Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. (1 other version)How artworks modify our perception of the world.Alfredo Vernazzani - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 (2):417-438.
    Many artists, art critics, and poets suggest that an aesthetic appreciation of artworks may modify our perception of the world, including quotidian things and scenes. I call this Art-to-World, AtW. Focusing on visual artworks, in this paper I articulate an empirically-informed account of AtW that is based on content-related views of aesthetic experience, and on Goodman’s and Elgin’s concept of exemplification. An aesthetic encounter with artworks demands paying attention to its aesthetic, expressive, or design properties that realize its purpose. Attention (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • To have seen or not to have seen: A Look at Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark (1997).Ronald A. Rensink - 2018 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 13 (2):230– 235.
    Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark (1997) drew attention to the phenomenon of change blindness, in which even large changes can be difficult to notice if made during the appearance of motion transients elsewhere in the image. This article provides a sketch of the events that inspired that article as well as its subsequent impact on psychological science and on society at large.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Perceiving agency.Mason Westfall - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):847-865.
    When we look around us, some things look “alive,” others do not. What is it to “look alive”—to perceive animacy? Empirical work supports the view that animacy is genuinely perceptual. We should construe perception of animacy as perception of agents and behavior. This proposal explains how static and dynamic animacy cues relate, and explains how animacy perception relates to social cognition more broadly. Animacy perception draws attention to objects that are apt to be well‐understood folk psychologically, enabling us to marshal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Search superiority: Goal-directed attentional allocation creates more reliable incidental identity and location memory than explicit encoding in naturalistic virtual environments.Jason Helbing, Dejan Draschkow & Melissa L.-H. Võ - 2020 - Cognition 196 (C):104147.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Automaticity: Componential, causal, and mechanistic explanations. Annual Review of Psychology, 67, 263-287.Agnes Moors - 2016 - Annual Review of Psychology 67:263-287.
    The review first discusses componential explanations of automaticity, which specify non/automaticity features (e.g., un/controlled, un/conscious, non/efficient, fast/slow) and their interrelations. Reframing these features as factors that influence processes (e.g., goals, attention, and time) broadens the range of factors that can be considered (e.g., adding stimulus intensity and representational quality). The evidence reviewed challenges the view of a perfect coherence among goals, attention, and consciousness, and supports the alternative view that (a) these and other factors influence the quality of representations in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Change Blindness and Misrepresentation.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):37-56.
    Some proponents of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness. CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Impoverished or rich consciousness outside attentional focus: Recent data tip the balance for Overflow.Zohar Z. Bronfman, Hilla Jacobson & Marius Usher - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):423-444.
    The question of whether conscious experience is restricted by cognitive access and exhausted by report, or whether it overflows it—comprising more information than can be reported—is hotly debated. Recently, we provided evidence in favor of Overflow, showing that observers discriminated the color‐diversity (CD) of letters in an array, while their working‐memory and attention were dedicated to encoding and reporting a set of cued letters. An alternative interpretation is that CD‐discriminations do not entail conscious experience of the underlying colors. Here we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Rethinking the Specious Present.Simon James Prosser - 2017 - In Ian Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience: Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 146-156.
    In this chapter I argue that despite its current popularity the doctrine of the specious present, or at least every current version of it, should be rejected. I describe two alternative accounts, which deal with experiences of two different kinds of change. The first is what I call the dynamic snapshot theory, which accounts for the way we experience continuous changes such as motion and other motion-like phenomena. The second account deals with the way we experience discontinuous changes, those for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Gorillas in the missed (but not the unseen): Reevaluating the evidence for attention being necessary for consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):299-316.
    The idea that attention is necessary for consciousness (the “Necessity Thesis”) is frequently advocated by philosophers and psychologists alike. Experiments involving inattentional and change blindness are thought to support the Necessity Thesis, but they do so only if subjects failing to notice the target stimulus are also not conscious of it. This article uses commonsense phenomenological observations supplemented with empirical data to argue that some subjects failing to notice the target stimulus nonetheless experience its color. Since subjects not noticing the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The empirical case against introspection.Rik Peels - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2461-2485.
    This paper assesses five main empirical scientific arguments against the reliability of belief formation on the basis of introspecting phenomenal states. After defining ‘reliability’ and ‘introspection’, I discuss five arguments to the effect that phenomenal states are more elusive than we usually think: the argument on the basis of differences in introspective reports from differences in introspective measurements; the argument from differences in reports about whether or not dreams come in colours; the argument from the absence of a correlation between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • How Early is Infants' Attention to Objects and Actions Shaped by Culture? New Evidence from 24-Month-Olds Raised in the US and China.Sandra R. Waxman, Xiaolan Fu, Brock Ferguson, Kathleen Geraghty, Erin Leddon, Jing Liang & Min-Fang Zhao - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Limits to the usability of iconic memory.Ronald A. Rensink - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Human vision briefly retains a trace of a stimulus after it disappears. This trace—iconic memory—is often believed to be a surrogate for the original stimulus, a representational structure that can be used as if the original stimulus were still present. To investigate its nature, a flicker-search paradigm was developed that relied upon a full scan (rather than partial report) of its contents. Results show that for visual search it can indeed act as a surrogate, with little cost for alternating between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Nonconceptual Epicycles.Sonia Sedivy - 2006 - European Review of Philosophy 6:33-66.
    This paper argues that perception is a mode of engagement with individuals and their determinate properties. Perceptual content involves determinate properties in a way that relies on our conceptual capacities no less than on the properties. The “richness” of perceptual experience is explained as a distinctive individual and property involving content. This position is developed in three steps: (i) novel phenomenological description of lived experience; (ii) detailed reconstruction of Gareth Evans’ proposal that we are capable of genuinely singular thought that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Change Detection.Ronald A. Rensink - 2002 - Annual Review of Psychology 53 (1):245-277.
    Five aspects of visual change detection are reviewed. The first concerns the concept of change itself, in particular the ways it differs from the related notions of motion and difference. The second involves the various methodological approaches that have been developed to study change detection; it is shown that under a variety of conditions observers are often unable to see large changes directly in their field of view. Next, it is argued that this “change blindness” indicates that focused attention is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  • Anger superiority effect for change detection and change blindness.Pessi Lyyra, Jari K. Hietanen & Piia Astikainen - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:1-12.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (1 other version)A Conceptual Map of Scientism.Rik Peels - manuscript
    I argue that scientism in general is best understood as the thesis that the boundaries of the natural sciences should be expanded in order to include academic disciplines or realms of life that are widely considered not to belong to the realm of science. However, every adherent and critic of scientism should make clear which of the many varieties of scientism she adheres to or criticizes. In doing so, she should specify whether she is talking about (a) academic or universal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Taking a New Look at Looking at Nothing.Fernanda Ferreira, Jens Apel & John M. Henderson - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (11):405-410.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Change blindness: Past, present, and future. [REVIEW]Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):16-20.
    Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set of requirements (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   121 citations  
  • Time, Unity, and Conscious Experience.Michal Klincewicz - 2013 - Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Center
    In my dissertation I critically survey existing theories of time consciousness, and draw on recent work in neuroscience and philosophy to develop an original theory. My view depends on a novel account of temporal perception based on the notion of temporal qualities, which are mental properties that are instantiated whenever we detect change in the environment. When we become aware of these temporal qualities in an appropriate way, our conscious experience will feature the distinct temporal phenomenology that is associated with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   173 citations  
  • Implicit processing of tactile information: Evidence from the tactile change detection paradigm.David Pritchett, Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):534-546.
    People can maintain accurate representations of visual changes without necessarily being aware of them. Here, we investigate whether a similar phenomenon also exists in touch. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants detected the presence of a change between two consecutively-presented tactile displays. Tactile change blindness was observed, with participants failing to report the presence of tactile change. Critically, however, when participants had to make a forced choice response regarding the number of stimuli presented in the two displays, their performance was (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Philosophical Significance of Attention.Sebastian Watzl - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):722-733.
    What is the philosophical significance of attention? The present article provides an overview of recent debates surrounding the connections between attention and other topics of philosophical interest. In particular, it discusses the interplay between attention and consciousness, attention and agency, and attention and reference. The article outlines the questions and contemporary positions concerning how attention shapes the phenomenal character of experience, whether it is necessary or sufficient for consciousness, and whether it plays a special role in the best philosophical theories (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Objects and attention: the state of the art.Brian J. Scholl - 2001 - Cognition 80 (1-2):1-46.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   153 citations  
  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Lost in the move? Secondary task performance impairs tactile change detection on the body.Alberto Gallace, Sophia Zeeden, Brigitte Röder & Charles Spence - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):215-229.
    Change blindness, the surprising inability of people to detect significant changes between consecutively-presented visual displays, has recently been shown to affect tactile perception as well. Visual change blindness has been observed during saccades and eye blinks, conditions under which people’s awareness of visual information is temporarily suppressed. In the present study, we demonstrate change blindness for suprathreshold tactile stimuli resulting from the execution of a secondary task requiring bodily movement. In Experiment 1, the ability of participants to detect changes between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Sensing without seeing in comparative visual search.Adam Galpin, Geoffrey Underwood & Peter Chapman - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):672-687.
    Rensink [Rensink, R. A. . Visual sensing without seeing. Psychological Science, 15, 27–32] has presented evidence suggesting visual changes may be sensed without an accompanying visual experience. Here, we report two experiments in which we monitored observers’ eye-movements whilst they searched for a difference between two simultaneously presented images and pressed separate response keys when a difference was seen or sensed. We first assessed whether sensing performance was random by collecting ratings of confidence in the validity of sensing and assessing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • On the applications of change blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2008 - Psychologia 51:100-106.
    An overview is presented of the ways that change blindness has been applied to the study of various issues in perception and cognition. Topics include mechanisms of change perception, allocation of attention, nonconscious perception, and cognitive beliefs. Recent work using change blindness to investigate these topics is surveyed, along with a brief discussion of some of the ways that these approaches may further develop over the next few years.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Towards a science of magic.Gustav Kuhn, Alym A. Amlani & Ronald A. Rensink - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (9):349-354.
    It is argued here that cognitive science currently neglects an important source of insight into the human mind: the effects created by magicians. Over the centuries, magicians have learned how to perform acts that are perceived as defying the laws of nature, and that induce a strong sense of wonder. This article argues that the time has come to examine the scientific bases behind such phenomena, and to create a science of magic linked to relevant areas of cognitive science. Concrete (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Change Blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press. pp. 76--81.
    Large changes that occur in clear view of an observer can become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, blink, or other such disturbance. This change blindness is consistent with the proposal that focused visual attention is necessary to see change, with a change becoming difficult to notice whenever conditions prevent attention from being automatically drawn to it. -/- It is shown here how the phenomenon of change blindness can provide new results on the nature of visual attention, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Internal vs. external information in visual perception.Ronald A. Rensink - 2002 - In Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Smart Graphics,. pp. 63-70.
    One of the more compelling beliefs about vision is that it is based on representations that are coherent and complete, with everything in the visual field described in great detail. However, changes made during a visual disturbance are found to be difficult to see, arguing against the idea that our brains contain a detailed, picture-like representation of the scene. Instead, it is argued here that a more dynamic, "just-in-time" representation is involved, one with deep similarities to the way that users (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Modeling and Control of Visual Perception.Ronald A. Rensink - 2007 - In Wayne D. Gray (ed.), Integrated Models of Cognitive Systems. Oxford University Press. pp. 132-148.
    Recent developments in vision science have resulted in several major changes in our understanding of human visual perception. For example, attention no longer appears necessary for "visual intelligence"--a large amount of sophisticated processing can be done without it. Scene perception no longer appears to involve static, general-purpose descriptions, but instead may involve dynamic representations whose content depends on the individual and the task. And vision itself no longer appears to be limited to the production of a conscious "picture"--it may also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The cog project: Building a humanoid robot.Rodney A. Brooks, Cynthia Breazeal, Matthew Marjanovic, Brian Scassellati & Matthew Williamson - 1999 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1562:52-87.
    To explore issues of developmental structure, physical em- bodiment, integration of multiple sensory and motor systems, and social interaction, we have constructed an upper-torso humanoid robot called Cog. The robot has twenty-one degrees of freedom and a variety of sen- sory systems, including visual, auditory, vestibular, kinesthetic, and tac- tile senses. This chapter gives a background on the methodology that we have used in our investigations, highlights the research issues that have been raised during this project, and provides a summary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • (1 other version)Visual Attention.Jeremy Wolfe - 2000 - In K.K. De Valois (ed.), Seeing. Academic Press. pp. 335-386.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • What we see: Inattention and the capture of attention by meaning.Arien Mack, Zissis Pappas, Michael E. Silverman & Robin Gay - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):488-506.
    Attention is necessary for the conscious perception of any object. Objects not attended to are not seen. What is it that captures attention when we are engaged in some attention-absorbing task? Earlier research has shown that there are only a very few stimuli which have this power and therefore are reliably detected under these conditions . The two most reliable are the observer’s own name and a happy face icon which seem to capture attention by virtue of their meaning. Three (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Attention, Consciousness, and Data Display.Ronald A. Rensink - 2006 - In 2006 Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, Statistical Graphics Section.
    Recent advances in our understanding of visual perception have shown it to be a far more complex and counterintuitive process than previously believed. Several important consequences follow from this. First, the design of an effective statistical graphics system is unlikely to succeed based on intuition alone; instead, it must rely on a more sophisticated, systematic approach. The basic elements of such an approach are outlined here, along with several design principles. An overview is then given of recent advances in our (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Visual search for change: A probe into the nature of attentional processing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7:345-376.
    A set of visual search experiments tested the proposal that focused attention is needed to detect change. Displays were arrays of rectangles, with the target being the item that continually changed its orientation or contrast polarity. Five aspects of performance were examined: linearity of response, processing time, capacity, selectivity, and memory trace. Detection of change was found to be a self-terminating process requiring a time that increased linearly with the number of items in the display. Capacity for orientation was found (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or Is Experience Limited to What’s in Attention?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.
    According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • (1 other version)Visual attention.Marvin Chun & Jeremy Wolfe - 2001 - In E. Bruce Goldstein (ed.), Blackwell Handbook of Perception. Blackwell. pp. 2--335.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Competition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes.Vincent Di Lollo, James T. Enns & Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Journal Of Experimental Psychology-General 129 (4):481-507.
    Advances in neuroscience implicate reentrant signaling as the predominant form of communication between brain areas. This principle was used in a series of masking experiments that defy explanation by feed-forward theories. The masking occurs when a brief display of target plus mask is continued with the mask alone. Two masking processes were found: an early process affected by physical factors such as adapting luminance and a later process affected by attentional factors such as set size. This later process is called (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • Change blindness, representations, and consciousness: Reply to Noe.Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):219.
    Our recent opinion article [1] examined what change blindness can and cannot tell us about visual representations. Among other things, we argued that change blindness can tell us a lot about how visual representations can be used, but little about their extent. We and others found the ‘sparse representations’ view appealing (and still do), and initially made the overly strong claim that change blindness supports the conclusion of sparse representations [2,3]. We wrote our article because change blindness continues to be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The siren song of implicit change detection.Stephen R. Mitroff, Daniel J. Simons & Steven Franconeri - 2002 - Journal Of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception And Performance 28 (4):798-815.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Change blindness blindness: Beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in change detection.Melissa R. Beck, Daniel T. Levin & Bonnie Angelone - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):31-51.
    Observers have difficulty detecting visual changes. However, they are unaware of this inability, suggesting that people do not have an accurate understanding of visual processes. We explored whether this error is related to participants’ beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in detecting changes. In Experiment 1 participants had a higher failure rate for detecting changes in an incidental change detection task than an intentional change detection task. This effect of intention was greatest for complex scenes. However, participants (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Picture changes during blinks: Looking without seeing and seeing without looking.J. Kevin O'Regan, H. Deubel, James J. Clark & Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7:191-211.
    Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized. -/- The results obtained were very similar to those obtained in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Change blindness: Implications for the nature of visual attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press. pp. 16-20.
    In the not-too-distant past, vision was often said to involve three levels of processing: a low level concerned with descriptions of the geometric and photometric properties of the image, a high level concerned with abstract knowledge of the physical and semantic properties of the world, and a middle level concerned with anything not handled by the other two. The negative definition of mid-level vision contained in this description reflected a rather large gap in our understanding of visual processing: How could (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • On the failure to detect changes in scenes across brief interruptions.Ronald A. Rensink, Kevin J. O'Regan & James J. Clark - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7 (1/2/3):127-145.
    When brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: the changes become extremely difficult to notice, even when they are large, presented repeatedly, and the observer expects them to occur (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). To determine the mechanisms behind this induced "change blindness", four experiments examine its dependence on initial preview and on the nature of the interruptions used. Results support the proposal that representations at (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Seeing, sensing, and scrutinizing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Vision Research 40:1469-1487.
    Large changes in a scene often become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, image flicker, movie cut, or other such disturbance. It is argued here that this _change blindness_ can serve as a useful tool to explore various aspects of vision. This argument centers around the proposal that focused attention is needed for the explicit perception of change. Given this, the study of change perception can provide a useful way to determine the nature of visual attention, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • The dynamic representation of scenes.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - Visual Cognition 7 (1/2/3):17-42.
    One of the more powerful impressions created by vision is that of a coherent, richly-detailed world where everything is present simultaneously. Indeed, this impression is so compelling that we tend to ascribe these properties not only to the external world, but to our internal representations as well. But results from several recent experiments argue against this latter ascription. For example, changes in images of real-world scenes often go unnoticed when made during a saccade, flicker, blink, or movie cut. This "change (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  • Change blindness.Daniel J. Simons & Daniel T. Levin - 1997 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):241-82.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   159 citations  
  • Mental imagery: In search of a theory.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):157-182.
    It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   116 citations  
  • Mental imagery.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mental imagery (varieties of which are sometimes colloquially refered to as “visualizing,” “seeing in the mind's eye,” “hearing in the head,” “imagining the feel of,” etc.) is quasi-perceptual experience; it resembles perceptual experience, but occurs in the absence of the appropriate external stimuli. It is also generally understood to bear intentionality (i.e., mental images are always images of something or other), and thereby to function as a form of mental representation. Traditionally, visual mental imagery, the most discussed variety, was thought (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations