Conductive arguments, as a separate category of reasoning, has experienced a revival. In 2010, the University of Windsor’s Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric dedicated a two-day symposium to the topic and later published the proceedings. In this article, I argue against the existence of conductive arguments as a usefully distinct type of argument. Some of what are deemed conductive arguments are simply inductive arguments and some are best construed as subsets of the constituents of what is commonly (...) called a position paper. (shrink)

Whether abduction is treated as an argument or as an inference, the mainstream view presupposes a tight connection between abduction and inference to the best explanation. This paper critically evaluates this link and supports a narrower view on abduction. Our main thesis is that merely the hypothesis-generative aspect, but not the evaluative aspect, is properly abductive in the sense introduced by C. S. Peirce. We show why equating abduction with IBE unnecessarily complicates argument evaluation by levelling the status of abduction (...) as a third reasoning mode. We also propose a scheme for abductive argument along with critical questions, and suggest retaining abduction alongside IBE as related but distinct categories. (shrink)

An approach to argument macrostructure -- The dialectical nature of argument -- Toulmin's problematic notion of warrant -- The linked-convergent distinction, a first approximation -- Argument structure and disciplinary perspective : the linked-convergent versus multiple-co-ordinatively compound distinctions -- The linked-convergent distinction, refining the criterion -- Argument structure and enthymemes -- From analysis to evaluation.

Mr. Wellman’s highly original contribution to the relatively new field of justification in ethics consists of characterizing the different ways in which ethical statements can be challenged and showing how each sort of challenge can be met by an appropriate response, enabling reasonable men to appropriately discuss or reflect on ethical issues. In developing his unique, systematic, methodology of ethics, Mr. Wellman has, first, rigorously reviewed and refuted the main arguments for the view of the nature of all reasoning as (...) deductive and, second, convincingly presented arguments for the existence of nondeductive evidences in ethics. Mr. Wellman’s broad definition of reasoning and his rejection of the identification of justification with reasoning reveals new dimensions of justification which will have wide implications in other areas of human speculation. (shrink)

In Jonathan Adler argued that conductive arguments, as they are commonly characterized, are impossible—that no such argument can exist. This striking contention threatens to undermine a topic of argumentation theory originated by Trudy Govier based on Carl Wellman and revisited by the papers in “Conductive argument, An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning”. I here argue that Adler’s dismissal of conductive arguments relies on a misreading of the term ‘non-conclusive’ used in the characterization of this type of reasoning and argument, and (...) that as a result, his refutation fails. However, Adler’s critique raises other questions about conductive arguments that have to be answered. (shrink)

Conductive Arguments are held to be defeasible, non-conclusive, and neither inductive nor deductive (Blair and Johnson in Conductive argument: An overlooked type of defeasible reasoning. College, London, 2011). Of the different kinds of Conductive Arguments, I am concerned only with those for which it is claimed that countervailing considerations detract from the support for the conclusion, complimentary to the positive reasons increasing that support. Here’s an example from Wellman (Challenge and response: justification in ethics. Southern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 1971): (...) Although your lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movies because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow. (1971: 57) I argue that Conductive Arguments are not possible—the “ought” conclusion only holds if countervailing considerations are nullified. (shrink)

"A sequel to Pollock's How to Build a Person, this volume builds upon that theoretical groundwork for the implementation of rationality through artificial ...

How are dependent (or linked) premises to be distinguished from independent (or convergent) premises? Deductive validity, sometimes proposed as a necessary condition for depende'nce, cannot be, for the premises of both inductive and deductive but invalid arguments can be dependent. The question is really this: When do multiple premises for a certain conclusion fonn one argument for that conclusion and when do they form multiple arguments? Answer: Premises are dependent when the evidence they offer for their conclusion is more than (...) the ordinary sum of their probabilities. Ordinary sums are defined in the paper. (shrink)

The book also comes with an exhaustive array of study aids that enable the reader to monitor and enhance the learning process.

No detailed description available for "From Axiom to Dialogue".

Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation presents the basic tools for the identification, analysis, and evaluation of common arguments for beginners. The book teaches by using examples of arguments in dialogues, both in the text itself and in the exercises. Examples of controversial legal, political, and ethical arguments are analyzed. Illustrating the most common kinds of arguments, the book also explains how to evaluate each kind by critical questioning. Douglas Walton shows how arguments can be reasonable under the right dialogue conditions by (...) using critical questions to evaluate them. The book teaches by example, both in the text itself and in exercises, but it is based on methods that have been developed through the author's thirty years of research in argumentation studies. (shrink)

This book concentrates on argumentation as it emerges in ordinary discourse, whether the discourse is institutionalized or strictly informal. Crucial concepts from the theory of argumentation are systematically discussed and explained with the help of examples from real-life discourse and texts. The basic principles are explained that are instrumental in the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. Methodical instruments are offered for identifying differences of opinion, analyzing and evaluating argumentation and presenting arguments in oral and written discourse. In addition, the (...) book provides a great variety of exercises and assignments to improve the students' skill in presenting argumentation. The authors begin their treatment of argumentation theory at the same juncture where argumentation also starts in practice: The difference of opinion that occasions the evolvement of the argumentation. Each chapter begins with a short summary of the essentials and ends with a number of exercises that students can use to master the material. _Argumentation_ is the first introductory textbook of this kind. It is intended as a general introduction for students who are interested in a proper conduct of argumentative discourse. Suggestions for further reading are made for each topic and several extra assignments are added to the exercises. Special features: * A concise and complete treatment of both the theoretical backgrounds and the practice of argumentation analysis and evaluation. * Crucial concepts from pragmatics presented in a non-technical way; introducing the theory of verbal communication. * Unique coverage of both oral and written presentation of arguments. * Exercises and assignments based on real-life texts from a variety of contexts. (shrink)

This volume gives a theoretical account of the problem of analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse. After placing argumentation in a communicative perspective, and then discussing the fallacies that occur when certain rules of communication are violated, the authors offer an alternative to both the linguistically-inspired descriptive and logically-inspired normative approaches to argumentation. The authors characterize argumentation as a complex speech act in a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. The various stages of a critical discussion are outlined, (...) and the communicative and interactional aspects of the speech acts performed in resolving a simple or complex dispute are discussed. After dealing with crucial aspects of analysis and linking the evaluation of argumentative discourse to the analysis, the authors identify the fallacies that can occur at various stages of discussion. Their general aim is to elucidate their own pragma- dialectical perspective on the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse, bringing together pragmatic insight concerning speech acts and dialectical insight concerning critical discussion. (shrink)

In previous work I argued against (i) the likelihood of finding a theoretically sound foundation for the linked/convergent distinction and (ii) the utility of the distinction even if a sound theoretical basis could be found. Here I subject Douglas Walton’s comprehensive discussion of the linked/convergent distinction found in Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory to careful scrutiny and argue that at best Walton’s theory remains incomplete and that attempts to fill out the details will run afoul of at least one of (...) the problems adduced above—i.e., result in either a theoretically unsound distinction or a theoretically sound, but unnecessary distinction. (shrink)

Sometimes logical support for a conclusion is provided exclusively by premises which are independently relevant to that conclusion. At other times, support is provided exclusively by independently irrelevant premises. On still other occasions, relevant and irrelevant premises may collectively offer a distinctive pattern of support. This paper provides a rigorous account of some of these differences in terms of a tripartite classification of convergent, linked and hybrid arguments. These various arguments are defined, diagrammed, and some of their logical properties are (...) explored. (shrink)

There are many radically different ways of understanding the distinction between linked and convergent arguments. This paper provides a generic model which enables one to articulate in a rigorous manner the important differences as well as the underlying similarities that exist between competing proposals. In addition, the paper offers a TRUE (Type Reduction Upon Elimination) test for distinguishing linked from convergent arguments which best captures the informal intuition that linked arguments are especially vulnerable to local criticisms pertaining to premise acceptability.

One popular test for distinguishing linked and convergent argument structures is Robert Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test. Douglas Walton, in his comprehensive survey of possible candidates for the linked/convergent distinction, advocates a particular version of Yanal's test. In a recent article, Alexander Tyaglo proposes to generalize and verifY Yanal's algorithm for convergent arguments, the basis for Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test. In this paper I will argue that Yanal's ordinary summing equation does not demarcate convergence and so his Ordinary Summing Test fails. (...) Hence, despite Walton's recommendation or Tyaglo's generalization, the Ordinary Summing Test should not be used for distinguishing linked argument structures from convergent argument structures. (shrink)

In this paper, a survey is presented of the main approaches to the structure of argumentation. The paper starts with a historical overview of the distinctions between various types of argument structure. Next, the main definitions given in the various approaches are discussed as well as the methods that are proposed to deal with doubtful cases.

In this paper, it is explained that a dialogical approach to complex argumentation can be fruitful for solving two important problems concerning the analysis of the argumentation structure. First, such an approach makes it possible to clarify the distinction between coordinative and multiple argumentation structures, and to identify clues in the presentation for each of these structures. Second, a dialogical approach can provide a basis for dealing more adequately with refutations of counterarguments.

Argumentation involves offering and/or exchanging reasons – either reasons for adopting various attitudes towards specific propositional contents or else reasons for acting in various ways. This paper develops the idea that the force of reasons is through and through a normative force because what good reasons accomplish is precisely to give one a certain sort of entitlement to do what they are reasons for. The paper attempts to shed light on what it is to have a reason, how the sort (...) of entitlement arising from reasons differs from other species of entitlement and how the norms by which such entitlement is assessed obtain their status as norms. (shrink)

This paper addresses several issues in argumentation theory. The over-arching goal is to discuss how a theory of analogical argument schemes fits the pragma-dialectical theory of argument schemes and argument structures, and how one should properly reconstruct both single and complex argumentation by analogy. I also propose a unified model that explains how formal valid deductive argumentation relates to argument schemes in general and to analogical argument schemes in particular. The model suggests “scheme-specific-validity” i.e. that there are contrasting species of (...) validity for each type of argument scheme that derive from one generic conception of validity. (shrink)

Preface -- Part I: Philosophical logic and philosophy of language -- Rules versus theorems : a new approach for mediation -- Between intuitionistic and two-valued logic -- On the relation between the partition of a whole into parts and the attribution of properties to an object -- Basic objectives of dialogic logic in historical perspective -- Pragmatic and semiotic prerequisites for predication : a dialogue model -- Pragmatics and semiotics : the peircean version of ontology and epistemology -- Intentionality and (...) its language-dependency -- Meaning postulates and rules of argumentation : remarks concerning the pragmatic tie between meaning (of terms) and truth (of propositions) -- What do language games measure? -- Features of Indian logic -- Part II: Methods in philosophy, in art, and in science -- The concept of science : some remarks on the methodological issue construction versus description in the philosophy of science -- Is and ought revisited -- Competition and cooperation : are they antagonistic or complementary? -- Another version of methodological dualism -- The pre-established harmony between the two Adams -- On the way to conceptual and perceptual knowledge -- Self and other : remarks on human nature and human culture -- On the concept of symmetry -- Procedural principles of the Eerlangen School : on the interrelation between the principles of method, of dialogue, and of reason. (shrink)

Many in the informal logic tradition distinguish convergent from linked argument structure. The pragma-dialectical tradition distinguishes multiple from co-ordinatively compound argumentation. Although these two distinctions may appear to coincide, constituting only a terminological difference, we argue that they are distinct, indeed expressing different disciplinary perspectives on argumentation. From a logical point of view, where the primary evaluative issue concerns sufficient strength of support, the unit of analysis is the individual argument, the particular premises put forward to support a given conclusion. (...) Structure is internal to this unit. From a dialectical point of view, where the focus concerns how well a critical discussion comes to a reasoned conclusion of some disputed question, the argumentation need not constitute a single unit of argument. The unit of dialectical analysis will be the entire argumentation made up of these several arguments. The multiple/co-ordinatively compound distinction is dialectical, while the linked/convergent distinction is logical. Keeping these two pairs of distinctions separate allows us to see certain attempts to characterize convergent versus linked arguments as rather characterizing multiple versus co-ordinatively compound arguments, in particular attempts of Thomas, Nolt, and Yanal, and to resolve straightforwardly conflicts, tensions, or anomalies in their accounts. Walton's preferred Suspension/Insufficient Proof test to identify linked argument structure correctly identifies co-ordinatively compound structure. His objection to using the concept of relevance to explicate the distinction between linked and convergent structure within co-ordinatively compound argumentation can be met through explicating relevance in terms of inference licenses. His counterexample to the Suspension/No Support test for identifying linked structure which this approach supports can itself be straightforwardly dealt with when the test is explicated through inference licenses. (shrink)

I will demonstrate that conductive arguments are found in the inference to the best explana-tion as it is used in science. Conductive arguments, I argue, operate on two levels: the first is in the con-struction of hypotheses; the second is through the competition of hypotheses. By constructing arguments based on observations of facts, all possible factors are taken into account and a judgment is made based on our weighing of considerations: conductive argumentation.

In pro and con arguments, an arguer acknowledges that there are points against the conclu-sion reached. Such points have been called ‘counter-considerations.’ Their significance is explored here in the light of recent comments by Rongdong Jin, Hans Hansen and others. A conception of connector words such as “although”, “nevertheless,” and “but” is developed, as is a new model recognizing the need for an ‘on balance’ judgment in these arguments.

This paper is to argue that conductive arguments could be understood from a rhetorical perspective. It contends that conductive arguments can be regarded as a particular mode of strategic maneuvering, rather than a new type of argument. Moreover, it demonstrates that the use of conductive arguments can be adequately analyzed and evaluated by adopting the theoretical tools developed in the extended Pragma-Dialectics.

T. Govier's description of ‘conductive argument’ and 'A priori analogy' is taken as a start to investigate non-deductive argumentation. It is here argued, that the nature of those types can be better understood when taking up a dynamic view (in addition to the usual structural view). The concepts of ‘frame’ and ‘position’ are constructed in order to establish such a twofold approach.

Mr. Wellman’s highly original contribution to the relatively new field of justification in ethics consists of characterizing the different ways in which ethical statements can be challenged and showing how each sort of challenge can be met by an appropriate response, enabling reasonable men to appropriately discuss or reflect on ethical issues. In developing his unique, systematic, methodology of ethics, Mr. Wellman has, first, rigorously reviewed and refuted the main arguments for the view of the nature of all reasoning as (...) deductive and, second, convincingly presented arguments for the existence of nondeductive evidences in ethics. Mr. Wellman’s broad definition of reasoning and his rejection of the identification of justification with reasoning reveals new dimensions of justification which will have wide implications in other areas of human speculation. (shrink)

William Baird collection in Social Sciences is the gift of the Estate of William Cameron Baird.

In this paper I demonstrate that most textbook accounts of the linked/convergent distinction fail to conform to the widespread intuition that all valid arguments ought to be classified as linked arguments. I also show that standard textbook accounts of linkage and convergence cannot provide a satisfactory treatment of fallacies of irrelevance and, due to their general insensitivity to the epistemic context in which arguments are offered, must be supplemented by subjective accounts of linkage and convergence which appeal exclusively to authorial (...) beliefs and intentions. (shrink)

This paper examines arguments that take counter- considerations into account, and it does so from a dialogical point of view. According to my account, a counterconsideration is part of a critical reaction from a real or imagined opponent, and an arguer may take it into account in his argument in at least six fully responsive ways. Conductive arguments will be characterized as one of these types. In this manner, the paper aims to show how conducive, and related kinds of argument (...) can be understood dialogically. (shrink)

The topic of conductive arguments, as a separate category of reasoning, is experiencing a revival. In 2010, the University of Windsor’s Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric dedicated a two-day symposium to the topic and recently published the proceedings. In this article, I argue against the existence of conductive arguments as a distinct type and argue against a popular analysis of the structure of conductive arguments.