Notwithstanding its obvious educational importance, the idea of an ethics of belief has been little explored by educational philosophers. The notion turns out to be more complex and to involve more difficulties than is usually supposed. Exploring these complexities and difficulties opens up many avenues of philosophical and educational inquiry. These in turn can enrich our reflections on contemporary educational developments and on ethical aspects of teaching. In particular they alert us to the need for educational theorists to give overdue (...) attention to the intellectual virtues. (shrink)

As a philosophy professor, one of my central goals is to teach students to think critically. However, one difficulty with determining whether critical thinking can be taught, or even measured, is that there is widespread disagreement over what critical thinking actually is. Here, I reflect on several conceptions of critical thinking, subjecting them to critical scrutiny. I also distinguish critical thinking from other forms of mental processes with which it is often conflated. Next, I present my own conception of critical (...) thinking, wherein it fundamentally consists in acquiring, developing, and exercising the ability to grasp inferential connections holding between statements. Finally, given this account of critical thinking, and given recent studies in cognitive science, I suggest the most effective means for teaching students to think critically. (shrink)

How can we cultivate intellectual virtues in our students? I provide an overview of virtue epistemology, explaining two types of intellectual virtues: reliabilist virtues and responsibilist virtues. I suggest that both types are acquired via some combination of practice on the part of the student and explanation on the part of the instructor. I describe strategies for teaching these two types of virtues in the classroom, including an activity for teaching the skill of using the square of opposition, and several (...) activities that encourage students to practice open-minded acts, intellectually courageous acts, and the motivation for truth. (shrink)

Assuming that critical thinking dispositions are at least as important as critical thinking abilities, Ennis examines the concept of critical thinking disposition and suggests some criteria for judging sets of them. He considers a leading approach to their analysis and offers as an alternative a simpler set, including the disposition to seek alternatives and be open to them. After examining some gender-bias and subject-specificity challenges to promoting critical thinking dispositions, he notes some difficulties involved in assessing critical thinking dispositions, and (...) suggests an exploratory attempt to assess them. (shrink)

This book is the first systematic treatment of 'responsibilist' or character-based virtue epistemology, an approach to epistemology that focuses on intellectual ...

After a brief overview of what intellectual virtues are, I offer three arguments for the claim that education should aim at fostering ‘intellectual character virtues’ like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual honesty. I then go on to discuss several pedagogical and related strategies for achieving this aim.

Notwithstanding its obvious educational importance, the idea of an ethics of belief has been little explored by educational philosophers. The notion turns out to be more complex and to involve more difficulties than is usually supposed. Exploring these complexities and difficulties opens up many avenues of philosophical and educational inquiry. These in turn can enrich our reflections on contemporary educational developments and on ethical aspects of teaching. In particular they alert us to the need for educational theorists to give overdue (...) attention to the intellectual virtues. (shrink)

Student participation is essential to philosophy since dialogue is at the center of philosophical activity: it provides students an opportunity to articulate their philosophical ideas, it helps them connect philosophy to their practical experience, it serves as an opportunity for instructors to take an interest in their students’ views, and it promotes intellectual virtues like courage and honesty. However, lectures can serve many of the same functions, albeit in different ways, e.g. a lecturer can engage other historical philosophers so as (...) to illustrate various dialogues in the history of philosophy. This paper argues that both student participation via dialogue and traditional lecturing play important roles in university education and attempts to offer guidance on how to strike a balance between lecture-driven and student-driven instruction. (shrink)