Several quantitative surveys have been conducted internationally to gather empirical information about physicians’ general attitudes towards health care rationing. Are physicians ready to accept and implement rationing, or are they rather reluctant? Do they prefer implicit bedside rationing that allows the physician–patient relationship broad leeway in individual decisions? Or do physicians prefer strategies that apply explicit criteria and rules?

This articles assesses the arguments that bioethicists have presented for the view that patient’ autonomy has value over and beyond its instrumental value in promoting the patients’ wellbeing. It argues that this view should be rejected and concludes that patients’ autonomy should be taken to have only instrumental value in medicine.

Although rationing of scarce health-care resources is inevitable in clinical practice, there is still limited and scattered information about how physicians perceive and execute this bedside rationing (BSR) and how it can be performed in an ethically fair way. This review gives a systematic overview on physicians’ perspectives on influences, strategies, and consequences of health-care rationing. Relevant references as identified by systematically screening major electronic databases and manuscript references were synthesized by thematic analysis. Retrieved studies focused on themes that fell (...) under three major headings: (i) conditions and influences of BSR, (ii) strategies of BSR, and (iii) consequences of BSR. The range of themes indicates that physicians’ rationing behavior is highly variable, strongly influenced by context-related factors, and consists mainly of implicit rationing strategies. Torn between patient advocacy and the obligation to contain costs, physicians experience various role conflicts. The development of explicit rationing strategies seems necessary to avoid arbitrary BSR and allow a fair allocation of health-care resources. (shrink)

A 78 year old married woman with progressive Alzheimer's disease was admitted to a local hospital with pneumonia and other medical problems. She recognized no one and had been incontinent for about a year. Despite aggressive treatment, the pneumonia failed to resolve and it seemed increasingly likely that this admission was to be for terminal care. The patient's husband (who had been taking care of her in their home) began requesting that the doctors be less aggressive in her treatment and, (...) as the days wore on, he became more and more insistent that they scale back their aggressive care. The physicians were reluctant to do so, due to the small but real chance that the patient could survive to discharge. But her husband was her only remaining family, so he was the logical proxy decisionmaker. Multiple conferences ensued, and finally a conference with a social worker revealed that the husband had recently proposed marriage to the couple's housekeeper and she had accepted. (shrink)

Although rationing by clinical judgment is controversial, its acceptability partly depends on how it is practiced. In this paper, rationing by clinical judgment is defined in three different circumstances that represent increasingly wider circles of resource pools in which the rationing decision takes place: triage during acute shortage, comparison to other potential patients in a context of limited but not immediately strained resources, and determination of whether expected benefit of an intervention is deemed sufficient to warrant its cost by reference (...) to published population based thresholds. Notions of procedural justice are applied along with an analytical framework of six minimal requisites in order to facilitate fair bedside rationing: (1) a closed system that offers reciprocity, (2) attention to general concerns of justice, (3) respect for individual variations, (4) application of a consistent process, (5) explicitness, and (6) review of decisions. The process could be monitored for its applicability and appropriateness. (shrink)

Demands by Patients or their Families for treatment thought to be inappropriate by health care providers constitute an important set of moral problems in clinical practice. A variety of approaches to such cases have been described in the literature, including medical futility, standard of care and negotiation. Medical futility fails because it confounds morally distinct cases: demand for an ineffective treatment and demand for an effective treatment that supports a controversial end (e.g., permanent unconsciousness). Medical futility is not necessary in (...) the first case and is harmful in the second. Ineffective treatment falls outside the standard of care, and thus health care workers have no obligation to provide it. Demands for treatment that supports controversial ends are difficult cases best addressed through open communication, negotiation and the use of conflict-resolution techniques. Institutions should ensure that fair and unambiguous procedures for dealing with such cases are laid out in policy statements. (shrink)

Law wrangles with setting and applying standards for the practice of medicine in many different arenas. One of the most prominent is medical malpractice litigation in which the trial process examines a physician's performance and measures it against the standard of care. The profession's prevailing custom, with some substantial tolerance for “respectable minority” views, has been the gold standard for scrutinizing physician practice and treatment decisions in the malpractice context. Using the profession's custom as the measure against which a physician's (...) performance is judged defers to the expertise of medicine. Deference to the medical profession is attractive as a tool for reining in law. Reliance on customary practice is criticized, however, for driving physicians to the relative safety of the middle of the herd. Creating such a strong incentive for compliance with customary practice can dampen medical innovation and the diffusion of new clinical knowledge. The safety of the herd can also deprive individual patients of the best care in their particular circumstances.Several current trends are strengthening claims that professional practice patterns are an inappropriate tool for distinguishing between high‐quality and substandard care. In particular, advocacy for evidence‐based medicine aggressively asserts that the traditional way of making medical treatment decisions is largely untethered from scientific method or data, rendering professional judgment, even in the aggregate, suspect. (shrink)

The ever‐increasing demand for organs led Spain, France, and other European countries to promote uncontrolled donation after circulatory determination of death (uDCDD). For the same reason, New York City has recently developed its own uDCDD protocol, which differs from European programs in some key ways. The New York protocol incorporates a series of technical and management improvements that address some practical problems identified in response to European uDCDD protocols. However, the more fundamental issue of whether uDCDD donors are dead when (...) organs are procured remains problematic for the New York City protocol and, indeed, for all uDCDD protocols. In the United States, two amendments to the legal criteria of death have been suggested to avoid a formal violation of the dead donor rule in DCDD protocols: first, replacing the requirement “irreversible” with the weaker term “permanent,” and second, using the term “circulatory” instead of “cardiac” to identify the key function that must be lost to declare death. While intended to facilitate controlled DCDD, these modifications create a problem for uDCDD protocols: if extracorporeal membrane oxygenation is introduced to preserve the organs, then circulation is restored after death is declared. In this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Kevin Munjal and colleagues call for a new ethical construct and policy so that uncontrolled and controlled DCDD can coexist. (shrink)

OBJECTIVE: To describe the issues faced, and how they were addressed, by the University of Toronto Critical Care Medicine Program/Joint Centre for Bioethics Task Force on Appropriate Use of Life-Sustaining Treatment. The clinical problem addressed by the Task Force was dealing with requests by patients or substitute decision makers for life-sustaining treatment that their healthcare providers believe is inappropriate. DESIGN: Case study. SETTING: The University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics/Critical Care Medicine Program Task Force on Appropriate Use of Life-Sustaining (...) Treatment. PARTICIPANTS: The 24-member Task Force included physician and nursing leaders from five critical care units, bioethicists, a legal scholar, a health administration expert, a social worker, and a hospital public relations professional. INTERVENTIONS: None. MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: Our specific lessons learned include a) a policy focus on process; b) use of a negotiation and mediation model, rather than a hospital ethics committee model, for this process; and c) the policy development process is itself a negotiation, so we recommend equal involvement of interested groups including patients, families, and the public. CONCLUSIONS: This article describes the key issues faced by the Task Force while developing its policy. It will provide a useful starting point for other groups developing policy on appropriate use of life-sustaining treatment. (shrink)

Requests by patients or their families for treatment which the patient's physician considers to be "inappropriate" are becoming more frequent than refusals of treatment which the physician considers appropriate. Such requests are often based on the patient's religious beliefs about the attributes of God (sovereignty, omnipotence), the attributes of persons (sanctity of life), or the individual's personal relationship with God (communication, commands, etc). We present four such cases and discuss some of the basic religious tenets of the three Abrahamic faith (...) traditions as they relate to such requests. We suggest that religious reasons for requesting "inappropriate" treatment are "special" and deserve serious consideration. We offer guidance to assist clinicians and clinical ethicists as they attempt to resolve these conflicts, emphasising the importance of understanding the religious beliefs of the patient/surrogate and suggesting the assistance of a religious interpreter. We suggest open discussion with patients and families of both the clinical situation and the theological basis for these requests. We also suggest that clinicians use additional religious doctrines or principles from patients' own traditions to balance the reasons behind the requests. We conclude that most persistent requests for "inappropriate" treatment should be honoured. (shrink)

Historically, the triage of temporarily scarce health resources has served narrow utilitarian ends. The recent H1N1 pandemic experience provided an opportunity for expanding the theoretical foundations/understandings of critical care triage in the context of declared infectious pandemics. This paper briefly explores the ethics-related challenges associated with the development of modern critical care triage protocols and provides descriptions of some ‘enhanced fairness’ features which were developed through the use of an inclusive deliberative engagement process by a Canadian provincial Department of Health.

In February 1999, I received a call from a lawyer at Hill Abra Dewar stating that she had instructions to retain my services as an expert witness in the case of Sawatzky v. Riverview Health Centre. She was representing the Manitoba League of Persons with Disabilities which had intervenor status.In Canada the admission of expert testimony depends upon the application of four criteria outlined in R. v. Mohan by Justice Sopinka. These criteria are: relevance; necessity in assisting the trier of (...) fact, the absence of any exclusionary rule; and a properly qualified expert. The lawyer believed that I could provide the court with relevant, reliable ethics testimony about surrogate decision-making and about medical futility-information that likely would be outside the experience and knowledge of the trier of fact. (shrink)

A commentary on “What's Not Being Shared in Shared Decision‐Making?” from the July‐August 2013.

: Bioethicists have articulated an ideal of shared decision making between physician and patient, but in doing so the role of clinical uncertainty has not been adequately confronted. In the face of uncertainty about the patient's prognosis and the best course of treatment, many physicians revert to a model of nondisclosure and nondiscussion, thus closing off opportunities for shared decision making. Empirical studies suggest that physicians find it more difficult to adhere to norms of disclosure in situations where there is (...) substantial uncertainty. They may be concerned that acknowledging their own uncertainty will undermine patient trust and create additional confusion and anxiety for the patient. We argue, in contrast, that effective disclosure will protect patient trust in the long run and that patients can manage information about uncertainty. In situations where there is substantial uncertainty, extra vigilance is required to ensure that patients are given the tools and information they need to participate in cooperative decision making about their care. (shrink)

It's not only necessary, but possible, if the public can be educated.

Background: Theoretically, the principle of justice is strong in healthcare priorities both nationally and internationally. Research, however, has indicated that questions can be raised as to how this principle is dealt with in clinical intensive care. Objective: The objective of this article is to examine how significant others may affect the principle of justice in the medical treatment and nursing care of intensive care patients. Method: Field observations and in-depth interviews with physicians and nurses in intensive care units (ICU). Emphasis (...) was placed on eliciting the underlying rationale for prioritisations in clinical intensive care with particular focus on clinicians’ considerations when limiting ICU treatment. Results: Significant others could induce an unintentional discrimination of ICU patients. Family members who were demanding received more time and attention for both the patient and themselves. Patients’ and families’ status and position and/or an interesting medical diagnosis seemed to govern the clinicians’ priorities of patients and families—consciously as well as unconsciously. The clinicians emphasised that patient information given through families was important. However, patients’ preferences and values conveyed to clinicians through their families were not always taken seriously. This even applied in cases with very serious prognoses and an explicit patient wish to forego life-prolonging treatment. Conclusion: The principle of justice was violated when qualified attention was given to significant others, and through this also to patients. Attention given to significant others was influenced by the healthcare workers’ professional and personal values, attitudes and interests. (shrink)

It's not only necessary, but possible, if the public can be educated.

The article by Professor Baergen and Dr. Woodhouse makes a succinct and serious contribution to progress in bioethical understanding of deciding for others. They begin with what is by now a familiar claim: family proxy decision makers may sometimes make decisions on behalf of incapacitated relatives that depart from what might be optimal from the patient’s point of view, since the well-being of family members, or of the family as such, may be substantially affected by the direction of a patient’s (...) care. They then develop this idea, noting that others apart from family members can also be substantially affected by a patient’s treatment, and arguing that the interests of strangers ought also to sometimes have a role in determining the aims and means of a patient’s treatment.Baergen and Woodhouse also devote attention to how extra-familial interests might be implemented in medical decision making. While I unearth a troubling consequence of the effort to realize their theoretical conclusion practically, my chief task is to point to some disanalogies between families and strangers, and consider the extent to which they call into question the relevance of the interests of strangers to the treatment of patients. (shrink)