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Time, Unity, and Conscious Experience

Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Center (2013)

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  1. (2 other versions)A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
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  • Scalar expectancy theory and Weber's law in animal timing.John Gibbon - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):279-325.
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  • Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience.Barry Dainton - 2000 - New York: Routledge.
    _Stream of Consciousness_ is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness.
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  • Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain (...)
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  • The Unity of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Tim Bayne draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. He develops an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified, and then applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. He goes on to explore the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the (...)
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  • The effect of perceived motion-in-depth on time perception.Fuminori Ono & Shigeru Kitazawa - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):140-146.
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  • (1 other version)No unchallengeable epistemic authority, of any sort, regarding our own conscious experience – Contra Dennett?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):107-113.
    Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say (...)
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  • Quality Space Model of Temporal Perception.Michal Klincewicz - 2010 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6789 (Multidisciplinary Aspects of Tim):230-245.
    Quality Space Theory is a holistic model of qualitative states. On this view, individual mental qualities are defined by their locations in a space of relations, which reflects a similar space of relations among perceptible properties. This paper offers an extension of Quality Space Theory to temporal perception. Unconscious segmentation of events, the involvement of early sensory areas, and asymmetries of dominance in multi-modal perception of time are presented as evidence for the view.
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  • The Qualitative Character of Spatial Perception.Douglas B. Meehan - 2007 - Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York
    Ordinary perceiving relies heavily on our sensing the spatial properties of objects, e.g., their shapes, sizes, and locations. Such spatial perception is central in everyday life. We safely cross a street by seeing and hearing the locations of oncoming vehicles. And we often identify objects by seeing and feeling their distinctive shapes. -/- To understand how we perceive spatial properties, we must explain the nature of the mental states figuring in spatial perception. The experience one has when seeing a cube, (...)
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  • Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
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  • Neural Correlates of Temporality?Michał Klincewicz - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):704-706.
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  • The case for proprioception.Ellen Fridland - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):521-540.
    In formulating a theory of perception that does justice to the embodied and enactive nature of perceptual experience, proprioception can play a valuable role. Since proprioception is necessarily embodied, and since proprioceptive experience is particularly integrated with one’s bodily actions, it seems clear that proprioception, in addition to, e.g., vision or audition, can provide us with valuable insights into the role of an agent’s corporal skills and capacities in constituting or structuring perceptual experience. However, if we are going to have (...)
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  • Consciousness cannot be separated from function.Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
    Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
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  • The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow.Richard Brown - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604.
    In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.
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  • (1 other version)Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
    Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice (...)
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  • Marginally perceptible outcome feedback, motor learning and implicit processes.Rich S. W. Masters, Jon P. Maxwell & Frank F. Eves - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):639-645.
    Participants struck 500 golf balls to a concealed target. Outcome feedback was presented at the subjective or objective threshold of awareness of each participant or at a supraliminal threshold. Participants who received fully perceptible feedback learned to strike the ball onto the target, as did participants who received feedback that was only marginally perceptible . Participants who received feedback that was not perceptible showed no learning. Upon transfer to a condition in which the target was unconcealed, performance increased in both (...)
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  • On the electrodynamics of moving bodies.Albert Einstein - 1920 - In The Principle of Relativity. [Calcutta]: Dover Publications. pp. 35-65.
    It is known that Maxwell’s electrodynamics—as usually understood at the present time—when applied to moving bodies, leads to asymmetries which do not appear to be inherent in the phenomena. Take, for example, the reciprocal electrodynamic action of a magnet and a conductor. The observable phenomenon here depends only on the relative motion of the conductor and the magnet, whereas the customary view draws a sharp distinction between the two cases in which either the one or the other of these bodies (...)
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  • The irrelevance of the presentist/eternalist debate for the ontology of Minkowski spacetime.Mauro Dorato - 2006 - In Dennis Geert Bernardus Johan Dieks (ed.), The ontology of spacetime. Boston: Elsevier. pp. 93-109.
    In this paper I argue that the debate between the so-called “presentists” – according to whom only the present is real – and the “eternalists”, according to whom past present and future are equally real, has no ontological significance. In particular, once we carefully distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of existence, it is difficult to find a single ontological claim on which the two parties could disagree. Since the choice of using a tense or a tenseless language (...)
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  • Perception of duration presupposes duration of perception - or does it? Husserl and Dainton on time.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):453-471.
    In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl's classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton's and Husserl's respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat opportunity to appraise (...)
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  • (1 other version)Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals.Anil K. Seth, Bernard J. Baars & David B. Edelman - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):119-39.
    The standard behavioral index for human consciousness is the ability to report events with accuracy. While this method is routinely used for scientific and medical applications in humans, it is not easy to generalize to other species. Brain evidence may lend itself more easily to comparative testing. Human consciousness involves widespread, relatively fast low-amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical core of the brain, driven by current tasks and conditions. These features have also been found in other mammals, which suggests that consciousness (...)
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  • Unconscious color priming occurs at stimulus- not percept-dependent levels of processing.Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Tony Ro & Neel S. Singhal - 2004 - Psychological Science 15 (3):198-202.
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  • Moving and looming stimuli capture attention.Steve Franconeri & Daniel J. Simons - 2003 - Perception and Psychophysics 65 (7):999-1010.
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  • To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes.Ronald A. Rensink, J. Kevin O'Regan & James J. Clark - 1997 - Psychological Science 8:368-373.
    When looking at a scene, observers feel that they see its entire structure in great detail and can immediately notice any changes in it. However, when brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: identification of changes becomes extremely difficult, even when changes are large and made repeatedly. Identification is much faster when a verbal cue is provided, showing that poor visibility is not the cause of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Is seeing all it seems?Andy Clark - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):181-202.
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  • Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness.Benjamin Libet - 2004 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    Over a long career, Libet has conducted experiments that have shown, in clear and concrete ways, how the brain produces conscious awareness.
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  • The timing of mental events: Libet's experimental findings and their implications.Benjamin Libet - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):291-99.
    The major findings by Libet et al. are briefly summarized. The criticisms and alternative proposals by Trevena and Miller, Pockett, and Gomes are analyzed and found to be largely unwarranted.
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  • Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The unimportance of identity.Derek Parfit - 1997 - In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 13-45.
    We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. The information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and he is in (...)
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  • Representationalism and the transparency of experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  • Present-time consciousness.Francisco J. Varela - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):111-140.
    My purpose in this article is to propose an explicitly naturalized account of the experience of present nowness on the basis of two complementary sources: phenomenological analysis and cognitive neuroscience. What I mean by naturalization, and the role cognitive neuroscience plays will become clear as the paper unfolds, but the main intention is to use the consciousness of present time as a study case for the phenomenological framework presented by Depraz in this Special Issue.
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  • The puzzle of temporal experience.Sean D. Kelly - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 208--238.
    There you are at the opera house. The soprano has just hit her high note – a glassshattering high C that fills the hall – and she holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds the note for such a long time that after a while a funny thing happens: you no longer seem only to hear it, the note as it is currently sounding, that glass-shattering high C that is loud and (...)
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  • Sync-ing in the stream of experience: Time-consciousness in Broad, Husserl, and Dainton.Shaun Gallagher - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    By examining Dainton's account of the temporality of consciousness in the context of long-running debates about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content, and a lack of phenomenological clarity concerning the central concept of overlapping (...)
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  • What is the unity of consciousness?Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford University Press.
    At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing (...)
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  • (4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
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  • (5 other versions)A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40).David Hume - 1739 - Mineola, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.
    A key to modern studies of 18th century Western philosophy, the Treatise considers numerous classic philosophical issues, including causation, existence, freedom and necessity and morality. This abridged edition has an introduction which explain's Hume's thought and places it in the context of its times.
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  • Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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  • (6 other versions)Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1781 - Mineola, New York: Macmillan Company. Edited by J. M. D. Meiklejohn.
    Immanuel Kant was one of the leading lights of 18th-century philosophy; his work provided the foundations for later revolutionary thinkers such as Hegel and Marx. This work contains the keystone of his critical philosophy - the basis of human knowledge and truth.
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  • Do English and Mandarin speakers think about time differently?Lera Boroditsky, Orly Fuhrman & Kelly McCormick - 2011 - Cognition 118 (1):123-129.
    Time is a fundamental domain of experience. In this paper we ask whether aspects of language and culture affect how people think about this domain. Specifically, we consider whether English and Mandarin speakers think about time differently. We review all of the available evidence both for and against this hypothesis, and report new data that further support and refine it. The results demonstrate that English and Mandarin speakers do think about time differently. As predicted by patterns in language, Mandarin speakers (...)
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  • Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright & Dennis K. Pearl - 1983 - Brain 106 (3):623--664.
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  • Res cogitans: an essay in rational psychology.Zeno Vendler - 1972 - Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press.
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  • Must an Appearance of Succession Involve a Succession of Appearances?Michael Pelczar - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):49-63.
    It is argued that a subject who has an experience as of succession can have this experience at a time, or over a period of time, during which there occurs in him no succession of conscious mental states at all. Various metaphysical implications of this conclusion are explored. One premise of the main argument is that every experience is an experience as of succession. This implies that we cannot understand phenomenal temporality as a relation among experiences, but only as a (...)
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  • (1 other version)There is no stream of consciousness.Susan J. Blackmore - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):17-28.
    Throughout history there have been people who say it is all illusion. I think they may be right. But if they are right what could this mean? If you just say "It's all an illusion" this gets you nowhere - except that a whole lot of other questions appear. Why should we all be victims of an illusion, instead of seeing things the way they really are? What sort of illusion is it anyway? Why is it like that and not (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
    Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice (...)
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  • Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...)
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  • A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.George Berkeley - 1901 - The Monist 11:637.
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  • Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation.Dan Zahavi - 1999 - The Personalist Forum 15 (2):444-448.
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  • The Ever-New Flow of Time: Henri Bergsons View of Consciousnes.G. William Barnard - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (11-12):11-12.
    Henri Bergson created a rich and detailed theory of consciousness beginning with the publication of Time and Free Will in 1889 and continuing through the publication of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion in 1932. His theory had much in common with William James’s views in that both emphasized consciousness as a continuous process. James's famous ‘stream of consciousness’ is strikingly similar to Bergson's early notion of duration (duree), even if Bergson more strongly emphasized the temporal qualities of consciousness. (...)
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  • Unconscious auditory information can prime visual word processing: A process-dissociation procedure study☆.Dominique Lamy, Liad Mudrik & Leon Y. Deouell - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):688-698.
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  • Brentano's Analysis of the Consciousness of Time.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):3-16.
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