- Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Cross-world luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists as well.Mirja Pérez de Calleja - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):112-125.details
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Doing What One Wants Less: A Reappraisal of the Law of Desire.Randolph Clarke - 1994 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):1-11.details
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Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Effective intentions: the power of conscious will.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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Irrationality: an essay on akrasia, self-deception, and self-control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Self-control, motivational strength, and exposure therapy.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):359-375.details
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Springs of action: understanding intentional behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):97-112.details
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Moral responsibility and the continuation problem.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.details
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Libertarianism, luck, and control.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.details
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Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.details
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Synchronic self-control is always non-actional.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):123–131.details
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Synchronic Self-control is Always Non-actional.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):123-131.details
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Frog and Toad lose control.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.details
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Frog and toad lose control.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63–73.details
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A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.details
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Free will remains a mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.details
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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):543-545.details
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Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws: The Metaphysics of Frankfurt-style Cases.Alfred R. Mele & David Robb - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 107--126.details
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Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 251--264.details
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Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.Albert R. MELE - 1992details
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