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Ordinary Truth in Tarski and Næss.Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - In Adrian Kuźniar & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (eds.), Uncovering Facts and Values: Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy. Boston: Brill | Rodopi. pp. 67-90.details
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Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.details
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Against Arguments from Reference.Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):332 - 356.details
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Unifying the Philosophy of Truth.Theodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José Martínez Fernández & Kentaro Fujimoto (eds.) - 2015 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - 2020 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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The many (yet few) faces of deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.details
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What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?Patricia Marino - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):415-457.details
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Theories, theoretical models, truth.Ryszard Wójcicki - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (4):471-516.details
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Theories, theoretical models, truth.Ryszard Wójcicki - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (4):471-516.details
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Theories, theoretical models, truth.Ryszard Wójcicki - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (4):337-406.details
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Truth and Justification: A Difference that Makes a Difference.Giorgio Volpe - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):217-232.details
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Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.details
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Deflationism and the Invisible Power of Truth.Andrea Strollo - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):521-543.details
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Conceptual Role Semantics and the Reference of Moral Concepts.Neil Sinclair - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):95-121.details
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Deflationary truth and the liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.details
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Modest scepticism about rule-following.Tomoji Shogenji - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):486-500.details
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Substantivism about truth.Gila Sher - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):818-828.details
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Lessons on Truth from Kant.Gila Sher - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (3):171-201.details
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The guru, the logician, and the deflationist: Truth and logical consequence.Stewart Shapiro - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):113–132.details
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Can Truth‐Conditional Theorists of Content Do Without ‘That’‐Clause Ascriptions?Lionel Shapiro - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (1):1-27.details
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Quine and the Problem of Truth.Joshua Schwartz - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (10).details
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Explanation in Psychology: Truth and Teleology.David Papineau - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:21-43.details
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Explanation in Psychology: Truth and Teleology.David Papineau - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:21-43.details
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Minimalism and truth.John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Graham Oppy - 1997 - Noûs 31 (2):170-196.details
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Benacerraf, Field, and the agreement of mathematicians.Eileen S. Nutting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2095-2110.details
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Sense and the identity conception of truth.Steven J. Methven - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1041-1056.details
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Thought, thoughts, and deflationism.Vann McGee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3153-3168.details
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Truth by default.Vann Mcgee - 2001 - Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1):5-20.details
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This is not an instance of (E).Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1035–1063.details
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Expressivism, deflationism and correspondence.Patricia Marino - 2005 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (2):171-191.details
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Not Half True.Poppy Mankowitz - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):84-112.details
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Arguments from reference and the worry about dependence.Ron Mallon - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 160-183.details
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Truth, correspondence, and success.Stephen Leeds - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (1):1 - 36.details
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Kitcher’s Explanatory Demand and the Appropriate-Means Requirement on Successful Action.Byeong D. Lee - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):1-11.details
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Knowledge without Truth.Joseph Thomas Tolliver - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):29-51.details
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“True” as Ambiguous.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.details
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Minimalism and truth aptness.Michael Smith, Frank Jackson & Graham Oppy - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):287 - 302.details
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The presidential address: Truth: The identity theory.Jennifer Hornsby - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):1–24.details
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Is truth a normative concept?Paul Horwich - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1127-1138.details
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Functionalism about Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Michael Horton & Ted Poston - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):13-27.details
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Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.details
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Truth and disquotation.Richard G. Heck - 2005 - Synthese 142 (3):317--352.details
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Truth and reduction.Volker Halbach - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (1-2):97-126.details
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How Innocent Is Deflationism?Volker Halbach - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):167-194.details
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Disquotational truth and analyticity.Volker Halbach - 2001 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (4):1959-1973.details
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What is Tarski's Theory of Truth?Sher Gila - 1999 - Topoi 18 (2):149-166.details
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Two conceptions of truth? – Comment.V. Mc Gee - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (1):71 - 104.details
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Radical embodied cognitive science and problems of intentionality.Eric Gordon Epstein - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):229-266.details
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Simplifying alethic pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.details
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