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Time, Unity, and Conscious Experience

Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Center (2013)

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  1. Unconscious color priming occurs at stimulus- not percept-dependent levels of processing.Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Tony Ro & Neel S. Singhal - 2004 - Psychological Science 15 (3):198-202.
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  • (1 other version)There is no stream of consciousness.Susan J. Blackmore - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):17-28.
    Throughout history there have been people who say it is all illusion. I think they may be right. But if they are right what could this mean? If you just say "It's all an illusion" this gets you nowhere - except that a whole lot of other questions appear. Why should we all be victims of an illusion, instead of seeing things the way they really are? What sort of illusion is it anyway? Why is it like that and not (...)
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  • To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes.Ronald A. Rensink, J. Kevin O'Regan & James J. Clark - 1997 - Psychological Science 8:368-373.
    When looking at a scene, observers feel that they see its entire structure in great detail and can immediately notice any changes in it. However, when brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: identification of changes becomes extremely difficult, even when changes are large and made repeatedly. Identification is much faster when a verbal cue is provided, showing that poor visibility is not the cause of (...)
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  • Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
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  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The unimportance of identity.Derek Parfit - 1997 - In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 13-45.
    We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. The information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and he is in (...)
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  • Representationalism and the transparency of experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  • (1 other version)Sensory Qualities.Austen Clark - 1992 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
    Drawing on work in psychophysics, psychometrics, and sensory neurophysiology, Clark analyzes the character and defends the integrity of psychophysical explanations of qualitative facts, arguing that the structure of such explanations is sound and potentially successful.
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  • Functionalism and qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
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  • Perceiving temporal properties.Ian Phillips - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):176-202.
    Philosophers have long struggled to understand our perceptual experience of temporal properties such as succession, persistence and change. Indeed, strikingly, a number have felt compelled to deny that we enjoy such experience. Philosophical puzzlement arises as a consequence of assuming that, if one experiences succession or temporal structure at all, then one experiences it at a moment. The two leading types of theory of temporal awareness—specious present theories and memory theories—are best understood as attempts to explain how temporal awareness is (...)
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  • Present-time consciousness.Francisco J. Varela - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):111-140.
    My purpose in this article is to propose an explicitly naturalized account of the experience of present nowness on the basis of two complementary sources: phenomenological analysis and cognitive neuroscience. What I mean by naturalization, and the role cognitive neuroscience plays will become clear as the paper unfolds, but the main intention is to use the consciousness of present time as a study case for the phenomenological framework presented by Depraz in this Special Issue.
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  • Consciousness and co-consciousness.Sydney Shoemaker - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford University Press. pp. S31 - S32.
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  • What is the unity of consciousness?Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford University Press.
    At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
    Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together, in principle they might come apart: the intentional component could be present without the sensational component or vice (...)
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  • Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
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  • Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...)
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  • Perception of duration presupposes duration of perception - or does it? Husserl and Dainton on time.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):453-471.
    In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl's classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton's and Husserl's respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat opportunity to appraise (...)
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  • Res cogitans: an essay in rational psychology.Zeno Vendler - 1972 - Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press.
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  • Brentano on inner consciousness.Mark Textor - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):411-432.
    I offer a reconstruction of Brentano's view of inner consciousness and show how Brentano prevented a regress of higher-order mental acts.
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  • The Presidential Address: The Unreality of Time.T. L. S. Sprigge - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92:1 - 19.
    T. L. S. Sprigge; I *—The Presidential Address: The Unreality of Time, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 1–20, htt.
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  • James, empiricism, and absolute idealism.Timothy L. S. Sprigge - 2006 - In John R. Shook & Joseph Margolis (eds.), A Companion to Pragmatism. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 166–176.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Reality as Experience Knowledge and Truth Intellectualism The Unity of Mind Metaphysical Pluralism.
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  • I *—The Presidential Address: The Unreality of Time.T. L. S. Sprigge - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1):1-20.
    T. L. S. Sprigge; I *—The Presidential Address: The Unreality of Time, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 1–20, htt.
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  • Intrinsic Connectedness.T. L. S. Sprigge - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:129 - 145.
    T.L.S. Sprigge; VIII*—Intrinsic Connectedness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 129–146, https://doi.org/10.1093/.
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  • Consciousness.Timothy L. S. Sprigge - 1994 - Synthese 98 (1):73-93.
    Various reflections on the nature of consciousness, partly inspired by Alastair Hannay's views on the subject, are presented. In particular, its reality as a distinct non-physical existence is defended against such alternatives as have dominated philosophy for many years. The main difficulty in such a defense concerns the contingency it seems to imply as to the relations between consciousness and its expression in behaviour. But it only implies such contingency if some version of the Humean principle that there cannot be (...)
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  • Multisensory prior entry.Charles Spence, David I. Shore & Raymond M. Klein - 2001 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 130 (4):799.
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  • (4 other versions)A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40).David Hume - 1739 - Mineola, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.
    A key to modern studies of 18th century Western philosophy, the Treatise considers numerous classic philosophical issues, including causation, existence, freedom and necessity and morality. This abridged edition has an introduction which explain's Hume's thought and places it in the context of its times.
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  • Change blindness.Daniel J. Simons & Daniel T. Levin - 1997 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):241-82.
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  • (1 other version)Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals.Anil K. Seth, Bernard J. Baars & David B. Edelman - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):119-39.
    The standard behavioral index for human consciousness is the ability to report events with accuracy. While this method is routinely used for scientific and medical applications in humans, it is not easy to generalize to other species. Brain evidence may lend itself more easily to comparative testing. Human consciousness involves widespread, relatively fast low-amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical core of the brain, driven by current tasks and conditions. These features have also been found in other mammals, which suggests that consciousness (...)
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  • (1 other version)No unchallengeable epistemic authority, of any sort, regarding our own conscious experience – Contra Dennett?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):107-113.
    Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say (...)
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  • Brentano's Analysis of the Consciousness of Time.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):3-16.
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  • Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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  • Phenomenal and access consciousness in olfaction.Richard J. Stevenson - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1004-1017.
    Contemporary literature on consciousness, with some exceptions, rarely considers the olfactory system. In this article the characteristics of olfactory consciousness, viewed from the standpoint of the phenomenal /access distinction, are examined relative to the major senses. The review details several qualitative differences in both olfactory P consciousness and A consciousness . The basis for these differences is argued to arise from the functions that the olfactory system performs and from the unique neural architecture needed to instantiate them. These data suggest, (...)
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  • Marginally perceptible outcome feedback, motor learning and implicit processes.Rich S. W. Masters, Jon P. Maxwell & Frank F. Eves - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):639-645.
    Participants struck 500 golf balls to a concealed target. Outcome feedback was presented at the subjective or objective threshold of awareness of each participant or at a supraliminal threshold. Participants who received fully perceptible feedback learned to strike the ball onto the target, as did participants who received feedback that was only marginally perceptible . Participants who received feedback that was not perceptible showed no learning. Upon transfer to a condition in which the target was unconcealed, performance increased in both (...)
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  • (2 other versions)A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
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  • Implicit processing of tactile information: Evidence from the tactile change detection paradigm.David Pritchett, Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):534-546.
    People can maintain accurate representations of visual changes without necessarily being aware of them. Here, we investigate whether a similar phenomenon also exists in touch. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants detected the presence of a change between two consecutively-presented tactile displays. Tactile change blindness was observed, with participants failing to report the presence of tactile change. Critically, however, when participants had to make a forced choice response regarding the number of stimuli presented in the two displays, their performance was (...)
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  • Must an Appearance of Succession Involve a Succession of Appearances?Michael Pelczar - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):49-63.
    It is argued that a subject who has an experience as of succession can have this experience at a time, or over a period of time, during which there occurs in him no succession of conscious mental states at all. Various metaphysical implications of this conclusion are explored. One premise of the main argument is that every experience is an experience as of succession. This implies that we cannot understand phenomenal temporality as a relation among experiences, but only as a (...)
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  • Cross-Cultural Differences in Mental Representations of Time: Evidence From an Implicit Nonlinguistic Task.Orly Fuhrman & Lera Boroditsky - 2010 - Cognitive Science 34 (8):1430-1451.
    Across cultures people construct spatial representations of time. However, the particular spatial layouts created to represent time may differ across cultures. This paper examines whether people automatically access and use culturally specific spatial representations when reasoning about time. In Experiment 1, we asked Hebrew and English speakers to arrange pictures depicting temporal sequences of natural events, and to point to the hypothesized location of events relative to a reference point. In both tasks, English speakers (who read left to right) arranged (...)
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  • The effect of perceived motion-in-depth on time perception.Fuminori Ono & Shigeru Kitazawa - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):140-146.
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  • (6 other versions)Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1781 - Mineola, New York: Macmillan Company. Edited by J. M. D. Meiklejohn.
    Immanuel Kant was one of the leading lights of 18th-century philosophy; his work provided the foundations for later revolutionary thinkers such as Hegel and Marx. This work contains the keystone of his critical philosophy - the basis of human knowledge and truth.
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  • Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain (...)
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  • Qualitative character and sensory representation.Douglas B. Meehan - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):630-641.
    Perceptual experience seems to involve distinct intentional and qualitative features. Inasmuch as one can visually perceive that there is a Coke can in front of one, perceptual experience must be intentional. But such experiences seem to differ from paradigmatic intentional states in having introspectible qualitative character. Peacocke argues that a perceptual experience’s qualitative character is determined by intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. But and also argues that perceptual experiences have nonconceptual representational content in addition to conceptual content and nonrepresentational sensational properties. He (...)
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  • Neural correlates of temporality: Default mode variability and temporal awareness.Dan Lloyd - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):695-703.
    The continual background awareness of duration is an essential structure of consciousness, conferring temporal extension to the many objects of awareness within the evanescent sensory present. Seeking the possible neural correlates of ubiquitous temporal awareness, this article reexamines fMRI data from off-task “default mode” periods in 25 healthy subjects studied by Grady et al. , 2005). “Brain reading” using support vector machines detected information specifying elapsed time, and further analysis specified distributed networks encoding implicit time. These networks fluctuate; none are (...)
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  • The timing of mental events: Libet's experimental findings and their implications.Benjamin Libet - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):291-99.
    The major findings by Libet et al. are briefly summarized. The criticisms and alternative proposals by Trevena and Miller, Pockett, and Gomes are analyzed and found to be largely unwarranted.
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  • Commentary on Dan Lloyd:“Neural correlates of Temporality”.Geoffrey Lee - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):707-710.
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  • Awareness of time distortions and its relation with time judgment: A metacognitive approach.Mathilde Lamotte, Marie Izaute & Sylvie Droit-Volet - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):835-842.
    The perception of time cannot be reduced to a simple percept produced by an internal clock. The aim of the present study was therefore to investigate the role of the individual consciousness of time on temporal judgments. In the present study, the participants’ awareness of attention-related time distortions was assessed using a metacognitive questionnaire. The participants were also required to verbally judge a series of stimulus durations in a single or a dual task condition. The results revealed that time was (...)
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  • Neural Correlates of Temporality?Michał Klincewicz - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):704-706.
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  • (4 other versions)The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
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  • Quality Space Model of Temporal Perception.Michal Klincewicz - 2010 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6789 (Multidisciplinary Aspects of Tim):230-245.
    Quality Space Theory is a holistic model of qualitative states. On this view, individual mental qualities are defined by their locations in a space of relations, which reflects a similar space of relations among perceptible properties. This paper offers an extension of Quality Space Theory to temporal perception. Unconscious segmentation of events, the involvement of early sensory areas, and asymmetries of dominance in multi-modal perception of time are presented as evidence for the view.
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  • The Qualitative Character of Spatial Perception.Douglas B. Meehan - 2007 - Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York
    Ordinary perceiving relies heavily on our sensing the spatial properties of objects, e.g., their shapes, sizes, and locations. Such spatial perception is central in everyday life. We safely cross a street by seeing and hearing the locations of oncoming vehicles. And we often identify objects by seeing and feeling their distinctive shapes. -/- To understand how we perceive spatial properties, we must explain the nature of the mental states figuring in spatial perception. The experience one has when seeing a cube, (...)
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  • Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
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