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  1. Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • Axiological Actualism.Josh Parsons - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):137 – 147.
    This intuition may be contrasted with the incompatible intuitions that might support, say, average utilitarianism. According to average utilitarianism we should bring about that outcome which has the highest average utility. That someone would have a higher than average level of utility is, therefore, ceteris paribus a reason to act so that that person exists. Because of this, the basic intuition is a reason for rejecting average utilitarianism.
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  • Counting the Cost of Global Warming: A Report to the Economic and Social Research Council on Research by John Broome and David Ulph.John Broome - 1992 - Strond: White Horse Press.
    Since the last ice age, when ice enveloped most of the northern continents, the earth has warmed by about five degrees. Within a century, it is likely to warm by another four or five. This revolution in our climate will have immense and mostly harmful effects on the lives of people not yet born. We are inflicting this harm on our descendants by dumping greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. We can mitigate the harm a little by taking measures to control (...)
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  • Adjusting Utility for Justice: A Consequentialist Reply to the Objection From Justice.Fred Feldman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):567-585.
    1. Introduction. In a famous passage near the beginning of A Theory of Justice, John Rawls discusses utilitarianism’s notorious difficulties with justice. According to classic forms of utilitarianism, a certain course of action is morally right if it produces the greatest sum of satisfactions. And, as Rawls points out, the perplexing implication is “…that it does not matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his (...)
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  • Adjusting Utility for Justice: A Consequentialist Reply to the Objection From Justice.Fred Feldman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):567-585.
    1. Introduction. In a famous passage near the beginning of A Theory of Justice, John Rawls discusses utilitarianism’s notorious difficulties with justice. According to classic forms of utilitarianism, a certain course of action is morally right if it produces the greatest sum of satisfactions. And, as Rawls points out, the perplexing implication is “…that it does not matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his (...)
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  • Child Versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law.Roberts Melinda - 1998 - Rowman & Littlefield.
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds. Lewis argues that the philosophical utility of modal realism is a good reason for believing that it is true.
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  • Don't Stop Thinking About Tomorrow: Two Paradoxes About Duties to Future Generations.David Boonin-Vail - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (4):267-307.
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  • Is the Person-Affecting Intuition Paradoxical?Melinda A. Roberts - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (1):1-44.
    This article critically examines some of the inconsistency objections that have been put forward by John Broome, Larry Temkin and others against the so-called "person-affecting," or "person-based," restriction in normative ethics, including "extra people" problems and a version of the nonidentity problem from Kavka and Parfit. Certain Pareto principles and a version of the "mere addition paradox" are discussed along the way. The inconsistencies at issue can be avoided, it is argued, by situating the person-affecting intuition within a non-additive form (...)
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
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  • Obligations to Future Generations.Richard I. Sikora & Brian M. Barry (eds.) - 1978 - White Horse Press.
    This reprint of a collection of essays on problems concerning future generations examines questions such as whether intrinsic value should be placed on the preservation of mankind, what are our obligations to posterity, and whether potential people have moral rights.
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  • Ethics Out of Economics.John Broome - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    Many economic problems are also ethical problems: should we value economic equality? how much should we care about preserving the environment? how should medical resources be divided between saving life and enhancing life? This book examines some of the practical issues that lie between economics and ethics, and shows how utility theory can contribute to ethics. John Broome's work has, unusually, combined sophisticated economic and philosophical expertise, and Ethics Out of Economics brings together some of his most important essays, augmented (...)
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  • Normative Population Theory: A Comment.Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson - 1991 - Social Choice and Welfare 8 (3):261--267.
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  • What Should We Do About Future Generations?Yew-Kwang Ng - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (2):235.
    Parfit's requirements for an ideal Theory X cannot be fully met since the Mere Addition Principle and Non-Antiegalitarianism imply the Repugnant Conclusion: Theory X does not exist. However, since the Repugnant Conclusion is really compelling, the Impersonal Total Principle should be adopted for impartial comparisons concerning future generations. Nevertheless, where our own interests are affected, we may yet choose to be partial, trading off our concern for future goodness with our self-interests. Theory X' meets all Parfit's requirements except the Mere (...)
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  • Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion.Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (3):339.
    Derek Parfit has famously pointed out that ‘total’ utilitarian views, such as classical hedonistic utilitarianism, lead to the conclusion that, to each population of quite happy persons there corresponds a more extensive population with people living lives just worth living, which is better. In particular, for any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, (...)
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  • An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):247-266.
    A search is under way for a theory that can accommodate our intuitions in population axiology. The object of this search has proved elusive. This is not surprising since, as we shall see, any welfarist axiology that satisfies three reasonable conditions implies at least one of three counter-intuitive conclusions. I shall start by pointing out the failures in three recent attempts to construct an acceptable population axiology. I shall then present an impossibility theorem and conclude with a short discussion of (...)
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  • In Defence of Repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.
    I defend the 'Repugnant' Conclusion that for any possible population of happy people, a population containing a sufficient number of people with lives barely worth living would be better. Four lines of argument converge on this conclusion, and the conclusion has a simple, natural theoretical explanation. The opposition to the Repugnant Conclusion rests on a bare appeal to intuition. This intuition is open to charges of being influenced by multiple distorting factors. Several theories of population ethics have been devised to (...)
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  • Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than.Stuart Rachels - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. pp. 249--263.
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  • The Repugnant Conclusion.Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg & Torbjörn Tännsjö - 2017 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
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  • Child Versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law.Melinda A. Roberts - 1998 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Child Versus Childmaker investigates a "person-affecting" approach to ethical choice. A form of consequentialism, this approach is intended to capture the idea that agents ought both do the most good that they can and respect each person as distinct from each other. Focusing on cases in which a conflict of interest arises between "childmakers"—parents, infertility specialists, embryologists, and others engaged in the task of bringing new people into existence—and the children they aim to create, the author considers what we today (...)
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  • The Repugnant Conclusion.Jesper Ryberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In Derek Parfit's original formulation the Repugnant Conclusion is characterized as follows: “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 1984). The Repugnant Conclusion highlights a problem in an area of ethics which has become known as population ethics . The (...)
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  • Ethics Out of Economics.Richard Bradley - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):837-841.
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  • Child Versus Childmaker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law.Axel Gosseries - 2001 - Ethics and the Environment 6 (2):114-118.
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  • Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
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  • Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than.Stuart Rachels - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):71 – 83.
    Ethicists and economists commonly assume that if A is all things considered better than B, and B is all things considered better than C, then A is all things considered better than C. Call this principle Transitivity. Although it has great conceptual, intuitive, and empirical appeal, I argue against it. Larry S. Temkin explains how three types of ethical principle, which cannot be dismissed a priori, threaten Transitivity: (a) principles implying that in some cases different factors are relevant to comparing (...)
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  • Can It Ever Be Better Never to Have Existed at All? Person-Based Consequentialism and a New Repugnant Conclusion.Melinda A. Roberts - 2003 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (2):159–185.
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  • Voices From Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?Caspar Hare - 2007 - Ethics 117 (3):498-523.
    This is about the rights and wrongs of bringing people into existence. In a nutshell: sometimes what matters is not what would have happened to you, but what would have happened to the person who would have been in your position, even if that person never actually exists.
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  • The Paradoxes of Future Generations and Normative Theory.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2004 - In Torbjörn Tännsjö & Jesper Ryberg (eds.), The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 201-218.
    As the title of this paper indicates, I’m going to discuss what we ought to do in situations where our actions affect future generations. More specifically, I shall focus on the moral problems raised by cases where our actions affect who’s going to live, their number and their well being. I’ll start, however, with population axiology. Most discussion in population ethics has concentrated on how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the (...)
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  • Genetic Selection and Modal Harms.Anthony Wrigley - 2006 - The Monist 89 (4):505-525.
    Parfit’s (1984) Non-Identity Problem provides a strong line of argument that we cannot be harmed by pre-conception choices or actions. I argue that we can no longer appeal to the Non-Identity problem in order to justify using pre-conception genetic screening and selection techniques as a harmless tool to determine the genetic constitution of future individuals. My criticism of the Non-Identity problem is based on a rejection of the metaphysical foundations of Parfit’s argument - Kripke’s (1980) essentialist arguments for the necessity (...)
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  • Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox.Larry S. Temkin - 1987 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (2):138-187.
    In "Futurc Generations: Further Problems,"‘ and Part Four of Reasons and Persons} Derek Pariit raises many perplexing questions. Although some think his ingenious arguments little more than delightful puzzles, I believe they challenge some of our deepest beliefs. In this article, I examine some of Pariit’s arguments, focusing mainly on "The Mere Addition Paradox." If my analysis is correct, Parfit’s arguments have extremely interesting and important implications that not even Pariit rcalized. In Part I, I present ParHt’s argument for the (...)
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  • Utilitarianism and New Generations.Jan Narveson - 1967 - Mind 76 (301):62-72.
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  • Possible People.R. M. Hare - 1988 - Bioethics 2 (4):279–293.
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  • The Person-Affecting Restriction, Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2003 - Ethical Perspectives 10 (3):185-195.
    Traditional ethical theories have paradoxical implications in regards to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future people. It has been suggested that the crux of the problem resides in an all too ‘impersonal’ axiology and that the problems of population axiology can be solved by adopting a ‘Person Affecting Restriction’ which in its slogan form states that an outcome can only be better than another if it is better for people. This move has been especially popular in the (...)
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  • Possible People.R. M. Hare - 1988 - Bioethics 2 (4):279-293.
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  • Counting the Cost of Global Warming.Dale Jamieson & John Broome - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):263.
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  • Counting the Cost of Global Warming.John Broome - 1992 - Environmental Values 1 (4):363-364.
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  • Genetic Selection and Modal Harms.Anthony Wrigley - 2006 - The Monist 89 (4):505-525.
    Parfit’s (1984) Non-Identity Problem provides a strong line of argument that we cannot be harmed by pre-conception choices or actions. I argue that we can no longer appeal to the Non-Identity problem in order to justify using pre-conception genetic screening and selection techniques as a harmless tool to determine the genetic constitution of future individuals. My criticism of the Non-Identity problem is based on a rejection of the metaphysical foundations of Parfit’s argument - Kripke’s (1980) essentialist arguments for the necessity (...)
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  • Is It Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations.Richard Sikora - 1978 - In Richard I. Sikora & Brian M. Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations. White Horse Press. pp. 112--166.
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  • Is the Repugnant Conclusion Repugnant?Jesper Ryberg - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (3):161-177.
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  • The Repugnant Conclusion.Jesper Ryberg, Torbjörn Tännsjö & Gustaf Arrhenius - 2006 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online; Last Accessed October 4:2006.
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