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  1. The Moral Nexus.R. Jay Wallace - 2019 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality—namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing. The book offers an interpretative argument (...)
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  • Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.
    A normative reason for a person to? is a consideration which favours?ing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person?s. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons to? for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views (...)
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  • How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims.Alex Voorhoeve - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):64-87.
    Many believe that we ought to save a large number from being permanently bedridden rather than save one from death. Many also believe that we ought to save one from death rather than a multitude from a very minor harm, no matter how large this multitude. I argue that a principle I call “Aggregate Relevant Claims” satisfactorily explains these judgments. I offer a rationale for this principle and defend it against objections.
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  • The individualist lottery: How people count, but not their numbers.Jens Timmermann - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):106–112.
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  • The realm of rights.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    In The Realm of Rights Judith Thomson provides a full-scale, systematic theory of human and social rights, bringing out what in general makes an attribution of ...
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  • Rights and compensation.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1980 - Noûs 14 (1):3-15.
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  • Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Long claimed to be the dominant conception of practical reason, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack in recent decades. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. Slaves of the Passions aims to set the record (...)
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  • Justifiability to each person.Derek Parfit - 2003 - Ratio 16 (4):368–390.
    sonable, in this sense, if we ignore, or give too little weight to, some other people's well-being or moral claims.' Some critics have suggested that, because Scanlon appeals to this sense of 'reasonable', his formula is empty. On this objection, whenever we believe that some act is wrong, we shall believe that people have moral claims not to be treated in this way. We could therefore argue that such acts are disallowed by some principle which no one could reasonably reject, (...)
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  • The distribution of numbers and the comprehensiveness of reasons.Veronique Munoz-Darde - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):207–233.
    In this paper, I concentrate on two themes: to what extent numbers bear on an agent's duties, and how numbers should relate to social policy. In the first half of the paper I consider the abstract case of a choice between saving two people and saving one, and my focus is on the contrast between a duty to act and a reason which merely makes an action intelligible. In the second half, I turn to the issue of social policy and (...)
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  • When rights are permissibly infringed.Phillip Montague - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):347 - 366.
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  • Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):332-342.
    John Broome argues that rationality cannot consist in reasons-responsiveness since rationality supervenes on the mind, while reasons-responsiveness does not supervene on the mind. I here defend this conception of rationality by way of defending the assumption that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind. Given the many advantages of an analysis of rationality in terms of reasons-responsiveness, and in light of independent considerations in favour of the view that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind, we should take seriously the backup view, a hypothesis (...)
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  • Contrary-to-Duty Scenarios, Deontic Dilemmas, and Transmission Principles.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):98-115.
    Actualists hold that contrary-to-duty scenarios give rise to deontic dilemmas and provide counterexamples to the transmission principle, according to which we ought to take the necessary means to actions we ought to perform. In an earlier article, I have argued, contrary to actualism, that the notion of ‘ought’ that figures in conclusions of practical deliberation does not allow for deontic dilemmas and validates the transmission principle. Here I defend these claims, together with my possibilist account of contrary-to-duty scenarios, against Stephen (...)
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  • The additive fallacy.Shelly Kagan - 1988 - Ethics 99 (1):5-31.
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  • Are there any natural rights?H. L. A. Hart - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (2):175-191.
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  • Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining (...)
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  • Morality, Mortality: Death and Whom to Save from It.Baruch A. Brody & Frances Kamm - 1995 - Hastings Center Report 25 (1):48.
    Book reviewed in this article: Morality, Mortality: Death and Whom to Save from It. By Frances Kamm.
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  • In defense of exclusionary reasons.N. P. Adams - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):235-253.
    Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense (...)
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  • Self-Defense and Rights.Judith Jarvis Thomson - unknown
    This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1976, given by Judith Jarvis Thomson, an American philosopher.
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  • Voluntary euthanasia and the inalienable right to life.Joel Feinberg - 1978 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (2):93-123.
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  • The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect.Philippa Foot - 1967 - Oxford Review 5:5-15.
    One of the reasons why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. When we think of a baby about to be born it seems absurd to think that the next few minutes or even hours could make so radical a difference to its status; yet as we go back in the life of the fetus we (...)
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  • Should the numbers count?John Taurek - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.
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  • Moral Luck By Bernard Williams Cambridge University Press, 1981, xiii + 173 pp., £16.50. [REVIEW]E. J. Bond - 1983 - Philosophy 58 (226):544-548.
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  • Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - Law and Philosophy 12 (3):329-343.
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  • How Do Reasons Accrue?Shyam Nair - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press. pp. 56–73.
    Reasons can interact in a variety of ways to determine what we ought to do or believe. And there can be cases where two reasons to do an act or have a belief are individually worse than a reason to not do that act or have that belief, but the reasons together are better than the reason to not do that act or have that belief. So the reasons together―which we can call the accrual of those reasons—can have a strength (...)
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  • Euthanasia.Philippa Foot - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (2):85-112.
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  • Introduction.Philip Stratton-Lake - 2002 - In Philip John Stratton-Lake (ed.), On What We Owe to Each Other. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell. pp. 1-17.
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  • Rights and duties of compensation.Phillip Montague - 1984 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1):79-88.
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  • The Deontic Structure of Morality.Rjay Wallace - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 137.
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