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  1. (2 other versions)Descriptive Psychology.Franz Brentano - 1982/1995 - Routledge.
    Franz Brentano (1838-1917) is a key figure in the development of Twentieth Century thought. It was his work that set Husserl on to the road of phenomenology and intentionality, that inspired Meinong's theory of the object which influenced Bertrand Russell, and the entire Polish school of philosophy. ^Descriptive Psychology presents a series of lectures given by Brentano in 1887; they were the culmination of his work, and the clearest statement of his mature thought. It was this later period which proved (...)
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  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  • Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Routledge.
    Unlike the first English translation in 1974, this edition contains the text corresponding to Brentano's original 1874 edition.
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  • (1 other version)Self-awareness and alterity: a phenomenological investigation.Dan Zahavi - 1999 - Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
    ... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...
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  • (1 other version)Being and nothingness.Jean-Paul Sartre - 1956 - Avenel, N.J.: Random House.
    Sartre explains the theory of existential psychoanalysis in this treatise on human reality.
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.
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  • What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.
    Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is (...)
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  • The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.Kathleen Virginia Wider - 1997 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    In this work, Kathleen V. Wider discusses Jean-Paul Sartre's analysis of consciousness in Being and Nothingness in light of recent work by analytic philosophers ...
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  • The Ubiquity of Self-Awareness.Tomis Kapitan - 1999 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 57 (1):17-43.
    Two claims have been prominent in recent discussion of self-consciousness. One is that first-person reference or first-person thinking is irreducible {Irreducibility Thesis), and the other is that awareness of self accompanies at least all those conscious states through which one refers to something. The latter {Ubiquity Thesis) has long been associated with philosophers like Fichte, Brentano and Sartre, but recently variants have been defended by D. Henrich and M. Frank. Facing criticism from three arguments which nevertheless cannot decisively refute the (...)
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  • Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.
    When a mental state is conscious – in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it – it instantiates a certain property F in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that F is the property of having sensory quality. The paper argues that this supposition is false. The first part of the paper discusses reasons for thinking that unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, for (...)
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  • (1 other version)A narrow representationalist account of qualitative experience.Georges Rey - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:435-58.
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  • Experience as representation.Fred Dretske - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.
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  • Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
    Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice (...)
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  • (4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
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  • The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.
    The title of The Rediscovery of the Mind suggests the question "When was the mind lost?" Since most people may not be aware that it ever was lost, we must also then ask "Who lost it?" It was lost, of course, only by philosophers, by certain philosophers. This passed unnoticed by society at large. The "rediscovery" is also likely to pass unnoticed. But has the mind been rediscovered by the same philosophers who "lost" it? Probably not. John Searle is an (...)
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  • The structure of (self-) consciousness.David Woodruff Smith - 1986 - Topoi 5 (September):149-156.
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  • Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.
    The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue (...)
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  • (1 other version)A theory of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
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  • Aristotle on consciousness.Victor Caston - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):751-815.
    Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to the first issue?the primary focus of (...)
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  • The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate.Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.) - 1994 - Cambridge, USA: Blackwell.
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  • Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections.
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  • (2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
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  • Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):293-330.
    Jean-Paul Sartre believed that consciousness entails self-consciousness, or, even more strongly, that consciousness is self-consciousness. As Kathleen Wider puts it in her terrific book The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, ‘all consciousness is, by its very nature, self-consciousness.’ I share this view with Sartre and have elsewhere argued for it at length. My overall aim in this paper is to examine Sartre's theory of consciousness against the background of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945/1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
    Challenging and rewarding in equal measure, _Phenomenology of Perception_ is Merleau-Ponty's most famous work. Impressive in both scope and imagination, it uses the example of perception to return the body to the forefront of philosophy for the first time since Plato. Drawing on case studies such as brain-damaged patients from the First World War, Merleau-Ponty brilliantly shows how the body plays a crucial role not only in perception but in speech, sexuality and our relation to others.
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  • (3 other versions)Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
    First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s monumental _Phénoménologie de la perception _signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers. _Phenomenology of Perception _stands in the great phenomenological tradition of Husserl, (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind: 60th Anniversary Edition.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - New York: Hutchinson & Co.
    This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.
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  • The Circle of Acquaintaince.David Woodruff Smith - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
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  • The Circle of Acquaintance: Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy, by David Woodruff Smith. [REVIEW]Richard E. Aquila - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):994-997.
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  • The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201-207.
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  • After Brentano: A one-level theory of consciousness.Amie L. Thomassoin - 2000 - European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):190-210.
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  • What is the "subjectivity" of the mental?William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:229-238.
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  • (2 other versions)The Nature of Consciousness.D. M. Rosenthal - 2004 - Mind 113 (451):581-588.
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  • Sense and Subjectivity: A Study of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty.Philip Michael Dwyer (ed.) - 1990 - New York: Brill.
    The philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and the later Wittgenstein are shown to yield a common position opposing 'realist' attempts to reduce appearance, sense, and meaning to perception-independent objects and relations. Their 'Gestalt Philosophy' thus constitutes a new form of 'anti- realism'.
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
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  • (2 other versions)Descriptive Psychology.Franz Brentano - 1995 - Routledge.
    Franz Brentano is a key figure in the development of Twentieth Century thought. It was his work that set Husserl on to the road of phenomenology and intentionality, that inspired Meinong's theory of the object which influenced Bertrand Russell, and the entire Polish school of philosophy. ^Descriptive Psychology presents a series of lectures given by Brentano in 1887; they were the culmination of his work, and the clearest statement of his mature thought. It was this later period which proved to (...)
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  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
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  • Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation.Dan Zahavi - 1999 - The Personalist Forum 15 (2):444-448.
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  • What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental.William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:109-130.
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  • [Letter from Gilbert Ryle].Gilbert Ryle - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (26):250 -.
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  • Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.
    In 1995, in my book, Ten Problems of Consciousness, I proposed a version of the theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. The present book, in part, consists of a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. It is also concerned with two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness: the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In addition, it connects representationalism with two more general issues: the nature of color and the location of (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.
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  • The Nature of Consciousness.Mark Rowlands - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, and argues that the phenomenal aspects (...)
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1057-1062.
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  • Marginal Consciousness.A. GURWITSCH - 1985
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  • The Nature of Consciousness.Mark Rowlands - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):745-748.
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  • (6 other versions)The Rediscovery of the Mind, by John Searle. [REVIEW]Mark William Rowe - 1992 - Philosophy 68 (265):415-418.
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.
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  • (1 other version)A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience.Georges Rey - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):435-457.
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  • (4 other versions)The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Synthese 134 (3):477-504.
    One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar self- awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question (...)
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