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  1. Deservingness Transfers.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (2):209-218.
    This article seeks to cause trouble for a brand of consequentialism known as ‘desertarianism’. In somewhat different ways, views of this kind evaluate outcomes more favourably, other things equal, the better the fit between the welfare different people enjoy and the welfare they each deserve. These views imply that we can improve outcomes by redistributing welfare to fit desert, which seems plausible enough. Unfortunately, they also imply that we can improve outcomes by redistributing desert to fit welfare: in other words, (...)
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  • What Makes Discrimination Wrong?Paul de Font-Reaulx - 2017 - Journal of Practical Ethics 5 (2):105-113.
    Most of us intuitively take discrimination based on gender or ethnicity to be impermissible because we have a right to be treated on the basis of merit and capacity rather than e.g. ethnicity or gender. I call this suggestion the Impermissibility Account. I argue that, despite how the Impermissibility Account seems intuitive to most of us with a humanist outlook, it is indefensible. I show that well-informed discrimination can sometimes be permissible, and even morally required, meaning we cannot have a (...)
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  • Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition.Michael Cholbi & Alex Madva - 2018 - Ethics 128 (3):517-544.
    The Black Lives Matter movement has called for the abolition of capital punishment in response to what it calls “the war against Black people” and “Black communities.” This article defends the two central contentions in the movement’s abolitionist stance: first, that US capital punishment practices represent a wrong to black communities rather than simply a wrong to particular black capital defendants or particular black victims of murder, and second, that the most defensible remedy for this wrong is the abolition of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality.Michael Walzer - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):413-415.
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  • A Theory of Justice: Original Edition.John Rawls - 2005 - Belknap Press.
    Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.
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  • Race, Capital Punishment, and the Cost of Murder.M. Cholbi - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (2):255-282.
    Numerous studies indicate that racial minorities are both more likely to be executed for murder and that those who murder them are less likely to be executed than if they murder whites. Death penalty opponents have long attempted to use these studies to argue for a moratorium on capital punishment. Whatever the merits of such arguments, they overlook the fact that such discrimination alters the costs of murder; racial discrimination imposes higher costs on minorities for murdering through tougher sentences, and (...)
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  • Retributivism: The Right and the Good. [REVIEW]Adil Ahmad Haque - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (1):59-82.
    Victor Tadros claims that punishment must be justified either instrumentally or on the grounds that deserved punishment is intrinisically good. However, if we have deontic reasons to punish wrongdoers then these reasons could justify punishment non-instrumentally. Morever, even if the punishment of wrongdoers is intrinsically good this fact cannot contribute to the justication of punishment because goodness is not a reason-giving property. It follows that retributivism is both true and important only if we have deontic reasons to punish. Tadros also (...)
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  • Two Claims About Desert.Nathan Hanna - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):41-56.
    Many philosophers claim that it is always intrinsically good when people get what they deserve and that there is always at least some reason to give people what they deserve. I highlight problems with this view and defend an alternative. I have two aims. First, I want to expose a gap in certain desert-based justifications of punishment. Second, I want to show that those of us who have intuitions at odds with these justifications have an alternative account of desert at (...)
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  • Desert, Justice and Capital Punishment.Patrick Lenta & Douglas Farland - 2008 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (3):273-290.
    Our purpose in this paper is to consider a procedural objection to the death penalty. According to this objection, even if the death penalty is deemed, substantively speaking, a morally acceptable punishment for at least some murderers, since only a small proportion of those guilty of aggravated murder are sentenced to death and executed, while the majority of murderers escape capital punishment as a result of arbitrariness and discrimination, capital punishment should be abolished. Our targets in this paper are two (...)
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  • Groups and justice.George Sher - 1977 - Ethics 87 (2):174-181.
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  • Ross on desert and punishment.Jeffrey Moriarty - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):231–244.
    W. D. Ross thinks it is good, other things equal, that people get what they deserve. But he denies that "the principle of punishing the vicious, for the sake of doing so, is that on which the state should proceed in its bestowal of punishments." Ross offers two main arguments for this denial: what I call the "scope argument" and the "state's purpose argument." I argue that both fail. In doing so, I illuminate Ross's distinctive views about desert and the (...)
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  • Why punish the deserving?Douglas N. Husak - 1992 - Noûs 26 (4):447-464.
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  • Groups and the equal protection clause.Owen M. Fiss - 1976 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (2):107-177.
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  • What is the point of equality.Elizabeth Anderson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
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  • (1 other version)Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
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  • (1 other version)Social Justice.David Miller - 1977 - Political Theory 5 (2):261-264.
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  • Critique of Practical Reason.T. D. Weldon, Immanuel Kant & Lewis White Beck - 1949 - Philosophical Review 58 (6):625.
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  • On the comparative element of justice.Owen McLeod - 2003 - In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and justice. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 123--123.
    Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers on the nature of desert and justice, their relations with each other and with other values.
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  • Merit, fit, and basic desert.Daniel Haas - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.
    Basic desert is central to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists over the four-case manipulation argument. I argue that there are two distinct ways of understanding the desert salient to moral responsibility; moral desert can be understood as a claim about fitting responses to an agent or as a claim about the merit of the agent. Failing to recognize this distinction has contributed to a stalemate between both sides. I suggest that recognizing these distinct approaches to moral desert will help (...)
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  • Is it better that ten guilty persons go free than that one innocent person be convicted?Vidar Halvorsen - 2004 - Criminal Justice Ethics 23 (2):3-13.
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  • Against the asymmetry of desert.Jeffrey Moriarty - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):518–536.
    Desert plays a central role in most contemporary theories of retributive justice, but little or no role in most contemporary theories of distributive justice. This asymmetric treatment of desert is prima facie strange. I consider several popular arguments against the use of desert in distributive justice, and argue that none of them can be used to justify the asymmetry.
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  • Is racial discrimination arbitrary?Peter Singer - 1978 - Philosophia 8 (2-3):185-203.
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  • Deserving jobs.David Miller - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):161-181.
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  • The common structure of virtue and desert.Thomas Hurka - 2001 - Ethics 112 (1):6-31.
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  • Do Offenders Deserve Proportionate Punishments?Göran Duus-Otterström - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (3):463-480.
    The aim of the paper is to investigate how retributivists should respond to the apparent tension between moral desert and proportionality in punishment. I argue that rather than attempting to show that the term ‘proportionate punishment’ refers to whatever penal treatment the offender morally deserves, retributivists should maintain two things: first, that a punishment is proportionate when it is commensurate to the seriousness of the crime; second, that offenders morally deserve proportionate punishments. This view requires adopting a local theory of (...)
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  • Appearance, Discrimination, and Reaction Qualifications.Andrew Mason - 2016 - Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (4):48-71.
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  • Desert and Wages.Owen McLeod - 1996 - Utilitas 8 (2):205-221.
    Women tend to earn less than their male colleagues. Furthermore, women tend to earn less than men who hold jobs that are nominally different but relevantly similar to their own. Advocates of ‘comparable worth’ protest these facts. Their protest sometimes takes this form: Those differences in pay between men and women are undeserved . The argument for this claim is simple. Some facts are relevant to the wage one deserves for performing a given job; some are not. In the vast (...)
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  • (1 other version)Adjusting utility for justice: A consequentialist reply to the objection from justice.Fred Feldman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):567-585.
    1. Introduction. In a famous passage near the beginning of A Theory of Justice, John Rawls discusses utilitarianism’s notorious difficulties with justice. According to classic forms of utilitarianism, a certain course of action is morally right if it produces the greatest sum of satisfactions. And, as Rawls points out, the perplexing implication is “…that it does not matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his (...)
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  • How to Deserve.David Schmidtz - 2002 - Political Theory 30 (6):774-799.
    People ought to get what they deserve. And what we deserve can depend on effort, performance, or on excelling in competition, even when excellence is partly a function of our natural gifts. Or so most people believe. Philosophers sometimes say otherwise. At least since Karl Marx complained about capitalist society extracting surplus value from workers, thereby failing to give workers what they deserve, classical liberal philosophers have worried that to treat justice as a matter of what people deserve is to (...)
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  • Egalitarianism.Arnesen Richard - 2002 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2002.
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  • Two cheers for meritocracy.David Miller - 1996 - Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (4):277–301.
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  • Microaggressions, Equality, and Social Practices.Emily McTernan - 2017 - Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (3):261-281.
    This article offers a definition of microaggressions that picks out a distinct injustice, and defines the injustice in question as structural. The article also argues that to be a relational egalitarian requires considering our social norms and social practices: the kinds of things that produce microaggressions and so structure socially unequal relations.
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  • (3 other versions)The Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle - 1951 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 143:477-478.
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  • What's so Bad about Discrimination?Shlomi Segall - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (1):82-100.
    The article argues that discrimination is bad as such when and because it undermines equality of opportunity. It shows, first, that other accounts, such as those concerning intent, efficiency, false representation, prejudice, respect and desert cannot account for the badness of discrimination as such. The inequality of opportunity account, in contrast, captures everything that is bad about discrimination. The article then addresses some counter-examples of practices that are discriminatory without arguably entailing inequality of opportunity, where the notable case is that (...)
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  • Equality and Desert.Louis Pojman - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (282):549 - 570.
    Justice is a constant and perpetual will to give every man his due. The principles of law are these: to live virtuously, not to harm others, to give his due to everyone. Jurisprudence is the knowledge of divine and human things, the science of the just and the unjust. Law is the art of goodness and justice. By virtue of this [lawyers] may be called priests, for we cherish justice and profess knowledge or goodness and equity, separating right from wrong (...)
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  • (1 other version)Adjusting Utility for Justice.Fred Feldman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):567-585.
    1. Introduction. In a famous passage near the beginning of A Theory of Justice, John Rawls discusses utilitarianism’s notorious difficulties with justice. According to classic forms of utilitarianism, a certain course of action is morally right if it produces the greatest sum of satisfactions. And, as Rawls points out, the perplexing implication is “…that it does not matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his (...)
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  • Desert and Responsibility.Geoffrey Cupit - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):83 - 99.
    It is often supposed that there is a relationship between desert and responsibility: that to be deserving we must be responsible for that which makes us deserving. Indeed, there seems little doubt that a supposed relationship between desert and responsibility, combined with a growing tendency to view less and less as the responsibility of the individual, contributed to the reluctance to appeal to desert which has been a feature of much recent moral and political philosophy. Certainly, if to be deserving (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Ultimate Origin of Things (1697).Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - unknown
    Beyond the world, i.e. beyond the collection of finite things, there is some one being who rules, not only as the soul is the ruler in me (or, to put it better, as the self is the ruler in my body), but also in a much higher way. For the one being who rules the universe doesn’t just •govern the world but also •builds or makes it. He is above the world and outside it, so to speak, and therefore he (...)
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  • (1 other version)Desert: Reconsideration of some received wisdom.Fred Feldman - 1995 - Mind 104 (413):63-77.
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  • Deserved Punishment, Deserved Harm, Deserved Blame.Laurence Stern - 1970 - Philosophy 45 (174):317 - 329.
    M y aim in this paper will be to show that the concept of desert remains an important and useful concept even if one supposes that the justification of praise, blame, punishment, and reward lies solely in their influence on behaviour. The argument will be incomplete, however. I will discuss only deserved legal punishment, the broader notion of deserved harm, and, briefly, deserved blame.
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  • Giving Desert its Due: Social Justice and Legal Theory.Wojciech Sadurski - 1985 - D. Reidel Publishing Company.
    During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the domain of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scholars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from (...)
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  • Giving Wrongdoers What They Deserve.Steven Sverdlik - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):385-399.
    Retributivist approaches to the philosophy of punishment are usually based on certain claims related to moral desert. I focus on one such principle:Censuring Principle : There is a moral reason to censure guilty wrongdoers aversively.Principles like CP are often supported by the construction of examples similar to Kant’s ‘desert island’. These are meant to show that there is a reason for state officials to punish deserving wrongdoers, even if none of the familiar goals of punishment, such as deterrence, will be (...)
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  • Moving Mountains: Variations on a Theme by Shelly Kagan.Victor Tadros - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (2):393-405.
    My response to Shelly Kagan’s book, The Geometry of Desert, is to raise both general and more specific issues. I criticise Kagan’s way of setting up his project. I will suggest many factors other than desert better explain Kagan’s cases. I then examine more particular aspects of the project. I investigate Kagan’s discussion of what he calls the V-shaped skyline. According to Kagan, the V-shaped skyline represents the idea that it is more important that the very vicious and the very (...)
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