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  1. Continuants and Occurrents.Peter Simons & Joseph Melia - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74:59-92.
    Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I argue that they are neither occurrents nor easily replaceable by them. The worst problem for continuants is the question in virtue of what a given continuant exists at a given time. For such truthmakers we must have recourse to occurrents, those vital to the continuant at that time. Continuants are, like abstract objects, invariants under equivalences over occurrents. But they are not abstract, and their being invariants enables us (...)
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
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  • Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change.David Simon Oderberg - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):686-708.
    Things change. If anything counts as a datum of metaphysics, that does. Change occurs in many ways: it can be accidental or substantial; essential or non-essential; intrinsic or extrinsic; subjective or objective. Changes can be physical, spatial, quantitative, qualitative, natural, artefactual, conceptual, linguistic. Events are arguably best defined as changes in an object or objects. All change is from something and into something, and hence is at least a two-term relation, involving a term from which and a term to which.
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  • The bundle theory and the substratum theory: deadly enemies or twin brothers?Jiri Benovsky - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):175-190.
    In this paper, I explore several versions of the bundle theory and the substratum theory and compare them, with the surprising result that it seems to be true that they are equivalent (in a sense of 'equivalent' to be specified). In order to see whether this is correct or not, I go through several steps : first, I examine different versions of the bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the substratum theory with tropes by going through various standard (...)
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  • The Category of Occurrent Continuants.Rowland Stout - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):41-62.
    Arguing first that the best way to understand what a continuant is is as something that primarily has its properties at a time rather than atemporally, the paper then defends the idea that there are occurrent continuants. These are things that were, are, or will be happening—like the ongoing process of someone reading or my writing this paper, for instance. A recently popular philosophical view of process is as something that is referred to with mass nouns and not count nouns. (...)
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds. Lewis argues that the philosophical utility of modal realism is a good reason for believing that it is true.
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  • I—What is a Continuant?Helen Steward - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):109-123.
    In this paper, I explore the question what a continuant is, in the context of a very interesting suggestion recently made by Rowland Stout, as part of his attempt to develop a coherent ontology of processes. Stout claims that a continuant is best thought of as something that primarily has its properties at times, rather than atemporally—and that on this construal, processes should count as continuants. While accepting that Stout is onto something here, I reject his suggestion that we should (...)
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  • Processes, Continuants, and Individuals.Helen Steward - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):fzt080.
    The paper considers and opposes the view that processes are best thought of as continuants, to be differentiated from events mainly by way of the fact that the latter, but not the former, are entities with temporal parts. The motivation for the investigation, though, is not so much the defeat of what is, in any case, a rather implausible claim, as the vindication of some of the ideas and intuitions that the claim is made in order to defend — and (...)
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  • Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Four- Dimensionalism defends the thesis that the material world is composed of temporal as well as spatial parts. This defense includes a novel account of persistence over time, new arguments in favour of the four-dimensional ontology, and responses to the challenges four- dimensionalism faces." "Theodore Sider pays particular attention to the philosophy of time, including a strong series of arguments against presentism, the thesis that only the present is real. Arguments offered in favour of four- dimensionalism include novel arguments based (...)
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  • Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics.Sally Haslanger - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):119-125.
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  • The argument from temporary intrinsics.Ryan Wasserman - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419.
    The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how persisting objects can have different intrinsic properties at different times. The relativizer responds to this problem by replacing ordinary intrinsic properties with relations to times. In this note, I identify and respond to three different objections to the relativizer's proposal, each of which can be traced to the work of David Lewis.
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  • A Case for Stage View Presentism.Jorgen Hansen - manuscript
    Until recently, perdurantism has been considered to be incompatible with the presentist ontology of time. However, discussions about presentist theories of perdurance are now surfacing, one of the most prominent arguments for which being Berit Brogaard’s essay: “Presentist Four-Dimensionalism”. In this paper, I examine Brogaard’s argument in contrast to Ted Sider’s arguments for (an Eternalist theory of) the “Stage View”. I then argue for another (and, I think, novel) view of presentist perdurantism, which avoids the problematic consequences that Brogaard’s view (...)
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  • The problems of intrinsic change: Rejoinder to Lewis.E. J. Lowe - 1988 - Analysis 48 (2):72-77.
    E. J. Lowe; The problems of intrinsic change: rejoinder to Lewis, Analysis, Volume 48, Issue 2, 1 March 1988, Pages 72–77, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/48.2.7.
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  • Parts of Classes.David K. Lewis - 1990 - Blackwell.
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  • Persistence through time.Sally Haslanger - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 315--354.
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  • Time, Tense, and Causation.Michael Tooley - 1997 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Michael Tooley presents a major new philosophical theory of the nature of time, offering a powerful alternative to the traditional "tensed" and recent "tenseless" accounts of time. He argues for a dynamic conception of the universe, in which past, present, and future are not merely subjective features of experience. He claims that the past and the present are real, while the future is not. Tooley's approach accounts for time in terms of causation. He therefore claims that the key to understanding (...)
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  • Presentist four-dimensionalism.Berit Brogaard - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):341-356.
    Four-dimensionalism is the thesis that everyday objects, such as you and me, are space-time worms that persist through time by having temporal parts none of which is identical to the object itself. Objects are aggregates or sums of such temporal parts. The main virtue of fourdimensionalism is that it solves—or does away with—the problem of identity through change.1 The main charge raised against it is that it is inconsistent with the thesis according to which there is change in the world.2 (...)
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  • Identity over time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Traditionally, this puzzle has been solved in various ways. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between “accidental” and “essential” changes. Accidental changes are ones that don't result in a change in an objects' identity after the change, such as when a house is painted, or one's hair turns gray, etc. Aristotle thought of these as changes in the accidental properties of a thing. Essential changes, by contrast, are those which don't preserve the identity of the object when it changes, such as when (...)
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  • Persistence, change, and explanation.Sally Haslanger - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):1 - 28.
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  • Endurance and indiscernibility.Trenton Merricks - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):165-184.
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  • Persons as Biological Processes: A Bio-Processual Way Out of the Personal Identity Dilemma.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2018 - In Daniel J. Nicholson & John Dupré (eds.), Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 357-378.
    Human persons exist longer than a single moment in time; they persist through time. However, so far it has not been possible to make this natural and widespread assumption metaphysically comprehensible. The philosophical debate on personal identity is rather stuck in a dilemma: reductionist theories explain personal identity away, while non-reductionist theories fail to give any informative account at all. This chapter argues that this dilemma emerges from an underlying commitment, shared by both sides of in the debate, to an (...)
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  • The Puzzle of Change.Mark Hinchliff - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:119-136.
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  • Parts of Classes.Michael Potter - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (172):362-366.
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  • Parts of Classes.David K. Lewis - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):394-397.
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  • (1 other version)Logic Matters.Rita Nolan - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (4):422-424.
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  • Is There a Problem About Persistence?Mark Johnston & Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 61 (1):107-156.
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  • The water falls but the waterfall does not fall: New perspectives on objects, processes and events.Antony Galton & Riichiro Mizoguchi - 2009 - Applied ontology 4 (2):71-107.
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  • (1 other version)Continuants and occurrents, I.Peter Simons - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):59–75.
    [Peter Simons] Commonsense ontology contains both continuants and occurrents, but are continuants necessary? I argue that they are neither occurrents nor easily replaceable by them. The worst problem for continuants is the question in virtue of what a given continuant exists at a given time. For such truthmakers we must have recourse to occurrents, those vital to the continuant at that time. Continuants are, like abstract objects, invariants under equivalences over occurrents. But they are not abstract, and their being invariants (...)
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.Allen Stairs - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):333-352.
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  • (1 other version)On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
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  • The loose and popular and the strict and philosophical senses of identity.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1969 - In Norman S. Care & Robert H. Grimm (eds.), Perception and personal identity. Cleveland,: Press of Case Western Reserve University. pp. 82--106.
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  • Four-Dimensional Objects.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Noûs 24 (2):245--255.
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  • Processes.Rowland Stout - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (279):19-27.
    A natural picture to have of events and processes is of entities which extend through time and which have temporal parts, just as physical objects extend through space and have spatial parts. While accepting this picture of events, in this paper I want to present an alternative conception of processes as entities which, like physical objects, do not extend in time and do not have temporal parts, but rather persist in time. Processes and events belong to metaphysically distinct categories. Moreover (...)
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  • Rearrangement of particles: Reply to Lowe.David Lewis - 1988 - Analysis 48 (2):65-72.
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  • The problem of change.Ryan Wasserman - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):48–57.
    Our world is a world of change. Children are born and grow into adults. Material possessions rust and decay with age and ultimately perish. Yet scepticism about change is as old as philosophy itself. Heraclitus, for example, argued that nothing could survive the replacement of parts, so that it is impossible to step into the same river twice. Zeno argued that motion is paradoxical, so that nothing can alter its location. Parmenides and his followers went even further, arguing that the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Acknowledgments.[author unknown] - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):746-746.
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  • Autopoiesis, biological autonomy and the process view of life.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-16.
    In recent years, an increasing number of theoretical biologists and philosophers of biology have been opposing reductionist research agendas by appealing to the concept of biological autonomy which draws on the older concept of autopoiesis. In my paper, I investigate some of the ontological implications of this approach. The emphasis on autonomy and autopoiesis, together with the associated idea of organisational closure, might evoke the impression that organisms are to be categorised ontologically as substances: ontologically independent, well-individuated, discrete particulars. However, (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Parts : a Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2:277-279.
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  • Truth, Love and Immortality: An Introduction to McTaggart's Philosophy.J. N. Findlay - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (121):361-365.
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  • .Peter van Inwagen - 1988
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  • Tensing the copula.David K. Lewis - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):1-14.
    A solution to the problem of intrinsic change for enduring things should meet three conditions. It should not replace monadic intrinsic properties by relations. It should not replace the having simpliciter of properties by standing in some relation to them. It should not rely on an unexplained notion of having an intrinsic property at a time. Johnston's solution satisfies the first condition at the expense of the second. Haslanger's solution satisfies the first and second at the expense of the third.
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  • Symposia papers: Four-dimensional objects.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Noûs 24 (2):245-255.
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  • (2 other versions)The Nature of Existence.John Mctaggart, Ellis Mctaggart & C. D. Broad - 1928 - Mind 37 (146):221-233.
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  • (2 other versions)Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):638-640.
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  • IPeter Simons.Peter Simons - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):59-75.
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  • Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.
    Precis of my book by this title, for a symposium.
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  • (2 other versions)Parts. A Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1989 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 179 (1):131-132.
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  • The Nature of Existence.R. F. Alfred Hoernle, John McTaggart & Ellis McTaggart - 1921 - Philosophical Review 32 (1):79.
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  • (1 other version)Bringing back intrinsics to enduring things.Andreas C. Bottani - 2016 - Synthese:1-22.
    According to David Lewis, the argument from temporary intrinsics is ‘the principal and decisive objection against endurance’. I focus on eternalist endurantism, discussing three different ways the eternalist endurantist can try to avoid treating temporary intrinsics as relational. Two of them, generally known as ‘adverbialism’ and ‘SOFism’, are familiar and controversial. I scrutinize them and argue that Lewis’ scepticism about them is well founded. Then, I sketch a further, to some extent new, version of eternalist endurantism, where the key idea (...)
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  • (1 other version)Bringing back intrinsics to enduring things.Andrea C. Bottani - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4813-4834.
    According to David Lewis, the argument from temporary intrinsics is ‘the principal and decisive objection against endurance’. I focus on eternalist endurantism, discussing three different ways the eternalist endurantist can try to avoid treating temporary intrinsics as relational. Two of them, generally known as ‘adverbialism’ and ‘SOFism’, are familiar and controversial. I scrutinize them and argue that Lewis’ scepticism about them is well founded. Then, I sketch a further, to some extent new, version of eternalist endurantism, where the key idea (...)
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