Switch to: Citations

References in:

Alethic Pluralism and Logical Paradoxes

In Fabio Bacchini, Stefano Caputo & Massimo Dell'Utri (eds.), New Frontiers in Truth. Cambridge Scholar. pp. 132-142 (2014)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Truth as a Substantive Property.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.
    One of the many ways that ‘deflationary’ and ‘inflationary’ theories of truth are said to differ is in their attitude towards truth qua property. This difference used to be very easy to delineate, with deflationists denying, and inflationists asserting, that truth is a property, but more recently the debate has become a lot more complicated, owing primarily to the fact that many contemporary deflationists often do allow for truth to be considered a property. Anxious to avoid inflation, however, these deflationists (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • (1 other version)Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
    Michael Dummett; VIII.—Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 141–162, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/59.1.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   287 citations  
  • (1 other version)Verifiability.F. Waismann - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (1):117--44.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  • Against Content Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):31-70.
    As meaning's claim to normativity has grown increasingly suspect the normativity thesis has shifted to mental content. In this paper, we distinguish two versions of content normativism: 'CE normativism', according to which it is essential to content that certain 'oughts' can be derived from it, and 'CD normativism', according to which content is determined by norms in the first place. We argue that neither type of normativism withstands scrutiny. CE normativism appeals to the fact that there is an essential connection (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   172 citations  
  • Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   893 citations  
  • Does thought imply ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.
    N.B. Dr Bykvist is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford. The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   125 citations  
  • Emotions and formal objects.Fabrice Teroni - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
    It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   149 citations  
  • (1 other version)New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1582 citations  
  • The normativity of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.
    It is very common these days to come across the claim that the notions of mental content and linguistic meaning are normative notions. In the work of many philosophers, it plays a pivotal role. Saul Kripke made it the centerpiece of his influential discussion of Wittgenstein’s treatment of rulefollowing and private language; he used it to argue that the notions of meaning and content cannot be understood in naturalistic terms. Kripke’s formulations tend to be in terms of the notion of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   183 citations  
  • Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   205 citations  
  • Pluralism and Paradox.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2012 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 339.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
    A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   112 citations  
  • Against Truth.Jamin Asay - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.
    I argue that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. Although many take this thesis to be central to deflationism about truth, it is sometimes left unclear what a metaphysically substantive property of truth is supposed to be. I offer a precise account by relying on the distinction between the property and concept of truth. Metaphysical substantivism is the view that the property of truth is a sparse property, regardless of how one understands the nature of sparse properties. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.
    What is the normative role of knowledge? I argue that knowledge plays an important role as a norm of assertion and action, which is explained and unified by its more fundamental role as a norm of belief. Moreover, I propose a distinctive account of what this normative role consists in. I argue that knowledge is the aim of belief, which sets a normative standard of correctness and a corresponding normative standard of justification. According to my proposal, it is correct to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   135 citations  
  • Making sense of relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.
    The goal of this paper is to make sense of relativism about truth. There are two key ideas. (1) To be a relativist about truth is to allow that a sentence or proposition might be assessment-sensitive: that is, its truth value might vary with the context of assessment as well as the context of use. (2) Making sense of relativism is a matter of understanding what it would be to commit oneself to the truth of an assessment-sensitive sentence or proposition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   258 citations  
  • (1 other version)New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1026 citations  
  • The Deflationary Conception of Truth.Hartry Field - 1986 - In Graham Macdonald & Crispin Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality: Essays on A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. Blackwell. pp. 55-117.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   104 citations  
  • Ought to Believe.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.
    My primary purpose in this paper is to sketch a theory of doxastic oughts that achieves a satisfying middle ground between the extremes of rejecting epistemic deontology because one thinks beliefs are not within our direct voluntary control and rejecting doxastic involuntarism because one thinks that some doxastic oughts must be true. The key will be appreciating the obvious fact that not all true oughts require direct voluntary control. I will construct my account as an attempt to surpass other accounts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  • Proof and Truth.Stewart Shapiro - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):493-521.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • The love of truth.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.
    It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense—that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation—it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Thoughts and norms.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):83-98.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • For the Love of Truth?Ernest Sosa - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49-62.
    Rational beings pursue and value truth . Intellectual conduct is to be judged, accordingly, by how well it aids our pursuit of that ideal. I ask whether these platitudes mean, and whether they are true.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations