- The Neutrality of Life.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):685-703.details
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Utility, Progress, and Technology: Proceedings of the 15th Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies.Michael Schefczyk & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2021 - Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing.details
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What does incommensurability tell us about agency?Luke Elson - 2021 - In Henrik Andersson & Anders Herlitz (eds.), Value Incommensurability: Ethics, Risk. And Decision-Making. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 181-198.details
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A New Argument Against Critical-Level Utilitarianism.Patrick Williamson - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (4):399-416.details
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What calibrating variable-value population ethics suggests.Dean Spears & H. Orri Stefánsson - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-12.details
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What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?Stephane Zuber, Nikhil Venkatesh, Torbjörn Tännsjö, Christian Tarsney, H. Orri Stefánsson, Katie Steele, Dean Spears, Jeff Sebo, Marcus Pivato, Toby Ord, Yew-Kwang Ng, Michal Masny, William MacAskill, Nicholas Lawson, Kevin Kuruc, Michelle Hutchinson, Johan E. Gustafsson, Hilary Greaves, Lisa Forsberg, Marc Fleurbaey, Diane Coffey, Susumu Cato, Clinton Castro, Tim Campbell, Mark Budolfson, John Broome, Alexander Berger, Nick Beckstead & Geir B. Asheim - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (4):379-383.details
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Why Variable-Population Social Orderings Cannot Escape the Repugnant Conclusion: Proofs and Implications.Dean Spears & Mark Budolfson - 2019details
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Critical Levels, Critical Ranges, and Imprecise Exchange Rates in Population Axiology.Elliott Thornley - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (3):382–414.details
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Topics in Population Ethics.Teruji Thomas - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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Transfinitely Transitive Value.Kacper Kowalczyk - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):108-134.details
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Equality for Prospective People: A Novel Statement and Defence.Alex Voorhoeve - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (3):304-320.details
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(1 other version)Non-Additive Axiologies in Large Worlds.Christian J. Tarsney & Teruji Thomas - 2020details
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Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment.Iason Gabriel - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (3):411-437.details
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Why the Repugnant Conclusion is Inescapable.Mark Budolfson & Dean Spears - unknowndetails
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Repugnance and Perfection.Nikhil Venkatesh - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 48 (3):262-284.details
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(1 other version)Population Ethics and Different-Number-Based Imprecision.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):166-181.details
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Long-Term Trajectories of Human Civilization.Seth D. Baum, Stuart Armstrong, Timoteus Ekenstedt, Olle Häggström, Robin Hanson, Karin Kuhlemann, Matthijs M. Maas, James D. Miller, Markus Salmela, Anders Sandberg, Kaj Sotala, Phil Torres, Alexey Turchin & Roman V. Yampolskiy - 2019 - Foresight 21 (1):53-83.details
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On Parfit’s Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle.Michal Masny - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):114-139.details
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A fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction.Jacob M. Nebel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2779-2787.details
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Population Axiology and the Possibility of a Fourth Category of Absolute Value.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):81-110.details
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(1 other version)Climate Change and Optimum Population.Hilary Greaves - 2019 - The Monist 102 (1):42-65.details
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Existential risks: New Zealand needs a method to agree on a value framework and how to quantify future lives at risk.Matthew Boyd & Nick Wilson - 2018 - Policy Quarterly 14 (3):58-65.details
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Moral Uncertainty About Population Axiology.Hilary Greaves & Toby Ord - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (2):135-167.details
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Imprecise lexical superiority and the (slightly less) Repugnant Conclusion.James Fanciullo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2103-2117.details
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Some Possibilities in Population Axiology.Teruji Thomas - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):807-832.details
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An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Ethics 129 (2):309-343.details
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A Good Exit: What to Do about the End of Our Species?Toby Handfield - 2018 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 15 (3):272-297.details
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Incommensurability in Population Ethics.Jacob Nebel - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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(1 other version)Climate change and optimum population.Hilary Greaves - manuscriptdetails
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Moral uncertainty about population ethics.Hilary Greaves & Toby Ord - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.details
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Population axiology.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):e12442.details
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A New Argument for the Irrelevance of Equality for Intrinsic Value.Stephen Kershnar & Duncan Purves - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):277-297.details
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The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):336-372.details
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Rossian totalism about intrinsic value.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2069-2086.details
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(1 other version)Population Ethics and Different‐Number‐Based Imprecision.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):166-181.details
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Existential Risks: Exploring a Robust Risk Reduction Strategy.Karim Jebari - 2015 - Science and Engineering Ethics 21 (3):541-554.details
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Person-affecting views and saturating counterpart relations.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):257-287.details
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In defence of repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.details
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Harming as causing harm.Elizabeth Harman - 2009 - In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. Springer. pp. 137--154.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(3 other versions)The repugnant conclusion.Jesper Ryberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Economics and economic justice.Marc Fleurbaey - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Impossible Ethics: Do Population Ethical Impossibility Results Support Moral Skepticism and/or Anti‐Realism?Victor Moberger - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (3):370-391.details
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Group Prioritarianism: Why AI should not replace humanity.Frank Hong - 2024 - Philosophical Studies:1-19.details
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(1 other version)Non-Additive Axiologies in Large Worlds.Christian Tarsney & Teruji Thomas - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11.details
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Why prevent human extinction?James Fanciullo - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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The repugnant conclusion can be avoided with moral intuitions intact: A lesson in order.Steven Kerr - manuscriptdetails
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(1 other version)Maximal cluelessness.Andreas Mogensen - manuscriptdetails
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Intrapersonal Arguments for the Repugnant Conclusion.Tomi Francis - 2023 - Ethics 134 (1):89-107.details
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Papers in Population Ethics.Elliott Thornley - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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