trust to support rules or policies for the conduct of research should specify (a) which public is being referred to (e.g. the general public or a specific public, such as a particular community or group); (b) what this public expects from scientists; (c) how the rule or policy will ensure that these expectations are met; and (d) why is it important to meet these expectations. (shrink)

Expectations play a major role in ‘driving’ biotechnology research and development. However, their ethical significance has been largely overlooked. This article examines the dynamics and ethics of expectations surrounding biotechnologies, focusing on biobanks and the promise of personalised medicines. It explores the personal and social implications of expectations, especially where technologies fail to eventuate. The article identifies the claims and practices that support the expectations pertaining to biotechnologies and some of the factors that work against the fulfilment of predicted innovations. (...) It is argued that the role of expectations in shaping thinking and action needs to be taken seriously by those who are concerned about the ethical implications of biotechnologies. (shrink)

Social scientists have begun elucidating the variables that influence public trust in science, yet little is known about hype in biotechnology and its effects on public trust. Many scholars claim that hyping biotechnology results in a loss of public trust, and possibly public enthusiasm or support for science, because public expectations of the biotechnological promises will be unmet. We argue for the need for empirical research that examines the relationships between hype, public trust, and public enthusiasm/support. We discuss the complexities (...) in designing empirical studies that provide evidence for a causal link between hype, public trust, and public enthusiasm/support, but also illustrate how this may be remedied. Further empirical research on hype and public trust is needed in order to improve public communication of science and to design evidence-based education on the responsible conduct of research for scientists. We conclude that conceptual arguments made on hype and public trust must be nuanced to reflect our current understanding of this relationship. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers of science have been prominent amongst social epistemologists who draw attention to communal aspects of knowing. As part of this work, I focus on the need to examine the relations between scientific communities and lay communities, particularly marginalized communities, for understanding the epistemic merit of scientific practices. I draw on Naomi Scheman's argument (2001) that science earns epistemic merit by rationally grounding trust across social locations. Following this view, more turns out to be relevant to epistemic assessment than (...) simply following the standards of "normal science". On such an account, philosophers of science need to attend to the relations between scientific communities and various lay communities, especially marginalized communities, to understand how scientific practices can rationally ground trust and thus earn their status as "good ways of knowing". Trust turns out to involve a wide set of expectations on behalf of lay communities. In this paper I focus on expectations of knowledge sharing, using examples of "knowledge-sharing whistleblowers" to illustrate how failures in knowledge sharing with lay communities can erode epistemic trust in scientific communities, particularly in the case of marginalized communities. (shrink)

Both scientists and philosophers of science have recently emphasized the importance of promoting transparency in science. For scientists, transparency is a way to promote reproducibility, progress, and trust in research. For philosophers of science, transparency can help address the value-ladenness of scientific research in a responsible way. Nevertheless, the concept of transparency is a complex one. Scientists can be transparent about many different things, for many different reasons, on behalf of many different stakeholders. This paper proposes a taxonomy that clarifies (...) the major dimensions along which approaches to transparency can vary. By doing so, it provides several insights that philosophers and other science studies scholars can pursue. In particular, it helps address common objections to pursuing transparency in science, it clarifies major forms of transparency, and it suggests avenues for further research on this topic. (shrink)

Most traditional epistemologists see trust and knowledge as deeply antithetical: we cannot know by trusting in the opinions of others; knowledge must be based on evidence, not mere trust. I argue that this is badly mistaken. Modern knowers cannot be independent and self-reliant. In most disciplines, those who do not trust cannot know. Trust is thus often more epistemically basic than empirical evidence or logical argument, for the evidence and the argument are available only through trust. Finally, since the reliability (...) of testimonial evidence depends on the trustworthiness of the testifier, this implies that knowledge often rests on a foundation of ethics. The rationality of many of our beliefs depends not only on our own character, but on the character of others. (shrink)